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A Theory of Legislative Threats
ABSTRACT
The Article presents a theory of legislative threats that pierces the fundamental concept of the legal system as a
regulatory institution and more generally as a mechanism of social governance. It examines ten case studies that
demonstrate the use of legislative threats in diverse areas of law and social policy. Conceptually, legislative threats
encompass a variety of threats that legislators exert on firms and financial institutions, organizations and
institutional shareholders, professions and industrial sectors, universities and public institutions, federal agencies,
and possibly even U.S. states, according to which legislators will exercise their legislative mandate and enact
adverse legislation in order to regulate the conduct or condition in question, unless the recipients of the threat alter
their behavior so as to bring it in line with the legislators’ demands (Implicit in the threat is the inverse promise that
the legislators will forgo the threatened legislation if, and only if the recipients of the threat comply with the
demands). The Article also offers an analytic taxonomy of threats that includes explicit, implicit, and anticipatory
legislative threats.
Using non-cooperative game-theory, the Article models the strategic interaction between legislators and threatrecipients and generates predictions concerning the inducement effect of legislative threats on behavior. Specifically,
the analysis considers conditions that may render threats credible, including (i) legislators’ pre-game commitment;
(ii) legislators’ reputation; and (iii) legislators’ emotional motivations. The analysis also examines (i) the effects of
the probabilistic nature of legislative threats; (ii) the effects of imperfect and asymmetric information on the threat’s
inducement effects; (iii) the effects of legislative threats on the properties of regulatory bargaining in the shadow of
the threat (e.g., the magnitude of transaction costs, information revelation, and degree of contractual
incompleteness); and (iv) the effects of strategic interaction within homogenous and heterogeneous as well as
organized and unorganized groups on threat-induced compliance.
The Article considers the effects of legislative threats on (i) social control efficacy and (ii) democratic and
constitutional legitimacy. To that end, the analysis highlights functional and institutional considerations
pertaining, respectively, to the comparative capacity of legislative threats to effectively control behavior in an
increasingly-complex and information-intensive social reality; and to various political, constitutional, and
democratic implications arising from the use of legislative threats. Functional considerations include: (i) the
asymmetric information of social planners and its effects on social control; (ii) the superiority of threat-induced selfregulation of conduct compared with “top down” regulation of conduct; (iii) the capacity of threat-induced selfregulation to accommodate rapidly-changing demands of social control; and (iv) the effects of threat-induced selfregulation on reducing the costs of law enforcement. In this respect, the analysis advances the following claim:
legislative threats can be viewed as a spontaneous response to the institutionally-handicapped position of lawmakers
and to the limits of the law in effectively controlling social activities; to that end, legislative threats are designed to
reduce information and transaction costs of policy-making and regulatory bargaining. Institutional considerations
encompass ways in which the use of legislative threats enables legislators and regulators to evade procedural
safeguards, institutional constraints, and substantive controls designed to limit the power to make law and effect
policy changes. These considerations are based upon the following observations: (i) using legislative threats,
legislators opt-out of the “rules of the game,” disenfranchise fellow legislators, and are therefore able to effect policy
changes notwithstanding a possible lack of majoritarian support; (ii) legislative threats disenfranchise the executive
branch by preventing a possible presidential veto and by sidestepping the government’s role in law enforcement; (iii)
legislative threats disenfranchise the states by redrawing the federal-state allocation of regulatory powers; (iv)
legislative threats bypass constitutional safeguards by evading judicial review of statutes; and (v) legislative threats
disenfranchise the judiciary by circumventing precedent-setting interpretation of statutes.
The Article argues that notwithstanding the superior functional capacity of legislative threats to control
behavior in an increasingly-complex and information-intensive society, the institutionally-unregulated and
politically-unaccountable use of implicit and explicit threats poses formidable normative challenges for the most
treasured attributes of American constitutional democracy. On balance, it seems that even though the benefits of
legislative threats may exceed their short-term cost (thus becoming efficient in the short-term), in the long-term the
reverse is true, thus suggesting that the best domain of legislative threats consists, in fact, of an empty set. For, any
increase in individual well-being and aggregate social welfare—due to the improved efficacy of social control—is
inevitably outweighed by a higher commensurate decrease in well-being and social welfare, reflecting in turn the toll
of violating constitutional and democratic principles; the negative impact on societal stability and the disincentive
on private investment; and the consequential decline in economic growth. In turn, the discussion develops a social
control scheme that is rooted in the province of legislation and is designed to ensure the socially-optimal trade-off
between regulatory efficacy and the toll on democratic accountability, namely: an outcome-oriented or risk-focused,
deferred-implementation, contingent sunset legislation.
Lastly, the Article argues that the exponential increase in the complexity of activities and the rapid changes in
behavior across all social domains are two major sources of growth-driven social instability. Paradoxically, absent
effective social control, the processes that drive well-developed market economies towards economic growth and
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social progress, may ultimately propel their economic decline, increase social instability, and lead to their gradual
societal deterioration. Thus, the more advanced a society becomes the more demanding is the lawmakers’ role.
Viewed from this perspective, the emergence of legislative threats—though institutionally illegitimate and socially
unwarranted—demonstrates the limits of law and the severe limitations of lawmakers. Moreover, they underscore
the growing incapacity of the legal system to deliver its pre-eminent promise: to maintain ordered liberty and to
promote sound public policies. Viewed from an ever broader perspective, the widespread use of legislative threats
demonstrates an increasing tendency towards (what I label) a second-order social control system, where legislators
establish second-order rules designed to create the incentives necessary to induce entities and groups to adopt
socially-desired rules of conduct. Inevitably, the trend toward second-order social control diminishes the
traditionally-extensive role of the regulatory state, but increases the power of groups that, in shaping their
regulatory environment, practically turn into islands of self-regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
As first-year law students, we are introduced to universal and fundamental truisms
about the nature of the legal system and its role in establishing and maintaining the
social order.1 One such truism, or so we are taught, is that the legal system, defined as
the “coercive order of public rules addressed to rational persons for the purpose of
regulating their conduct,” is designed to guide and control social behavior.2 We are
also taught that in order to perform this age-old function, the legal system relies upon
well-established sources of law, including statutes and opinions, from which legal
norms originate.3 Legal norms, so the truism goes, control the behavior of individuals
and the conduct of firms, organizations, and the government and its agencies.4
These seemingly-universal truisms have never been questioned nor have they ever
been subject to rigorous theoretical examination. Notwithstanding the credence that the
conventional view of the legal system has been afforded over the years, the most
fundamental question—namely, is the conventional view descriptive of and coextensive with
how modern social control actually works?—seems to have escaped critical examination.5
I believe there are several explanations for why, to date, this question has neither
been posed nor thoroughly studied. The principal reason is that legal scholarship tends
to focus somewhat disproportionately on the work of the judiciary, driven by the
implicit assumption that courts are the prime social control institution in the overall
design of the legal system.6 In keeping, Richard Posner notes that “[t]he trouble started
with Holmes’s well-known characterization of the judge as an interstitial legislator,
1

Maintaining order counts as the prime objective of all societies and groups because, as evolution theorist
Robert Ardrey observed, “[n]either the population explosion nor the density of urban populations, neither
nuclear catastrophe nor the devious adventures of youth, represents a threat to our civilized future quite so
perplexing as man’s propensity for the violent way.” See Robert Ardrey, The Social Contract: A Personal Inquiry
into the Evolutionary Sources of Order and Disorder 253-54 (1970).
2 These fundamental, long-standing truisms are not only inculcated to first-year law students but, given their
basic role in the functioning of the legal system, they seem to lie outside the realm of scholarly criticism and
intellectual inquiry. Similar statements on the nature of the legal system and the role of statutes and cases are
also found in Jane C. Ginsburg, Legal Methods: Cases and Materials 1-19 (1996) (discussing the origins, nature,
and authority of case-law and the attributes and types of legislation). See also E. Allan Farnsworth, An
Introduction to the Legal System of the United States 47-60, 61-71 (3d ed., 1996) (statutory law is the end-product of
the legislative process and is used to control social behavior).
3 “[B]y enacting statutes, making regulations, giving judgments, etc., norms are created.” See Joseph Raz,
The Concept of a Legal System 70 (1980). Norms originating from these sources satisfy the “chain of validity”
criterion. Id. at 105 (“A law belongs to a given system if, and only if, it is either part of the first constitution or
has been enacted by the exercise of powers directly or indirectly conferred by it”).
4 To that end, the legal system employs civil and criminal as well as private and public law enforcement
mechanisms that are designed to ensure deterrence. See Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law
474-78, 571-90 (2004). See also Charles Fried & David Rosenberg, Making Tort Law: What Should be Done and Who
Should Do It 16-22 (2003) (the liability system should be designed to achieve optimal incentives).
5 A plethora of theories have been offered to examine the type and scope of social activities that merit social
control. For example, political economic theories suggest that legislators ought to control activities provided
that they are consequential to social welfare. Importantly, however, such theories only explain or prescribe the
role of legislators as social planners and policy-makers but do not address the pivotal question that is the
subject-matter of the present inquiry, which is, how legislators effectuate control social behavior.
6 See Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cures, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1207-10 (1981).
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which Cardozo echoes in the Nature of the Judicial Process.”7 Furthermore, even when
legislation is the focus of the inquiry, the intellectual enterprise engages issues that lie
on the outer boundary of the legislative process or where legislation interacts with the
judicial process, rather than on how the legislative process in and of itself serves the
function of social control. Indeed, many studies focus on issues relating to statutory
construction and normative constraints on legislative power (e.g., delegation, the voidfor-vagueness doctrine, and ex post facto legislation).8 Moreover, the landscape of
modern civil litigation in the U.S. further reinforces the scholarly over-emphasis of the
judiciary’s social control function. The confluence of collectivized and large-scale
litigation—including class actions and informal aggregation of numerous claimants into
a single legal proceeding—where judges and attorneys fashion complex global
settlements,9 militate in favor of the view that courts, not legislatures, play a major role
in modern social control.10 And, reinforcing this view, commentators have analogized
class action settlements to ad hoc administrative agencies,11 and class action attorneys to
lawmakers.12
The question raised earlier—namely, doesthe conventional view of the legal system
adequately account for how modern social control actually works?—lies at the center of
this Article. The theory of legislative threats I present in this Article casts doubt over the
validity of the seemingly-absolute truisms that permeate the conventional wisdom.
This analysis pierces the fundamental concept of the legal system as a regulatory
institution and, more generally, as a mechanism of social governance. Contrary to the
conventional view, this theory demonstrates that the threat of formal legislation—rather
than the legislation itself—plays a formidable role in controlling social behavior, in
creating the underlying incentives, and in maintaining the existing social order. More
precisely, the theoretical propositions I advance in this Article subvert the longstanding premises on which modern legal systems rest concerning, in particular, the
role of legislation and legal norms in controlling activity across diverse domains of

7

See Richard A. Posner, So What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, in OVERCOMING LAW 387, 392 (1995)
(“[D]espite realist effort to refocus legal scholarship from common law to the emergent world of statute law,
legislation proved a challenge to which the realist tradition … was unable to rise”).
8 See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 369-371 (1989).
9 See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371 (2001) (large class action
lawsuits are essentially large commercial transactions in which attorneys’ activities are business-oriented;
pleadings do not initiate adjudication but succeed the finalization of the transaction; judges broker deals, they
do not adjudicate cases; and the desire for nationwide deals displace boundaries on the judicial function).
10 See Jack B. Weinstein, Individual Justice In Mass Tort Litigations: The Effect of Class Actions, Consolidations, and
Other Multiparty Devices 102-104 (1995
) ( judges in mass tort litigation are significantly involved in settlement
discussions and resolution of cases); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (federal
judges have departed from blindfold disengagement to adopt an active, “managerial” approach according to
which they negotiate with parties and work beyond the public view and are out of reach of appellate review).
11 See Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010 (1997). For a detailed account of large, administrative-like settlements see Peter H.
Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts (enlarged ed., 1987).
12 See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 733 (2004).
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modern society.13 In turn, however, this Article offers a theory of social control and
regulation of conduct that is rooted in reality, rather than rests precariously on idealized
premises and bygone truisms. As such, the theory offers explanatory value and
predictive power.
As conceptualized in this Article, legislative threats encompass a variety of threats
that legislators exert on firms and financial institutions, organizations and institutional
shareholders, professions and industrial sectors, universities and public institutions,
federal agencies, and possibly even U.S. states. According to these threats, legislators
will exercise their legislative mandate and enact adverse legislation in order to regulate
the conduct or condition in question, unless the recipients of the threat alter their
behavior so as to bring it in line with the legislators’ demands. Implicit in the threat is
the inverse promise that the legislators will forgo the threatened legislation if, and only
if the recipients of the threat comply with the demands. Under certain conditions,
legislative threats induce these entities to modify their conduct and abandon certain
practices so as to avert the risk of unfavorable legislation. Legislative threats thus
describe an unaccounted-for mechanism which legislators frequently use to exercise
their institutional power to control social conduct and to effect public policy.14 The
inducement effect of legislative threats explains therefore ubiquitous instances in which
firms announce—what at a first glance may seem to be—a voluntary adoption of
socially-desirable policies or banning of existing, socially-harmful practices.15
Evidently, the theoretical inquiry implicates important societal interests and high
social stakes because legislative threats are used to control diverse activities, the
consequences of which are vital to social welfare. Specifically, legislative threats are
observed and play an important role in regulating environmental hazards and in
managing risks to health; in enhancing the security standards of Internet commerce and
in reducing the risks of e-piracy to consumers; in mitigating the risks of cyber attacks by
terrorists; and in enhancing consumer protection from product risks. Legislative threats
are also employed to resh
ap e the responsibilities and functioning of corporate boards;
to induce banks and financial institutions to monitor and detect money laundering and
help deter organized crimes; and to curtail the use of steroids and illegal substances in
professional sports. In general, legislative threats are employed to effect policy reforms
13

Legislative threats, providing an informal, unregulated source from which “legal norms” originate, are
distinctly contrasted with canonical conceptions of the legal system and the well-established sources of law.
For a discussion of the sources of law see generally the classic works of John Chipman Gray, The Nature and
Sources of the Law (2d ed. 1921) and Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1945).
14 References to legislators and legislation incorporate regulators and regulations, respectively.
While
important distinctions exist (e.g., authority, hierarchy), these have no analytic bearing on the arguments
presently made. In fact, highlighting these distinctions would only limit the high level of generality and the
broad applicability of the thesis. Unless otherwise noted, legislation and regulation are used interchangeably.
15 See, e.g., James Moore, SLI Urges Joint Action to Keep Boards True, THE TIMES, Jan. 2, 2003, at 23 (“Trade
bodies including … the National Association of Pension Funds and the Investment Managers Association
released a new code of practice on shareholder activism … designed to head off the threat of legislation aimed
at forcing shareholders to take a more active role in the companies in which they invest”); Bob Alexander,
Options for House of Lords Reform, THE TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003 (“[E]ither … the threat of legislation hangs over the
[profession] as an incentive to reform. Otherwise self-interest prevails”).
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where a given conduct or condition is associated with negative externalities. Hence, the
effects of legislative threats on social welfare cannot be underestimated.
Puzzlingly, while legislative threats provide a remarkably-powerful social control
mechanism, this phenomenon has gone virtually unnoticed and thus far, has remained
unaccounted for on both theoretical and normative grounds. This Article not only fills
this significant gap in the current understanding of political institutions and policymaking dynamics, but should also bring about a sea-change in how we think about the
inner workings of legislatures and the informal and often less visible practices of
legislators. Overall, the theory of legislative threats offers a sharp and compelling
conceptual departure from the conventional thinking on law and social control.
Lest there by any doubt, legislative threats are not merely a conceptual novelty, one
created by academic intellectualism and whose applicability is limited to the unruly
world of ideas. The theoretical inquiry examines ten case studies that are drawn from
diverse social context, thus revealing how legislators actually go about doing their
business. These case studies demonstrate the pervasive use of legislative threats and
their role as a regulatory mechanism. These observations therefore help decipher the
subtle way, often not sufficiently visible to the public eye, in which legislators exercise
their political mandate to control social behavior and to make public policy. Their
combined weight lays down veritable foundations that are necessary to sustain one of
the theory’s positive arguments—legislators, without an existing institutional mandate
or legitimate constitutional authority, employ legislative threats to opt-out of the
lawmaking processes and bring about policy and regulatory changes.
Generalizing from these cases, the theoretical claims offer an incisive, novel account
of the ways in which legislators and other lawmaking officials actually control social
behavior; the counter-intuitive role the legal system and formal legal norms play in
facilitating threats, and thereby in regulating and guiding conduct; and the forces that
work in reality to define the regulatory environment and societal framework in which
social activities take place. Uncovering the use of legislative threats, the theory posits
that such threats introduce a de facto (albeit, not a de jure) source from which norms
originate. And, as legislative threats have become increasingly widespread, an
extensive “body” of norms—to which I refer as invisible law—has gradually emerged.
This Article exposes this set of “norms,” crafted and devised in compliance with
institutionally-unregulated an politically-accountable threats to use legislative power.
Unlike visible and formal legal norms (e.g., statutes, regulations), however, informal
legislative threats control individual behavior and regulate the conduct of entities by
threatening to use legislative power, rather than by using that power to introduce formal
legislative measures.16 The unregulated use of threats to exercise legislative power pose
formidable normative challenges for the most celebrated hallmarks of American
16

See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 206-207 (revised ed., 1999). According to Rawls’ formulation of the
concept of a legal system, coercive rules are addressed to rational persons and define the basic structure within
which the pursuit of all other activities takes place must be public. Id. at 207. Echoing this notion, Lon Fuller
stated that “[t]he first desideratum of a system for subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules is an
obvious one: there must be rules.” See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 46 (revised ed., 1964).
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constitutional democracy including primarily, the protection of constitutional rights
and liberties, the separation of powers, and the majority decisional principles used to
determine the legitimacy and validity of legal norms on which the legal system rests.17
These normative concerns render the concept and workings of legislative threats as well
as the body of invisible law all the more worthy of rigorous theoretical study.
Against this backdrop, a roadmap of this Article is now in order. Part I reviews the
social control schemes the legal system formally relies upon to produce legal norms: (i)
state-mandated regulation of conduct; (ii) state-licensed self-regulation of conduct; and
(iii) regulation through litigation. For completeness, this overview also considers extralegal regulatory institutions, namely private ordering of conduct and social norms,
which make up the remainder of the social regulatory universe.
Parts II and III, respectively, lay down the empirical and conceptual foundations as
well as the analytic underpinnings of the theory (Part II), and the underlying economic
machinations of legislative threats (Part III). Specifically, Part II examines ten case
studies drawn from diverse areas of social control that demonstrate the ubiquitous use
of legislative threats and elucidate their regulatory function. Abstracting from these
context-specific cases, the discussion develops an analytic taxonomy of threats that
includes explicit, implicit, and anticipatory legislative threats. This taxonomy is valuable
not only because it enhances the analytic precision of the inquiry into these threats but,
more practically, because it delineates the actual boundaries of the legislative threat
phenomenon. The taxonomy also helps to identify instances that would otherwise not
be considered as legislative threats, thus exposing the actual scope of this phenomenon.
Discovering the broad scope of legislative threats is essential to evaluating their use on
normative grounds. Lastly, the taxonomy also generates insights that are necessary to
explain the intricate mechanism underlying the inducement effect of legislative threats
and their capacity to regulate social conduct.
Part III focuses on the question that lies at the heart of the matter: How and in what
circumstances do legislative threats induce a change in the behavior of entities to which the
threat is directed? In other words, when are threat-recipients expected to comply with
the legislator’s demands and when is compliance unlikely? In order to begin analyzing
these issues, I rely on non-cooperative game theory and model the strategic interaction
between legislators and entities as a (finitely-repeated dynamic) game in which
legislators issue probabilistic threats. This key characteristic feature of legislative threats
derives from the fact that executing a threat does not—and, in fact, cannot—ensure the
enactment of the threatened legislation. In other words, the legislator cannot guarantee
that the threatened consequences will actuallymaterialize. Therefore, the threatened
legislation is may be probable but definitely not certain. Having constructed the model,
the analysis examines how a firm determines what its best response is, once a legislator
has threatened to enact unfavorable legislation. Using game-theoretic analytical
17

The use of legislative threats therefore runs afoul the precepts of justice associated with the rule of law.
According to John Rawls, the “precepts [of justice] are those that would be followed by any system of rules
which perfectly embodied the idea of a legal system,” namely, “a system of public rules addressed to rational
persons.” See Rawls, supra note 16, at 207 (emphasis added).
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methods, the model is used to predict how legislators and firms are expected to behave,
showing in turn the possible existence of two mutually-exclusive predictions: compliance
equilibrium and non-compliance equilibrium. The analysis thus unveils the potential
inducement effect of legislative threats, which underlies their regulatory function.
Moreover, the analysis shows that the inducement effect of the threat—that is,
whether the firm’s best response strategy is “comply” or “not comply”—crucially
depends on what the firm believes the legislator will do in the particular situation; and
further, on what the firm believes the likelihood of the threatened legislation is if the
legislator carries out the threat. Stated differently, precisely which equilibrium
materializes in reality crucially depends on two conditions: (i) whether or not threatrecipients believe that the threat is credible or, rather, “cheap talk” (i.e., the credibility
condition); and (ii) whether or not the perceived probability that the threatened
legislation will be successfully enacted into law is sufficiently high so as to exceed a
given probability threshold below which threat-recipients will not comply, even though
the threat is or merely believed to be credible (i.e., the effectiveness condition).
Given that credibility is a necessary (albeit insufficient) condition for inducing a
firm’s compliance, the analysis identifies the circumstances in which threats are
expected to be credible or incredible. In this respect, the discussion focuses on three
mechanisms that may render the threat credible: (i) legislators’ pre-game commitment;
(ii) legislators’ reputation; and (iii) legislators’ emotional motivations. In consideration
of the effectiveness condition, the discussion underscores a variety of institutional,
political, and reputational factors that influence legislative behavior in Congress and
therefore the probability of the threatened legislation; and identifies various tactics
showing how a legislator may affect that probability, so as to secure the threat’s
inducement effect, and guarantee early compliance.
The analysis further shows that compliance with legislative threats is, in essence, a
form of implicit and informal political transaction, in which the legislator barters the
non-use of legislative power with respect to a particular issue in return for the firm’s
commitment to change its conduct. Focusing on bargaining in the shadow of the threat
as a form of compliance, the discussion spotlights two important effects: (i) legislative
threats elicit valuable information and otherwise reduce transaction costs, facilitating in
turn efficient regulatory bargaining; (ii) as legislative threats lower transaction costs and
decrease contractual incompleteness, bargaining increasingly provide an opportunity to
devise functionally-superior measures to address the very problems to which the
legislator initially directed the legislative threat.
For the sake of completeness I extend the analysis to consider games with perfect
and imperfect information, where the legislator can decide the level of severity of the
threatened legislation (i.e., lenient, moderate, or severe). If enacted, the threatened
legislation affects the firm in direct proportion to the leniency, moderation, or severity of
its terms. That the legislator also decides whether or not to reveal the level of severity
further compounds the analysis but renders the model as descriptive as possible of the
real legislative landscape.
Moreover, as legislative threats are most often directed towards numerous
entities—rather than a single firm—including businesses in a specific industry,
participants in a given market, and members of a certain profession, the analysis
considers the effects on compliance of strategic interaction within homogenous and
6
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heterogeneous, organized and unorganized groups. The analysis shows that an entity’s
compliance or non-compliance decision is driven in part by the compliance, or noncompliance (e.g., free-riding, holdout) of other entities in the group. Moreover, it is
shown that compliance may be used strategically as a tool to promote members’
idiosyncratic interests. Hence, while in some circumstances strategic interaction within
groups may undermine compliance (e.g., predatory non-compliance), in certain others it
may counter-intuitively reinforce compliance (e.g., predatory compliance, raising rivals’
costs, deterring entry). In addition, the discussion develops several related points,
showing that: (i) formal and subtle enforcement mechanisms used by groups play a
decisive role in ensuring group-wide compliance; (ii) group organization increases the
likelihood of group-wide compliance and renders legislative threats generally more
useful in regulating social behavior; (iii) the issuance of a legislative threat (and the
advent of collective action problems) reinforces the tendency of unorganized groups to
organize; (iv) legislators may (and in some cases do) rationally subsidize the cost of
organizing; and (v) the tendency towards organization reduces the transaction costs of
bargaining, thereby enabling legislators and group representatives to negotiate and
design superior regulatory measures. In turn, these effects further reinforce the
legislator’s incentive to use threats and the group’s impetus to organize. Lastly, the
analysis shows that insofar as legislative threats increase the propensity to organize,
their widespread regulatory use (as a form of social governance) may counter social and
economic processes that contributed to the gradual weakening and disintegration of
organizations.
Having examined the concept, pervasive use, and economic underpinnings of
legislative threats, Part IV focuses on differences between formal legislative measures and
informal legislative threats, as alternatives means of social control. The analysis highlights
functional and institutional considerations pertaining, respectively, to the comparative
capacity of legislative threats to effectively control behavior in an increasingly-complex
and information-intensive social reality; and to various political, constitutional, and
democratic implications arising from the use of legislative threats. Highlighting these
considerations not only advances the understanding of the phenomenon, but is also
essential to evaluating on normative grounds the ubiquitous use of legislative threats
and to assessing their social welfare implications against explicit normative criteria.
More specifically, functional considerations include: (i) the asymmetric information of
social planners and its effects on social control; (ii) the superiority of threat-induced selfregulation of conduct compared with “top down” regulation of conduct; (iii) the
capacity of threat-induced self-regulation to accommodate rapidly-changing demands
of social control; and (iv) the effects of threat-induced self-regulation on reducing the
costs of law enforcement. In this respect, the analysis advances the following claim:
legislative threats can be viewed as a spontaneous response (in the sense of unplanned
and unregulated) to the institutionally-handicapped position of lawmakers and to the
limits of the law in effectively controlling social activities; to that end, legislative threats
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are designed to reduce information and transaction costs of policy-making and
regulatory bargaining.18
Moreover, institutional considerations encompass ways in which the use of legislative
threats enables legislators and regulators to evade procedural safeguards, institutional
constraints, and substantive controls designed to limit the power to make law and effect
policy changes. These considerations are based upon the following observations: (i)
using legislative threats, legislators opt-out of the “rules of the game,” disenfranchise
fellow legislators, and are therefore able to effect policy changes notwithstanding a
possible lack of majoritarian support; (ii) legislative threats disenfranchise the executive
branch by preventing a possible presidential veto and by sidestepping the
government’s role in law enforcement; (iii) legislative threats disenfranchise the states
by redrawing the federal-state allocation of regulatory powers; (iv) legislative threats
bypass constitutional safeguards by evading judicial review of statutes; and (v)
legislative threats disenfranchise the judiciary by circumventing precedent-setting
interpretation of statutes.
Notwithstanding the superior functional capacity of legislative threats to control
behavior in an increasingly-complex and information-intensive society, the
institutionally-unregulated and politically-unaccountable use of implicit and explicit
threats poses formidable normative challenges for the most treasured attributes of
American constitutional democracy. Contrasting these considerations underscores the
intrinsic tension between their potential welfare gains and the toll on democratic
principles. This conflict therefore raises the ultimate normative question, namely—Is
the use of legislative threats as regulators of social conduct socially desirable? The analysis in
Part V aims to answer precisely this question against explicit normative criteria,
namely: democratic legitimacy and social control efficacy. I argue that, on balance, it
seems that even though the benefits of legislative threats may exceed their short-term
cost (thus becoming efficient in the short-term), in the long-term the reverse is true, thus
suggesting that the best domain of legislative threats consists, in fact, of an empty set.
For, any increase in individual well-being and aggregate social welfare—due to the
improved efficacy of social control—is inevitably outweighed by a higher
commensurate decrease in well-being and social welfare, reflecting in turn the toll of
violating constitutional and democratic principles; the negative impact on societal
stability and the disincentive on private investment; and the consequential decline in
economic growth. In turn, the discussion develops a social control scheme that is
rooted in the province of legislation and is designed to ensure the socially-optimal
trade-off between regulatory efficacy and the toll on democratic accountability, namely:
an outcome-oriented or risk-focused, deferred-implementation, contingent sunset legislation.
I devote the Conclusion to argue that the exponential increase in the complexity of
activities and the rapid changes in behavior across all social domains are two major
sources of growth-driven social instability. Paradoxically, absent effective social

18

The magnitude of transaction costs of policy-making can explain the institutional structure of democratic
institutions. See Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions 353-58 (1990).
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control, the processes that drive well-developed market economies towards economic
growth and social progress, may ultimately propel their economic decline, increase
social instability, and lead to their gradual societal deterioration. Thus, the more
advanced a society becomes the more demanding is the lawmakers’ role. Viewed from
this perspective, the emergence of legislative threats—though institutionallyillegitimate and socially-unwarranted—demonstrates the limits of law and the severe
limitations of lawmakers. Moreover, they underscore the growing incapacity of the
legal system to deliver its pre-eminent promise: to maintain ordered liberty and to
promote sound public policies. Viewed from an ever broader perspective, the
widespread use of legislative threats demonstrates an increasing tendency towards
(what I label) a second-order social control system, where legislators establish second-order
rules designed to create the incentives necessary to induce entities and groups to adopt
socially-desired rules of conduct. Inevitably, the trend toward second-order social
control diminishes the traditionally-extensive role of the regulatory state, but increases
the power of groups that, in shaping their regulatory environment, practically turn into
islands of self-regulation.
Lastly, the theory of legislative threats relates to various aspects of policy-making
through legislative and administrative rule-making processes, and thus sheds light on
the role and function of the law and lawmakers as a form of governance in controlling
social conduct and in facilitating economic growth. In this respect, the theoretical
analysis relates to the institutional allocation of lawmaking responsibilities, the
separation of powers, and the emergence of invisible law. The discussion is expected to
draw the interest of a broad audience insofar as it advances existing knowledge and
contributes to the literature in a number of fields, including constitutional theory and
separation of powers; institutions of economic governance, including law and social
control, social norms, private ordering, and self-regulation; the theory of public choice;
political economy and political institutional economics; and political science and
congressional studies.

I. BACKGROUND: CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON
THE REGULATION OF SOCIAL CONDUCT
According to conventional wisdom, the legal system employs a coercive set of norms to
define the basic societal structure within which the pursuit of all activities and conducts
may take place.19 While the work of legislators in Congress and State legislatures
account for a significant part of the lawmaking universe, many norms pour forth from
various public and private rule-making on both the federal and state levels.20 The
19

The coercive power of government to enforce the law is necessary to maintain steady social cooperation
and to prevent individuals and firms from sinking into the tragedy of the commons that accompanies
institutional break-up. This proposition and its underlying reasoning, of which we think as the Hobbes’s
thesis, posit that the existence of effective law enforcement machinery serves as security between individuals.
See Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Ch. III (1957) and David P. Gauthier, The Logic of
Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes 76
- 89 (1969).
20 See Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 61 (discussing the hierarchy of legislative bodies).
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system relies upon norms of different hierarchies, including statutes, regulations, and
opinions,21 and normsof different kinds, including standards and rules.22
Operating in tandem, the lawmaking and law-enforcement functions of the system
control the conduct of individuals, firms, organizations, and governmental bodies.23
Relying on social control as its functional hallmark, the system aims to provide the
framework necessary to maintain the stability of social cooperation,24 to facilitate market
exchange25 and, ultimately, to achieve an efficient allocation of scarce resources.26
Economic research on the role of legal systems in facilitating markets confirms these
arguments.27 Focusing, for instance, on the effects of legal norms and law enforcement
on the depth, breadth, and resiliency of financial markets, empirical research finds that,
consistent with the Coaseian view, financial markets are more developed in the
presence of a well-developed legal system that affords effective investor protection.28
From an institutional perspective, the legal system relies upon three normproducing sources:29 (i) state-mandated regulation of conduct (i.e., laws, acts,
21

Analytically, opinions (i.e., particularized norms) should be included in the taxonomy of legal norms
although they originate from a lawmaking process different than that from which statutes emanate.
22 Rules and standards differ in scope (i.e., the breadth of their potential application); the level of generality
or particularity; the amount of information necessary to enforce them; the scope of discretion they entail; and in
the degree of uncertainty (i.e., the level of variability in outcomes), thereby serving different social control
functions. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). Legal norms employ exceptions,
presumptions, and other means to manage the tension between generality and particularity. See Frederick
Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (1991) (exceptions link scope of rules to linguistic underpinnings).
23 For a comprehensive account see Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J. LAW &
ECON. 255 (1993); Donald Wittman, General Structure of the Law, in Bouckaert et al. (eds.), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS, Vol. I: 1072 (2000).
24 See Rawls, supra note 16, at 206-207 (the system’s comprehensive scope “reflect the fact that the law
defines the basic structure within which the pursuit of all other activities takes place”).
25 Legal norms not just facilitate market exchange but also “commoditize” specific goods so as to create a
market for such goods. Assuming the market is not prone to systemic failures, this would result in an efficient
distribution of the “commodity” in question.
26 The indispensable role of a well-developed legal system in reducing transaction costs to facilitate market
exchange has been identified by Ronald H. Coase in The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) and The
Firm, the Market, and the Law, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 1, 9 (1988) (“for anything approaching
perfect competition to exist, an intricate system of rules and regulations would normally be needed”). See also
Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, in ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 3, 11-12
(1994) (“If we move from a regime of zero transaction costs to one of positive transaction costs, what becomes
immediately clear is the crucial importance of the legal system in this new world”).
27 See Paul H. Rubin, Legal Systems as Frameworks for Market Exchanges, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS (Claude Manard & Mary Shirley eds., 2004) (countries with a well-established legal system that
defines property rights, allows for their exchange, and protects property rights are more prosperous and
exhibit higher growth rate than countries lacking such a system).
28 See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POLIT. ECON. 1113 (1998) (examining legal rules governing
shareholders’ rights and the quality of their enforcement across 49 countries, and showing that ownership
concentration is negatively related to investors’ legal protection); see also Florencio Lopez de Silanes et al., Legal
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FINANCE 1131 (1997) (capital markets are less-developed in countries with
poorer legal protection of investors). The same is true of other markets as well. See, e.g., Pablo Casas-Arce &
Albert Saiz, Do Courts Matter? Rental Markets and the Law (2005), available at http://www.ssrn.com (costly
enforcement of rental contracts hampers the development of housing markets).
29 Broadly defined, however, norms are not limited to these three sources; private ordering and social norms
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regulations, and ordinances made by primary and secondary legislative bodies); (ii)
state-licensed self-regulation of conduct (i.e., rules and regulations adopted by selfregulatory organizations pursuant to statutory authorization); and (iii) regulation
through litigation (i.e., judge-made laws declared in court opinions and regulatory
policies crafted in negotiated resolutions of large-scale litigation). Virtually all legal
norms (as distinguished from social norms and private ordering that are discussed
below in Parts I(D) and I(E), respectively) originate from one of these sources.
Human behavior is influenced both by internal norms and values as well as by
exogenous restrictions such as legal sanctions. The order we see around us is only
Thus,
partially explained by the existence of law and law enforcement.30
notwithstanding their broad scope and general applicability, legal rules account only
for a fraction of the social control universe. Extra-legal rules, including those
originating from the private ordering of conduct as well as various types of social
norms, make up the remainder. Similar to legal norms, the extra-legal regulation of
conduct emanates from a specified rule-making process that may have formal or
informal attributes.31 Furthermore, depending on the specific context to which legal
norms apply and the ability of regulated entities to opt-out, the function served by
private ordering and social norms in controlling behavior may substitute or
complement that of the legal system.
The comparative institutional analysis that follows presents an overview of legal
and extra-legal regulatory schemes.32 In the interest of clarity, the analysis considers (i)
the rule-making process from which norms originate; (ii) the regulatory domain; (iii) the
constraints limiting the rule-making power; and (iv) the range of enforcement
mechanisms used to ensure compliance. Laying down these intellectual foundations
serves at least three purposes. First, understanding conventional schemes of social
control is conducive to advancing the concept of legislative threats and to appreciating
its novelty. Second, familiarity with these schemes is essential to examining the
comparative functional effects, costs, and benefits of legislative threats and alternative
regulatory schemes. Third, gaining knowledge of these issues is necessary to assessing
the normative desirability of using threats to further predetermined social objectives.

A. State-mandated Regulation of Conduct
Conceptually, state-mandated regulation of conduct encompasses all legal norms
formally enacted by the polity and its administrative organs, including statutes,
may also play an important role in regulating conduct and in achieving predetermined objectives.
30 Cf. Oliver Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using a Hostage to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519
(1983). Williamson coins the idea of legal centralism to express the notion that the existing social order results
from the law and its enforcement. Nowadays, however, a plethora of theoretical and empirical literature
challenges this proposition. See generally Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984); see also Robert
Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERS. 85 (1989) (conditions under which conventions are established).
31 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, NW. U. L. REV. 319 (2002) (discussing the attributes of
governance arrangements originating from private ordering).
32 However, my analysis does not address theoretical issues relating to the coordination, prioritization, and
integration of norms originating from different sources.

11

A Theory of Legislative Threats
regulations, ordinances, and orders.33 These norms are mandated insofar as they are
created and imposed by the state. As I demonstrate below, “top down” law differs
from “bottom up” norms (i.e., self-regulation of conduct, private ordering, and social
norms). Subject to procedural and substantive constraints, the regulatory scope of
formal legal rules encompasses all aspects of modern social, political, and economic life,
ranging from the control of individual conduct to the regulation of business
organizations, markets, government agencies, and the judiciary. Indeed, these legal
norms make up a voluminous body of law and, as such, represent the regulatory
scheme most heavily relied upon to control behavior across a wide variety of contexts.34
The Securities Exchange Act of 193435 and the rules and regulations adopted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)36 pursuant to statutory authority,
demonstrate the use of this scheme to control the conduct of issuers, insiders,
underwriters, and other financial markets participants.37 However, the regulatory
framework governing U.S. financial markets is more complex than suggested above, as
it includes rules adopted by self-regulatory organizations (e.g., the New York Stock
Exchange) pursuant to a state-granted rule-making license and rules made up by courts
and promulgated in judicial opinions.38 Lastly, informal social norms39 and private
ordering40 supplement the legal norms and contribute to shaping the ultimate
regulatory environment governing financial markets.41
33

Under the Constitution, the President has limited power to issue Executive Orders, which are also
considered legislative in nature and analytically belong to this category of regulatory measures.
34 Documenting the increasing quantity and importance of statutes and regulations as a means of controlling
social conduct, Felix Frankfurter observed in 1947 that “[i]nevitably the work of the Supreme Court reflects the
great shift in the center of gravity of lawmaking. Broadly speaking, the number of cases disposed of by
opinions has not changed from term to term. But even as late as 1875 more than 40% of the controversies
before the Court were common-law litigation, fifty years later only 5%, while today cases not resting on
statutes are reduced almost to zero. It is therefore accurate to say that courts have ceased to be the primary
makers of law.” See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947).
35 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
36 Rules and regulations adopted by the SEC pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 are codified in 17 C.F.R.
230.100 et seq. Rules and regulations adopted and promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 are codified in 17 C.F.R. 240.0-1 et seq.
37 See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (showing that concentrated
ownership of shares in public companies is negatively related to the legal protection of investors, which is
consistent with the hypothesis that investor protection laws aid in the development of capital markets).
38 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 822 (2d. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)
(announcing the “disclose or abstain” rule).
39 Social norms serve a regulatory function in financial markets. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter,
Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001)
(corporate law is a sophisticated mechanism facilitating governance by social norms). See also Harrison Hong
& Marcin Kacperczyk, The Price of Sin: The Effects of Social Norms on Markets (2005), at www.ssrn.com (norms
prohibiting investment in companies that promote vice affect tobacco, alcohol and gaming companies’ returns).
40 For a discussion of the regulatory role of private ordering in financial markets see Steven L. Schwarcz,
Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2002) (discussing private
ordering governing the operation of rating agencies in global financial markets).
41 Corporate law and social norms interact with each other, such that the impact of social norms is greatest
when the law is weakest. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Do Norms Matter?: A Cross-Country Examination of the Private
Benefits of Control, COLUM. L. & ECON. WORKING PAPER NO. 183 (2001), at http://www.ssrn.com (social norms
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State-mandated legal norms originate from deliberative rule-making processes of
primary and secondary legislative bodies. Ordinarily, these rule-making processes are
transparent to the public eye, well-structured, and governed by a set of legal rules that
prescribe how valid rules are to be made. Functionally, these procedures are designed
to ensure that the rule-making adheres to legitimate decisional rules; provides sufficient
opportunity to gather information (e.g., through public comments); and enables
meaningful deliberation and consideration (e.g., through floor debate and hearings).
The power to craft legal norms to control social behavior is however, clearly
limited. Substantive and procedural constraints erect significant limitations to the rulemaking power, thus aiming to safeguard constitutional rights and liberties; prohibit the
retroactive application of legal norms;42 guarantee reasonable determinacy of legal
norms;43 ensure that legal norms do not single out an individual or a particular group;44
and limit or invalidate a broad delegation of legislative powers to inferior bodies.45
Lastly, the legal system relies upon various enforcement mechanisms to ensure
compliance with legal rules. While some are designed to work ex ante, before a
violation has occurred, others operate ex post, in response to a violation or infliction of
harm. Furthermore, while in some contexts law enforcement is initiated by public
officials (e.g., attorney general actions, parens patriae actions, and criminal prosecution),
enforcement actions may also be commenced by private entities (e.g., class actions, qui
tam actions, and private prosecution of offenses). Lastly, the particular composition of
enforcement mechanisms may vary from one legal context to another.46

may discourage predatory behavior by those in control of the firm but their impact is negatively-correlated
with the impact of legal rules). See also Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1009 (1997) (Delaware cases best understood as attempts to create social norms).
42 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9 (“No … ex post facto Law will be passed”).
43 The void-for-vagueness doctrine is designed to ensure that legal norms are not excessively vague and not
unreasonably uncertain, as in such cases the person to whom it is addressed may not know what the norm
requires. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Symposium: Void for Vagueness—Vagueness in Law and Language: Some
Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 509, 536 (1994) (vague provisions are unfair because, when law is enforced,
a citizen becomes a victim of retroactive legislation). Vague rules encroach on protected constitutional rights
and limit the individuals’ realm of personal or economic freedom. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of
Liberty 152-53 (1960). A law-and-economic expression of this intuition is found in Richard Craswell & John E.
Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 281 (1986) (uncertain about a legal
standard, an individual tends to over-comply because knowing that there is a risk that he will be held liable
even when he complies, the decrease in the risk of liability gained by over-compliance may offset its cost).
44 A legal norm must be of general applicability, meaning that a norm cannot single-out an individual or
group of individuals. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9. The rationale underlying the Bill of Attainder Clause is the
implementation of the separation of powers as a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial
function or, more simply, trial by legislature. See U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 440 (1965).
45 Broad delegation runs afoul the fundamental notion of a representative democracy. See Laurence H.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 977-82 (3rd ed., 2000) (the non-delegation doctrine imposes an important
structural limit on legislative power). The doctrine has been relaxed, however, leaving room for congressional
delegation. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
46 Cf. Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, A Survey of Securities Laws and Enforcement, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH
WORKING PAPER NO. 3405 (2004), at http://papers.ssrn.com (presenting comparative data on the composition
of securities law enforcement and showing that largest impact is due to securities class actions).
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B. State-licensed Self-regulation of Conduct
State-licensed self-regulation of conduct represents a regulatory regime in which
private entities including, among others, industrial sectors, trade and professional
organizations, and national securities or commodities exchanges formulate and adopt
legal rules pursuant to a statutory delegation of rule-making power.47 Highlighting the
virtues of self-regulation, economists maintain that this scheme enables entities that
possess mostinformation or are otherwise better-positioned to diagnose problems and
devise efficient regulatory measures, to establish effective compliance architectures.
Moreover, in certain contexts self-regulatory organizations (SROs) are bound to have
stronger incentives than other lawmakers to design desirable regulatory measures.48 In
addition, self-regulation offers a superior cost- effective institutional alternative.49
Seeking to secure the efficiency gains associated with self-regulation, legislatures
ordinarily enact a statute to lay down the relevant regulatory objectives and entrust the
task of devising, tailoring (and also enforcing) detailed rules to a rule-making body that
represents the entities engaged in that economic sector or activity.50 Yet, the statutory
license normally also limits the regulatory mandate, both procedurally and
substantively.51 Compliance with these procedural requirements and substantive
constraints is a sin quo non of a legally-effective rule.52
The underlying rationale is that while self-regulation can enhance social welfare, it
is also prone to unconstrained self-interest and self-dealing
, opportunism, and other
53
forms of rent-seeking. Thus, absent limitations on the rule-making mandate, there are
47

As noted, the present discussion focuses on self-regulation pursuant to a statutory delegation although the
scholarly reference to self-regulation is normally broader. See Anthony Ogus, Self-Regulation, in Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest (eds.), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, Vol. IX, 587, 588-89 (2000). In its
most basic sense, the concept of self-regulation covers a large number of self-imposed rules and standards,
including those adopted by the head of a household, a firm’s management, or by political associations. While
these arrangements do not derive from state delegation and have no legal significance per se, they are
nevertheless relevant to mapping the spectrum of schemes and understanding their effect on social control.
48 See Adam C. Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Securities Markets, 26 REGULATION 32 (2003) (comparing the
incentives of securities exchanges and the state to regulate abuses in the securities markets and concludes that
exchanges are more likely to regulate in a way that optimizes the trade-off between investor protection and
minimizing the cost of regulation).
49 A prime example is the control of the Internet domain name system and the assignment of protocol
numbers, which the U.S. government entrusted to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), a nonprofit corporation. ICANN sets rules governing a medium of surpassing importance, thus
demonstrating that self-regulation is used to regulate conduct that bears significant impact on social welfare.
See Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 215-16 (2000).
50 See “Self-regulation,” in John Black, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 422 (2d ed., 2002) (self-regulation is
a system where the approach of government to regulating a sector is to lay down general objectives and to
entrust the rule-making task to a representative body of that sector).
51 These limitations are embodied in specific rule-making procedures that SROs must follow, and in
substantive factors that must be considered in formulating and adopting rules.
52 In some cases SROs must even obtain approval of the proposed rules from a designated agency, such as
the SEC, which must approve rules proposed by national securities exchanges.
53 Cf. Chris J. Hoofnagle, Privacy Self Regulation: A Decade of Disappointment (2005), at www.ssrn.com (the
Federal Trade Commission’s “Do-Not-Call” registry was a successful measure to protect consumer privacy,
whereas the self-regulation of consumer privacy on the Internet allowed firms to obfuscate their practices and
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no guarantees that SROs will adequately account for negative externalities. Concretely,
such rules may protect incumbents in the industry and entrench their market position,
erect inefficient barriers to entry and inhibit market competition, erode the quality of
services and products offered to consumers, and shield firms from liability. All of these
work to the detriment of consumers and other third-parties.
The sharing of regulatory responsibility with SROs has a lengthy historical
precedent and in recent years, has been expanding both domestically and abroad.54
Nowhere is the expansion of the self-regulation as prevalent as in the commercial,
financial, and business sectors.55 The most recent addition to the pool of SROs is the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a nonprofit company that was
established by Congress in 2002 as a response to governance crises in American public
corporations.56 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act entrusts the PCAOB with the task of overseeing
the audit of public companies in order to protect investors.57 To that end, “[t]he Board
shall establish or adopt, or both, by rule, auditing, quality control, ethics, independence,
and other standards relating to the preparation of audit reports for issuers.”58
Similarly, national securities exchanges that operate under the federal securities
laws and register with the SEC as such, are required to adopt rules that govern the
conduct of their members, including issuers, dealers, trading specialists, and other
financial market participants.59 Exercising its rule-making power, the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) has adopted a highly-detailed set of rules designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices,60 promote just and equitable principles
of securities trading,61 and provide a means by which the NYSE can take appropriate

thus failed to achieve this goal).
54 See Bernard S. Black, The Role of Self-Regulation in Supporting Korea’s Securities Markets, 3 J. KOREAN LAW 17
(2003) (in order to successfully compete for trading in shares of cross-listed Korean companies, Korea will need
both legislative change and stronger self-regulation of listed companies).
55 See, e.g., Joan M. Gilmour et al., Opening the Door to Complementary and Alternative Medicine: Self-Regulation
in Ontario, 24 LAW & POLICY 149 (2002) (discussing the Regulated Health Professions Act of 1991 that
established self-regulation in Ontario in the areas of complementary and alternative medicine).
56 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 101, PUB. L. NO. 107-204, 116 STAT. 745 (2002). The PCAOB replaces the
accounting industry’s private ordering peer review program. Research suggests that the peer review system
was efficacious. See Gilles Hilary & Clive S. Lennox, The Credibility of Self-Regulation: Evidence from the
Accounting Profession's Peer Review Program, 40 J. ACCNT. & ECON. 211 (2005) (peer review opinions provide
credible information about quality differences between firms).
57 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(a).
58 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(c)(2). As with other SROs, the Act delegates enforcement responsibility to
the PCAOB. Specifically, the PCAOB registers public accounting firms (§ 101(c)(1)); conducts inspections of
registered public accounting firms (§ 101(c)(3)); conducts investigations and disciplinary proceedings (§
101(c)(4)); and enforces compliance with the Act, the rules of the Board, professional standards, and the
securities laws relating to the preparation and issuance of audit reports (§ 101(c)(6)).
59 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.
60

NYSE rules seek to prevent misappropriation of customer funds and excessive or unauthorized
trading in customer accounts. See New York Stock Exchange Rule 408.
61 For example, all NYSE member firms are subject to the “know your customer” rule, which requires firms
to obtain essential facts about the customer that are important for the customer’s investment decisions. See
New York Stock Exchange Rule 405.
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disciplinary actions against its membership.62 NYSE self-regulation is subject to the
SEC, which reviews proposed rules, their intended purpose, and their statutory basis.63
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the trade organization of
the securities industry, has also been granted the mandate to regulate the conduct of its
members. As the world’s largest private-sector regulator of financial services, NASD
Regulation, Inc. touches upon virtually every aspect of the securities industry. By law,
every securities firm doing business with the American public must register with
NASD.64 Today, about 5,400 brokerage firms and more than 665,000 stockbrokers and
registered representatives fall under NASD’s regulatory jurisdiction. NASD’s selfregulation encompasses a wide array of issues, including the registration and conduct
of securities firms and the maintenance of the high-quality service of its members.65
Lastly, SRO-adopted rules must also be enforced in order to ensure adequate
compliance incentives and achieve the underlying statutory objectives.66 Lenient or
inadequate enforcement, however, will result in suboptimal compliance and—assuming
SROs on average adopt efficient rules—in some loss of social welfare.67 As with the
adoption of rules, this concern arises because SRO enforcement is prone to self-interest
and self-dealing, opportunism, and other forms of abuse. Suboptimal enforcement can
wear away the institutional advantages of SROs as a social control mechanism and
diminish the corresponding welfare gain. SROs’ enforcement policies are subject to
government oversight and to the threat of intervention, often resulting in higher
enforcement activity: just enough to preempt intervention.68

C. Regulation through Litigation
Regulation through litigation encompasses judge-made law declared in court
opinions and regulatory policies crafted in negotiated resolutions of large-scale
litigation. The latter has emerged in recent years as a new vehicle for regulating
62

The Exchange maintains a self-regulatory system, acting as the SEC-appointed Designated Examining
Authority with respect to member firms. See NYSE Regulation, at http://www.nyse.com/regulationl (last
visited Dec. 16, 2005).
63 The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), a self-regulatory organization established by
Congress in 1975, and supervised by the SEC, is the primary regulatory authority in the municipal securities
market. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78o-4(b). The MSRB can propose and adopt rules to effectuate the purposes of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to transactions in municipal securities. See Grandon v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., 147 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1998).
64 For detailed information about NASD’s regulatory and compliance architecture see NASD Rules &
Regulations, at http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&nodeId=6 (Dec. 16, 2005).
65 When necessary, NASD can bring enforcement actions against those who violate the rules. These actions
are handled by NASD enforcement mechanisms.
66 In order to ensure compliance, the NASD takes enforcement actions that include expelling and suspension
of member firms. See NASD Five-Year Statistical Review 2002–2006, at http://www.nasd.com (Dec. 19, 2005).
67 I assume that enforcement mechanisms used by SROs operate efficiently in that the social cost of
enforcement is lower than the social benefits gained from compliance. Given this assumption, lenient or
inadequate enforcement will necessarily result in social loss.
68 See Peter M. Demarzo et al., Self-Regulation and Government Oversight, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 687 (2005)
(assuming SROs seek to maximize their members’ welfare, SROs will choose a more lax enforcement policy
than what is necessary to protect customers unless the government monitors self-regulation and enforcement).
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conduct, thus blurring the institutional allocation of regulatory and adjudicatory
responsibilities between legislators and courts, respectively.69 Mega-lawsuits involving
asbestos risks,70 tobacco and gun injuries,71 breast implant defects,72 lead paint hazards,73
and other harmful products resulted in negotiated policies designed to settle these
lawsuits. In some instances, the vast liability exposure of industrial defendants worked
as a financial lever to impose a policy change on entire industrial sectors.74 To date, the
Master Settlement Agreement that was negotiated with the tobacco industry provides
the most noteworthy example of regulation through litigation.75
Regulatory policies negotiated in settlement usurp traditional legislative and
administrative rule-making mandates, as they do not emanate from a publicly-visible,
legislative rule-making process. Having been identified as a new form of social
engineering, such cases shiftedthe locus of policy -making to courtrooms, so as to
empower federal and state judges.76 In this respect, Alabama Attorney General
69 See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Overview, in W. Kip Viscusi (ed.), REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 1-20
(2002). The interaction between litigation and regulation emerges because many of the economic rationales
underlying regulation, including forms of market failures (e.g., negative externalities to people not parties to a
market exchange, asymmetric consumer information) also give rise to the mega-lawsuits discussed below.
70 Historically, exposure to asbestos risks has not been subject to stringent regulation. Yet, the wave of
asbestos-related litigation has induced the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to introduce a strict regulatory framework, thus creating strong
incentives to reduce asbestos-related risks and injuries.
71 The gun litigation involved lawsuits brought by local governments against the firearms industry, seeking
to hold it liable for the cost associated with gun violence. Inspired by the tobacco cases, the litigation was
initiated by New Orleans and Chicago and followed by thirty other cities. See David Kairys, The Cities Take the
Initiative: Public Nuisance Lawsuits against Handgun Manufacturers, in GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
363-83 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 2003). The settlement introduced regulatory measures, including changes in
safety devices and distribution of firearms. See Phillip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Litigation as Regulation: Firearms,
in Viscusi, supra note 69, at 67
- 93 (analyzing the settlement’s regulatory impact).
72 The litigation resulted in a multibillion dollar class settlement, providing compensation for injuries and
thereby forcing manufacturers out of the market. While the settlement did not introduce regulatory measures,
it played an important role in generating risk-related information and, consequently, leading the FDA to ban
implants. See Joni Hersch, Breast Implants: Regulation, Litigation, and Science, in Viscusi, supra note 69, at 142-43.
73 See Randall Lutter & Elizabeth Mader, Litigating Lead-Based Paint Hazards, in Viscusi, supra note 69, at 105135 (the lead paint wave of litigation, including lawsuits of state and local governments against paint
manufacturers and lawsuits of tenants against landlords, was a poor institutional solution to address social
problems associated with lead exposure).
74 Cf. Rubenstein, supra note 9 (the settlement of large class action lawsuits are essentially significant
commercial transactions in which defendants purchase finality).
75 This settlement led to the imposition of charges on future consumers on a per unit basis and thus ended
lawsuits brought by state governments to recover Medicaid expenses that they had attributed to tobacco
consumption. The charges imposed (essentially, an excise tax), were expected to award plaintiffs (i.e., forty-six
states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories) $229 billion over a period of twenty-six years, from
1999 to 2025. The settlement also introduced regulatory restrictions concerning tobacco advertising (which,
arguably, had anticompetitive effects). See David M. Cutler et al., The Economic Impacts of the Tobacco Settlement,
21 J. POLICY ANAL. & MANAG. 1 (2002) (examining the impact of the settlement on health costs).
76 Judge Weinstein of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York observes that in mass
tort cases (including the Agent Orange case over which he presided) “judges have found themselves involved in
settlement discussions in a manner that would be unusual in an ordinary tort case or a commercial dispute.”
See Jack Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation 102-3 (1995).
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pointedly observed that “[t]he aim of this litigation [was] to shift the awesome powers
of the legislative bodies—powers to control commercial regulation, taxation, and
appropriation—to the judicial branch of government. With that shift comes an assault
on civil rights, democratic representation, and free enterprise.”77
Compared with state-mandated regulation or even self-regulation, regulatory
measures crafted through settlements of large-scale litigation involve very limited
public input or expertise.78 Even worse, these policies are subject to virtually no
institutional accountability. Not surprisingly, this phenomenon has been subject to
harsh criticism on the grounds that devising regulatory policies through litigation
disenfranchises constituencies and is therefore anti-democratic.79 This result is by and
large inevitable, owing to the institutional constraints within which courts operate.80
Courts (and this is no secret) are not capable, let alone well-positioned to take into
account macro-level and diverse societal considerations that ought to shape the
regulatory choice.81 They lack the tools necessary to evaluate the impact and
desirability of a given regulatory policy.82
Similar limitations, not to mention rational self-interest, confine or even inherently
bias the capacity of the parties to craft effective, socially-balanced regulatory policies.83
For, as publicly-minded as plaintiffs’ attorneys may be, they cannot—nor do they have
the incentives to—adequately represent the social interests in question.84 It therefore
77

See State Attorney Generals and the Power to Change the Law, in REGULATION BY LITIGATION: THE NEW WAVE
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED LITIGATION 1, 3-6 (Manhattan Institute, 1999) (suits against the tobacco and
firearms industries trample upon the separation of powers as a defining feature of the rule of law).
78 See Peter H. Schuck, Why Regulating Guns Through Litigation Won’t Work?, in SUING THE FIREARMS INDUSTRY:
A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 225-249 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2004)
(hereinafter: “Why Regulating Guns Through Litigation Won’t Work?”) (presenting a comparative institutional
analysis of courts and regulators and argues that regulators are unquestionably better equipped than judges to
address and manage gun-related risks).
79 James Wootton, President of the Institute of Legal Reform at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, observed
that “[w]hen issues of great importance are settled by undemocratic means, people feel that they have been
shut out of the decision-making process.” See Litigation or Government Regulation, in REGULATION THROUGH
LITIGATION: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF BOUNTY HUNTERS AND BUREAUCRATS IN THE AMERICAN REGULATORY REGIME
1, 2 (1999) (hereinafter: “Litigation or Government Regulation”).
80 For a discussion of the institutional constraints within which courts operate, see Lon L. Fuller, The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
81 Commentators observe that, as a general matter, “legislatures have the comparative advantage over courts
in acquiring, evaluating, and acting upon the relevant expert information and knowledge needed for rationally
and reliably determining the appropriate standard of optimal precautions and the mode of enforcing the
standard. … The questions implicated by those judgments … span multiple, diverse disciplines, including
science, technology, business organization and finance, economics, and distributive and other public policies.”
See Charles Fried & David Rosenberg, Making Tort Law: What Should Be Done and Who Should Do It 94 (2003).
82 Arguably, government regulation is appropriate when policy decisions apply to an entire product line or
market. Design defects and safety issues should be assessed and set on a product-wide basis. See W. Kip
Viscusi, Overview, in Viscusi, supra note 69, at 1-2.
83 Surely, plaintiffs’ attorneys (hired by the government to handle mega-lawsuits) and, more so, corporate
defendants not only tailor settlement terms to promote self-interests, but also consider short time-horizons and
less information than is necessary to design socially-desirable regulatory measures.
84 See Litigation or Government Regulation, supra note 79, at 1-2 (discussing conflicts of interest affecting the
conduct of private attorneys who lead these cases).
OF
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stands to reason that regulatory measures crafted and shaped by repeat corporate
defendants in order to settle mega-lawsuits will pass judicial muster despite their
inherent self-serving features.85 Thus, regulation through litigation can be viewed as an
especially troubling version of regulatory capture, wherein “regulators” are bridled by
and serve the interests of those whose conduct they are expected to regulate.86
Lastly, these institutional shortcomings worsen when decisions that shape the
“regulatory” end-product are delegated to juries on a case-by-case basis. Juries, as we
know, are ill-equipped to systematically analyze risk, information, and other matters
that arise in such cases and ultimately bear on the negotiated policy. Behavioraleconomic research demonstrates the cognitive failings and mental heuristics to which
jurors are prone, including hindsight, anchoring, availability, and framing biases.87
Given these institutional hindrances, regulation through litigation is destined to
prescribe socially-inefficient regulatory measures.88

D. Private Ordering as a Regulator of Conduct
Private ordering operates as a regulator of conduct in certain social contexts.89 For
instance, the case of eBay, which hosts the world’s largest online trading community,
provides a fascinating example of the role and functioning of private ordering in
regulating a community and the behavior of its members. Members buy and sell in
85 Documenting the institutional shift from litigation to regulation, economists Edward Glaeser and Andrei
Shleifer observed that during the Progressive Era, the U.S. replaced litigation by regulation as the principal
mechanism for the social control of business. Explaining this shift, they suggest that courts are more
vulnerable to subversion than regulators, especially given the significant inequality in distribution of wealth
and political power in society. See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State,
HARVARD INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1924 (2001), at http://www.ssrn.com.
86 See Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory
Capture (1988) (explaining regulatory capture). Empirical research shows that regulatory capture is associated
with distorted incentives, social welfare losses, and lower growth rates. See Irina Slinko et al., Laws for Sale: An
Empirical Study of the Effects of Regulatory Capture, CEFIR DISCUSSION PAPER (2004), at http://www.ssrn.com.
87 Kip Viscusi reports a study that demonstrates that jury-eligible citizens do not properly apply negligence
rules. Data gathered in this study shows that jurors are particularly prone to erroneous risk beliefs and are
subject to the zero-risk mentality. See W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30
J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2001); see also W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 313 (2001) (anchoring effects of appeals by plaintiff’s lawyers or media coverage lead jurors to abandon
punitive damages formulas). While a balance of risks and costs lies at the heart of the negligence standard,
jurors penalize corporate defendants in instances in which the company performed risk analyses and decided
against making a safety improvement after the analysis indicated that the improvement was unwarranted. See
W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547 (2000).
88 To clarify, I do not claim that the legislative or administrative processes are free of errors or other
shortcomings. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & James T. Hamilton, Are Risk Regulators Rational? Evidence from
Hazardous Waste Cleanup Decisions, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1010 (1999) (target risk levels chosen by regulators with
respect to the cleanup of hazardous waste sites are inefficient, as they are largely a function of political
variables and risk perception biases, including the anchoring and the availability heuristics).
89 Research in this area focuses on the “potential enforcement mechanisms [that are] available to support
agreements” without reliance on legal norms. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Contract Law is Not Enough: The Many
Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
(Claude Manard & Mary Shirley eds., 2004); see also See John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order
under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2433 (2000).
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auctions conducted on the eBay website. Over the last decade the community has
grown exponentially, reaching as many as 150 million registered members worldwide
who are set to buy and sell goods worth more than $40 billion.90 As The Economist
observed, “from being a website begun as a hobby and often used to trade collectibles
such as Beanie Babies, it has become an economy in its own right.”91 The success of this
marketplace depends on the ability of buyers and sellers to feel secure in conducting
transactions. Ensuring fair dealing, deterring fraud, and providing mechanisms to
enforce online transactions are therefore essential to this community. Even though
activity conducted on eBay’s trading platform is subject to state law, eBay has
supplemented the law with its own policies and rules, all of which are designed to
maintain a secure online environment.92 To that end, “eBay’s reputation-management
[and dispute resolution system] establishes a level of order and trust.”93
The regulatory use of private ordering flourishes in many sectors and
organizations94 including the Japanese mafia;95 in the U.S. cotton industry;96 and among
Jewish Ultra-Orthodox diamond merchants in the New York City.97 Moreover, the
societal interests served by private ordering predate the Internet.98 It is known, for
example, that (similar to Internet-age eBay) pre-legal societies that reigned in the
Mediterranean in the Medieval period relied upon private ordering to facilitate
90 See Anniversary Lessons from eBay, THE ECONOMIST, June 11, 2005 at 11 (discussing the exponential growth
of eBay’s trading community and the main features of its trading platform). “The remarkable tale of eBay’s
growth points to some important lessons ... To succeed, firms need … to listen carefully to their customers,
paying close attention to what they do and don’t want.” Id.
91 See Meg and the Power of Many: The World’s Biggest Online Auctioneer is Trading on a New Sort of Future, THE
ECONOMIST, June 11, 2005 at 63 (hereinafter: Meg and the Power of Many).
92 For example, eBay offers a dispute-resolution service and buyers and sellers who violate the trading rules
can be expelled. See Meg and the Power of Many, supra note 91, at 63, 64, 66 (discussing rules that govern trading
on eBay’s platform and the PayPal money transfer system that reduces the probability of fraud). See also David
P. Baron & David Hoyt, eBay: Private Ordering for an Online Community (2001) (same).
93 See Meg and the Power of Many, supra note 91, at 63. When a transaction is completed, buyers and sellers
are invited to rate how successful it has been and review the other party. These reviews can be read by all
users. Indeed, many users have come to value their reputations because traders earning sufficient positive
feedback from parties with whom they have transacted are eligible for refunds.
94 For a survey see Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of
Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328 (2005). See also Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors
Settle Disputes (1991) (ranchers in Shasta county rely on privately-set principles to settle disputes).
95 See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical
Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41 (2000) (enforcement mechanisms used by mafia members).
96 See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms,
and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (arbitration system used by farmers and cotton merchants).
97 See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (regulation and enforcement of trading in New York City’s diamond district).
98 See, e.g., Karen Clay, Trade without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California, 13 J. L. ECON. & ORG.
202 (1997). A particular private ordering institution, the Community Responsibility System, was important in
supporting impersonal exchange from as early as the twelfth century despite the lack of state enforcement of
contracts. See Avner Greif, On the Social Foundations and Historical Development of Institutions that Facilitate
Impersonal Exchange: From the Community Responsibility System to Individual Legal Responsibility in Pre-Modern
Europe, STANFORD UNIVERSITY ECONOMIC WORKING PAPER NO. 97016 (1997).
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exchange and economic growth.99
In sum, private ordering provides an effective self-enforcing regulatory institution
where state law is either undeveloped or non-existent; where reliance on state law is not
a viable option (due to, for example, regulatory capture and other rent-seeking
behaviors that result in inherently-biased legal norms); and, lastly, where enforcement
institutions are ineffective (e.g., where the judiciary is prone to political subversion).100

E. Social Norms as Regulators of Conduct
Extra-legal regulatory measures encompass social norms which, like private
ordering, regulate conduct for which a consensus has emerged.101 Conceptually, a social
norm is a rule that is neither formally promulgated, nor enforced by a threat of legal
sanctions. Unlike legal rules, norms do not follow from a well-defined, deliberative
rule-making process but, rather, result from the gradual, decentralized emergence of a
social accord concerning a particular conduct.102 Repeated behavioral patterns
gradually ossify into a custom and subsequently into a norm.103 This is why norms are
accorded presumptive legitimacy and provide an effective control mechanism.104
Enforcement of norms relies upon such mechanisms as the inculcation of values
and social sanctions. When the underlying values are properly internalized, an
individual will experience remorse when in violation of a norm. Both the magnitude of
one’s remorse and the incentives to comply are affected by how well (or how poorly)
the norm is complied with by others.105 Social sanctions, on the other hand, include
99

See Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, Ch. 3 (2006)
(private-order contract enforcement institutions used by the Maghribi traders). The evolution of medieval
trade was positively correlated with the creation of self-enforcing institutions, which supplied means for the
enforcement of contracts. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the
Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993). See also Avner Greif et al., Coordination, Commitment,
and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745 (1994) (merchant guilds in the late
Medieval period explain how merchants trusted one another).
100 See John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Dispute Resolution without Courts in Vietnam, 15 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 637, 644 (1999).
101 For reviews of the economic literature see Kaushik Basu, Social Norms and the Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998) and Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
102 Experiments show that cooperation among individuals facing social dilemmas increases if they are
allowed to communicate before making a choice because intra-group communication elicits social norms to
which the group adheres. See Cristina Bicchieri, Covenants Without Swords: Group Identity, Norms, and
Communication in Social Dilemmas, 14 RATIONALITY & SOCIETY 192 (2002).
103 New norms can compete with established norms. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) (“norm cascades” develop when rapid shifts occur due to fragile social conditions);
see also Kuran Timur, Ethnic Norms and their Transformation through Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623
(1998) (norms may become more demanding over time). The prevailing norms are not necessarily socially
efficient. See Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm
Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2027 (2001) (evolutionary forces may lead away from efficient norms).
104 See Social Norms, with a Note on Religion, in Richard A. Posner, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 288, 289 (2001).
105 See Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and
Organizational Cultures, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 390 (1994) (subjective expectations concerning the likelihood of
violations by others influence one’s decision whether or not to violate the norm because the higher the
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refusals to interact with the offender; denial of social benefits; condemnation of one’s
conduct; feelings of shame, guilt, and humiliation; and loss of reputation.106
Lastly, the regulatory domain of social norms comprises a wide variety of activities:
etiquette, tipping,107 and business practices108 are but a few examples.109 Many
commonplace behaviors are in fact norm- rather than law-driven. Yet, because social
norms are basically a public good—as no one can claim credit for creating or enforcing a
welfare-enhancing norm—their creation and enforcement will be insufficient given
what is optimal for the group as a whole.

II. THE SOCIAL LANDSCAPE RE-EXAMINED:
LEGISLATIVE THREATS AS REGULATORS OF SOCIAL CONTROL
Though legislative threats function as regulators of conduct, they are anything but
standard legal norms; nor do they qualify as extra-legal norms. In fact, in distinct
contrast to legal and extra-legal control of social co
nduct , legislative threats present an
innovative, unaccounted for regulatory strategy. As the analysis below shows,
legislative threats control social behavior in an entirely different manner than that
which underlies formal legal rules. Legislative threats may bear a wielding effect on the
conduct of firms and organizations to which the threat is directed, thus inducing these
entities to radically alter their behavior so as to bring it in line with the threat.
Notwithstanding their potent regulatory impact, legislative threats neither result
from a rule-making process nor are they accompanied by a formal enforcement
mechanism. Analytically, legislative threats do not fit within any of the aforementioned
regulatory schemes. They are not the end-product of a state-mandated regulation of
conduct nor do they qualify as rules adopted pursuant to a state license granted to
private lawmaking bodies (firms, trade organizations, professions, etc.) to engage in the
self-regulation of conduct. Counter-intuitively, the capacity of legislative threats to
control behavior arises from an absence of any rule-making product.110
Against this backdrop, the theory I develop below presents a coherent, analytic
account of legislative threats as an innovative regulatory mechanism. Section A
examines ten case studies that are drawn from diverse areas of social control and
demonstrate the ubiquitous use of legislative threats as regulators of social conduct.
Section B subsequently presents an analytic taxonomy of threats that includes explicit,
implicit and anticipatory legislative threats. This taxonomy is valuable not merely
likelihood, the lower the remorse one will experience).
106 See Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions,
19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369 (1999) (sanctions for violating social norms include guilt, shame, and retaliation).
107 See Ofer H. Azar, The Social Norm of Tipping: Does It Improve Social Welfare?, 85 J. Econ. 141 (2005) (the
norm of tipping, responsible for $26 billion a year in gross tipping in U.S. restaurants, enhances social welfare).
108 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999) (social norms play
an important role in shaping the conduct of officers and directors); Edward B. Rock, Norms & Corporate Law,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001) (social norms define corporate culture and explain the manner in which the law,
in the absence of bright line rules, influences corporate governance).
109 See Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365 (1997).
110 This effect on behavior, to which I refer as the “inducement effect”, is explained in Part III below.
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because it enhances the analytic precision of our understanding of these threats but,
more practically, because it delineates the actual boundaries of the phenomenon of
legislative threats. The taxonomy also helps to identify instances that would otherwise
not be recognized as legislative threats, thus bringing to light the actual scope of this
phenomenon. Lastly, the taxonomy generates insights that are necessary to explain the
intricate mechanism underlying the inducement effect and capacity of legislative threats
to regulate social conduct.

A. How Do Legislators Go about Doing their Legislative Business?
We are accustomed to thinking about the role of legislators and the function that the
legislative process serves in a rather straightforward fashion, namely—that benevolent
legislators propose, craft, and work to enact legislative measures that control social and
governmental conduct and enhance social welfare.111 Further, we ordinarily think that
it is precisely to that end that they debate and deliberate, hold committee hearings and
plenary sessions, employ staff and aids, negotiate terms with their opponents, draft and
redraft proposed bills, and exercise their legislative powers.112 The legislative process,
we tend to presume without a great deal of skepticism, is designed to produce a formal
piece of legislationsuch as the recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
This rather utopian representation of the legislative process fails on two counts,
however—(i) the public choice count, and (ii) the instrumental count. First, legislators—
and this is not a secret or a surprise—conduct their political business so as to advance
their political self-interest113 and not necessarily the social good.114 Instead, the
regulatory initiatives and decision-making of legislators in many areas of social policy
often cater to special interests and, hence, can only be explained by the steadfast pursuit
of political and personal gain.115 Second, even if we assume goodwill on the part of
111

As rational choice theorists argue, there is hardly any doubt that political agents in charge of regulatory
policy do not always exhibit a strong benevolent commitment to advance social welfare. Rather, in advancing
their own self-interest, policymakers often cater to special interests. See Peter T. Leeson, How Much Benevolence
is Benevolent Enough?, forthcoming in PUBLIC CHOICE (2005) (in the absence of an enforcement mechanism that
punishes political agents who cater to special interests, benevolence is an all-or-nothing proposition; unless
benevolence is complete, society at large fares no better than if politicians were strictly self-interested).
112 Legislators are busy doing other things too, primarily raising funds necessary to cover the fast-rising costs
of statewide electoral campaigns. See Richard E. Neustadt, Foreword to the 2001 Edition, in Eric Redman, THE
DANCE OF LEGISLATION: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WORKINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 8-10 (2001).
113 See generally Pierre Lemieux, The Public Choice Revolution, 27 REGULATION 22 (2004) (when acting as voters,
politicians, or bureaucrats, individuals remain self-interested and try to maximize their utility).
114 To be sure, senators and House representatives may exercise their legislative mandate to enact legislative
measures to promote benevolent preferences, partisan objectives, and self-interest. In fact, a policy decision
that seems to reflect a public choice pathology may in reality stem from prioritized preferences. See, e.g.,
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553
(2001) (differences in the scope of state and federal environmental protection stem from varying intensities of
environmental preference rather than from public choice pathologies).
115 For an expression of the public choice critique of welfare economics see James M. Buchanan, Politics,
Policy, and the Pigouvian Margins, 29 ECONOMICA 17 (1962) (the welfare economic method for analyzing the case
for state regulation is misguided as it ignores the political determination of social policies). See also Timothy J.
Besley & Stephen Coate, The Public Choice Critique of Welfare Economics: An Exploration, NBER WORKING PAPERS
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legislators, it still does not follow as a matter of strict logic that legislators will
necessarily rely upon legislative measures as the instrument of choice to control
conduct and maintain social order. Rather, even benevolent legislators may—and in
many instances do—use legislative threats rather than legislative measures to induce
regulatory changes that promote the social good.
I argue that the inner workings of legislators on Capitol Hill, at the House of
Parliament, or at the Bundestag are far more intricate than what is ordinarily thought or
commonly observed.116 Counter-intuitively, the day-to-day legislative business and the
use of the legislative process more generally are often strategically designed to serve a
contrary objective. That is, to avoid enacting a new legislative measure altogether. The
legislative process is frequently used solely to exert threats of impending legislation
rather than to enact any legislative measure. Therefore, the formal and observable body
of legislative measures is nothing but the tip of the “regulatory” iceberg. It certainly
does not account for the full picture, which must also encompass legislative threats and
the ensuing body of invisible law (i.e., informal regulation of social conduct).
The prevalent use of legislative threats incorporates all areas of activity, ranging
from cyber-security and e-piracy to digital obscenity and air-pollution; from hazardous
waste recycling to greenhouse gas emissions; from D&O compensation and money
laundering to fighting obesity117 and the use of illegal substances. Notably, legislative
threats provide an effective regulatory strategy to control the behavior of firms,
organizations, professions, industrial sectors, and governmental agencies.118 In certain
cases, legislative threats have even been used by the federal government and federal

NO. 7083 (1999), at http://econpapers.repec.org.
116 The complex inner workings of Congress have bewildered researchers, resulting in an incomplete
understanding of how this institution functions. In the postwar era, researchers implicitly assumed that the
Senate, as an institution, is made up of one hundred Senators, notwithstanding the fact that Senate staff has
grown to approximately 3,000 individuals. Eric Redman, a former member of Senator Magnuson’s staff, has
observed that “[i]t was as if the academic community had looked at the glamorous and highly visible tip of an
iceberg and declared that tip to be the iceberg; the other 97 percent of the individuals [] who support that tip,
were simply left in the murky depths. [A]nyone who knew the Senate would know that to ignore the role of
staff is to ignore [] Senate reality.” See Redman, supra note 112, at 17 (emphasis in original).
117 See Ben Leepman, New Curbs Planned on Sweet Sales and Smoking, EVENING STANDARD, Mar. 3, 2004,
available at http://www.findarticles.com (the U.K. Health Secretary’s threatened legislation which would have
prohibited promotion of harmful food products in order to reduce obesity rates).
118 Legislative threats are also directed towards federal and state administrative agencies, thus inducing
regulators to comply with the threat or face the risk of adverse legislation including, for example, strict
statutory standards, stricter review of agency actions, and revocation of delegation. See Senate Democrats Back
off Calls for Price Cap Legislation, June 19, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/allpolitics/06/19/senate.energy
(a threat of federal legislation to impose price caps on electricity for the western U.S. induced the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission to extend price mitigation measures for California and ten other states in the
West). See also Drew Edwards, Bill Banning NCAA Sports Gambling to Reach Congress, 86 THE DAILY BEACON,
Jan. 30, 2001 (reporting that seeking to forestall a threatened legislation from being considered by Congress, the
Nevada Gaming Commission recommended that the gambling industry limits bets on college sporting events
to $550). Cf. Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 41 (1993) (hereinafter:
“Breaking the Vicious Circle”) (describing statutory amendments that “provide a strict statutory standard [] and
… statutory ‘hammers’ designed to force EPA to promulgate standards”).
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legislators to regulate the conduct of U.S. states.119
The discussion below revolves around ten case studies that demonstrate how
legislators actually go about doing their business and achieving their regulatory
objectives. These diverse cases illustrate how legislators and government officials
strategically exercise their institutional mandate and rule-making power to exert
legislative threatsand u ltimately, how these threats function as regulators of conduct.

1. Cyber-security
Recently, officials from the Department of Homeland Security grew concerned with
the inadequate security measures presently taken by the U.S. computer industry to
make computer and network infrastructure sufficiently secure from the imminent risks
of terrorist cyber-attacks.120 Seeking to address this concern, the officials convened
about 350 computer executives and software developers to discuss these issues, share
information on the risk of cyber-attacks, learn of the efforts currently being undertaken,
and evaluate possible solutions to mitigate the problem.121
Having examined the nature of the problem, the officials warned the captains of the
computer industry that either they step up to the plate and voluntarily align their
practices with the standards that the Department of Homeland Security considers
necessary to guard against the risk of cyber-attacks or the officials would seek to enact
into law an adverse legislative measure. Among other things, the threatened legislation
would regulate the conduct of these companies, impose minimum security standards,
and secure a desirable solution to this social concern.122

119 In a recent paper, Mark Roe re-conceptualized the race-to-the-top theory of state competition in corporate
law. Roe argues that Delaware’s competitive pressure comes not from other states but from the federal
government. He posit that when the issue is important, the federal government either takes over the issue or
threatens to do so, thereby making Delaware legislators conscious that if they misstep, federal authorities could
step in. The threat that important issues will be taken away if Delaware players damaged the economy or riled
powerful interests has conditioned Delaware’s behavior in shaping its corporate law. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, enacted following the corporate governance failures in Enron and WorldCom, demonstrates, in Roe’s
opinion, how Congress took over corporate law issues. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 588 (2003). See also Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005) (claiming that interest
groups dominating Delaware lawmaking forgo a winner-takes-all strategy fearing that federal legislators may
act if results are lopsided; and that state-level players want to minimize federal intervention in corporate law).
120 Conveying the security concern, Tom Ridge, secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, said that
“’[i]t only takes one vulnerable system to start a chain reaction that can lead to devastating results.’” See John
Markhoff, U.S. Pressing Industry on Technology Security, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at C8.
121 The meeting took place at the National Cyber Security Summit that was sponsored by the Department of
Homeland Security. Among those attending the Summit were technology companies and industry trade
groups. See Markhoff, supra note 120, at C8. As I demonstrate in Part III(C), the presence of trade
organizations bears significant impact on the incentives of industry participants to comply with the threat.
122 See Markhoff, supra note 120, at C8 (describing the meeting between the government officials and the
industry participants and the information they exchanged). A draft legislative proposal would have also
required companies to disclose their security status in the financial reports they file with the SEC. Presumably,
poor security status would have been priced by the financial market, thus affecting the market value and stock
price of these companies and increasing their cost of capital.
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The officials’ threat of legislation followed the National Strategy for Secure
Cyberspace that the government had issued a year earlier in order to improve the
security of computer networks.123 Silicon Valley executives claimed, however, that the
Strategy had not been given sufficient attention and proper priority at the industry
level. Indeed, “many specific propositions … were reportedly eschewed at the request
of an industry hesitant to being forced to do anything.”124
Underscoring the threat, the officials blatantly stated that “[t]here are a lot of people
who are willing to legislate. If that’s what you want, I can promise you that’s what you’re
going to get.”125 Plainly, this story demonstrates the use of an explicit legislative
threat.126 The captains of the computer industry (i.e., the threat-recipients) were
presented with a binary choice. They could either strictly comply with the demands or
face the risk of adverse legislation and suffer its negative consequences. No doubt, the
officials got their way, as industry executives reacted by saying that the
“administration’s message had been unambiguous.”127
In response to the impending threat, four major business associations that were
present at the Summit formed an industry-wide group (aptly labeled the National
Cyber Security Summit Alliance). They formed five specialized working groups to
study the security problem, devise measures to reduce vulnerability, and to develop a
specific plan.128 This Alliance, which vowed to have “initial deliverables” by a specific
date,129 was the first significant step towards fending off the legislative threat.130

2. E-Piracy
Electronic piracy is one of the least desirable offshoots of technological progress in
an information-based economy.131 In recent years, the prospects of e-piracy over the
Internet have given rise to another area of regulatory concern, as piracy threatens to
reduce Internet traffic, undermine e-commerce, impose significant anti-piracy costs on

123

See The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/.
See News Release: U.S. Businesses Promise Security Plan by March 1, 2004, SCOTLAND IS, at
http://www.scotlandis.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2004). Furthermore, “[s]ince the Bush administration released
its National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace … there has been a lot of talk about how to implement it, more calls
to action … and not a great deal of concrete activity.” Id.
125 Id. (emphasis added).
126 Legislative threats are classified into three categories which include explicit threats, implicit threats, and
anticipatory threats. A detailed discussion is presented in Part II(B) below.
127 A chief executive who attended the Summit stated that “’[c]learly the message was that if private
enterprise doesn’t start embracing this, more is to follow.’” Id.
128 Microsoft Inc., through its Chief Security Strategist, led the most important working group in charge of
putting together technological measures to actually secure the software that potential cyber-terrorists would
exploit. Surely, this reveals Microsoft’s assessment of the harsh consequences that an adverse legislative
measure would entail for the industry as a whole and for Microsoft in particular.
129 See News Release: U.S. Businesses Promise Security Plan by March 1, 2004, supra note 124 (“It seems that the
threat of legislation has kicked-started things”).
130 Id. (the Alliance created a public-private self-regulation partnership).
131 See Thomas A. Stewart, The Wealth of Knowledge: Intellectual Capital and the Twenty-first Century
Organization, 91-95 (2001) (the emergence of real-time activity is a key feature of technological progress).
124
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businesses and consumers, and thwart consumer benefits from increased economic
competition. In an attempt to address this concern, the Federal Trade Commission’s
threat to legislate e-privacy standards induced commercial Internet sites to self-regulate
so as to protect consumers.132
In 2002, responding to worries about the unauthorized sharing of digital media, the
Federal Communications Commission stepped into the arena of e-piracy in an effort to
prevent piracy via digital TV. The concern focused on the piracy of copyrighted content
and the unauthorized distribution of such content over the Internet for use by others.
To address the problem, FCC regulators decided to mandate, as a minimum standard,
the use of “broadcast flag” technology that was uniquely designed to prevent piracy of
digital signals.133 The FCC also invited comments on a variety of topics and issues
related to this proposed measure. Giving a clear signal that the FCC was keen on taking
an action to halt e-piracy, the FCC’s Commissioner warned that the decision should
“‘make clear to various industry stakeholders that they have only a small window to
reachagreement … or they will face a solution imposed on them in the near-term
future.’”134 This statement rendered the legislative threat unambiguous.
The FCC’s regulatory threat—namely, the decision to impose mandatory
technological measures unless the industry devised a voluntary solution—followed an
earlier threat. Working with both Republican and Democrat co-sponsors,135 Senator
Ernest Hollings, who chaired the Commerce and Science Committee, introduced a bill
that would have required Silicon Valley technology firms and Hollywood
entertainment and content producers to agree on a standard to stop digital piracy of
copyrighted content.136 According to the Hollings bill, the government would step in
and mandate a solution if the industry did not reach an agreement within one year.
Stating that the “the two sides needed the threat of legislation to make further
progress,” Senator Hollings issued an explicit threat and circulated draft versions of the
threatened legislation to high-tech and media companies aiming to induce an industryengineered solution.137 The Hollings bill was introduced only after hearings that had
been held before the Commerce and Science Committee had been unsuccessful in

132

See Mary Mosquera, FTC Threat to Regulate E-Privacy Gets Real, TECH WEB, May 30, 2000, at
http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB20000530S0006 (FTC “had used the threat of legislation as a cattle
prod … to get more commercial Internet sites involved in self-regulation”).
133 “Broadcast flag” technology is a sequence of digital bits that instruct electronic devices not to play pirated
content. With this technology in place, consumers could make copies for their own use but would be
prevented from distributing the copyrighted material over the Internet.
134 See Stephen Chiger, FCC Steps into Digital Copyright Debate, PCWORLD.COM, Aug. 8, 2002, at
http://www.pcworld.com. The FCC’s decision, it was reported, “represents new government pressure for
industry groups to create [a] system on their own for digital rights management.” Id.
135 Co-sponsorship may bear significantly on the credibility of the legislative threat and therefore on the
compliance incentives of firms and the inducement effect of the threat.
136 See Bill would Prevent Sharing of Digital Music, Video, USA TODAY.COM, Mar. 22, 2002, at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2002/03/22/digital-piracy.htm.
137 Id. Senator Hollings added that “’[g]iven the pace of private talks so far, the private sector needs a nudge.
The government can provide that nudge.’” Id.
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reaching an agreed-upon solution.138 Instead, media companies including Disney Inc.
used those hearings to accuse technology firms, including Intel Inc., of profiting from
digital piracy. Such non
- cooperative behavior rapidly became cooperative once a
legislative threat was issued.
The companies began negotiating the standard
technology in the shadow of this threat.

3. Digital Obscenity
Recently, the House Judiciary Committee’s Copyright Subcommittee launched an
investigation into a dispute between the Directors Guild of America (DGA), a
representative body of directors and film studios that make up the U.S. movie industry,
and a Utah-based manufacturer that sells DVD players capable of editing-out sex,
profanity, violence, and foul language from films.139 The dispute arose because,
arguably, editing-out such materials violates artistic copyrighted content.
The Judiciary Committee expressed the interest that the industry and the
manufacturer end the dispute. The Committee’s chair threatened to introduce formal
legislation to address these issues and solve the dispute if the parties did not reach an
agreement. The threat was subsequently “renewed … when DGA representatives met
with the lawmaker and his staff” and “were made aware of Congressman Smith’s [i.e.,
the chair of the Copyright Subcommittee] intense interest” in having that matter
resolved.140 Lo and behold, the threats induced Hollywood (notwithstanding the
lawsuit it had filed to enjoin the violating conduct) to enter into negotiations with the
company in an attempt to reach a satisfactory solution and avert the risk of legislation.

4. D&O Compensation
The terms governing the appointment, compensation, and removal of officers and
directors in public companies are an important dimension of corporate governance.141
The correlation between pay and performance (or a lack thereof) has attracted a great
deal of public interest in the wake of the unprecedented corporate fraud scandals that
broke out in Enron and WorldCom (in the U.S.) and Parmalat (in Europe).142
138

Disney CEO Michael Eisner considered the Hollings bill a positive development, reasoning that the “’bill
provides the needed discipline of a deadline for the conclusion of industry negotiations.’” Id.
139 See Brooks Boliek, DGA Edits Itself from House Hearing, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER.COM, May 20, 2004, at
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com.
140 Lawmakers outlined various options for introducing legislation if the parties did not comply with the
legislative threat. See Brooks Boliek, Lawmakers Push Fast-forward to Settle DVD Dispute, THE HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER.COM, May 20, 2004, at http://www.Hollywoodreporter.com.
141 See generally Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive
Compensation (2004) (structural flaws in corporate governance enable managers to influence their own pay,
prevent corporate boards from negotiating at arm’s length with the executives they are meant to oversee,
produce widespread distortions in executive pay, and decouple compensation from performance).
142 Fraudulent corporate conduct has different manifestations in the U.S. than in Europe. For a comparative
discussion of such scandals, earnings management, and financial irregularities see John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory
of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ (COLUM. L. & ECON. WORKING PAPER NO. 274, 2005)
(dispersed ownership governance systems that characterize U.S. public companies are prone to earnings
management, while concentrated ownership governance systems that are typical in European companies are
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Entrenchment of board members (known as “classified boards”) and the ensuing
insulation of management from removal have since been looked at unfavorably.143
It is precisely against this backdrop, that investor rebellion over a potential £22
million payoff to the poorly-performing CEO of the pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmith
Kline and large payments to directors at the telecom company Marconi
(notwithstanding the company’s business failures), led members of the U.K. Parliament
to realize that increased pay-performance sensitivity is needed.144 To that end, MPs
directed a clear threat of legislation to public companies, seeking to end these
practices.145 If enacted, the legislation would require that companies stop rewarding
ineffectual directors who failed to promote the best interests of their shareholders.146
This legislative threat changed the corporate landscape in Britain, forcing public
companies to reduce the length of directors’ contracts and forge a close link between
compensation and performance. In order to ensure sustained compliance with the
threat, the parliamentarian corporate governance committee in charge of these issues
noted that “[t]he threat of legislation against boardroom excess should be left hanging
over big companies if they refuse to end ‘rewards for failure’ voluntarily.”147

5. Money Laundering
Seeking to deter organized criminal activity, governments adopt measures that are
designed to reduce the benefits from committing such crimes.148 Bans on money
laundering—i.e., the use of complex transactions and transfers of money through
financial institutions to conceal the ultimate source of money holdings—may provide
an effective deterrent.149 In addition, anti-laundering measures have gained renewed
global interest as a counter-terrorism measure.150 Given the machinations of money
prone to appropriation of high private benefits of control).
143 Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (2005) (staggered
boards, which substantially insulate boards from removal in either a hostile takeover or a proxy contest, are
associated with an economically meaningful reduction in firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q).
144 Empirical evidence on cash and equity executive compensation confirms these concerns. See Marco Becht
et al., Corporate Governance and Control 98-99, ECGI FINANCE WORKING PAPER NO. 02
- 2002 (2002), available at
http://www.ecgi.org/wp.
145 See Jill Treanor, MPs Move to End Rewards for Failure, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 27, 2003, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk.
146 Concerns over excessive director and executive compensation arose in the U.K. in the mid-1990s. At the
time, a corporate governance committee headed by Sir Richard Greenbury, the Marks & Spencer chairman,
was appointed to recommend appropriate practices. Sir Greenbury is reported to have said in that respect that
“[i]f [corporate boards and executives] don’t accept the main thrust of the [committee’s] report they will get
legislation.”
See Kirstie Hamilton, Fat Cats Maul Greenbury, THE TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, available at
http://www.lexis.com (internal quotations omitted).
147 See Treanor, supra note 145. While the Department of Trade and Industry did not advocate legislation, it
kept it as an option, stating that “’[i]f the wishes of shareholders are not being adequately reflected in contracts
being agreed by companies’ remuneration committees [] legislation will need to be reconsidered.’” Id.
148 See Donato Masciandaro, Money Laundering: The Economics of Regulation, 7 EURO. J. L. & ECON. 225 (1999)
(presenting an economic analysis of money laundering and of anti-money laundering regulation).
149 See “Money laundering,” in Black, supra note 50, at 305.
150 See E. Anthony Wayne, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Middle East and South Asia,
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laundering, banks and other financial institutions are the ultimate gatekeepers as they
are best-positioned to monitor money transfers, detect suspicious activity, and report
such incidents to enforcement agencies. Short of strict enforcement, however, such bans
remain virtually ineffective. Furthermore, imposing fines and other sanctions to enforce
anti-laundering measures on financial institutions that fail to comply is a difficult task
which requires substantial information that is not readily-available to enforcement
agencies. For this reason, anti-laundering has been governed by banks’ self-regulation.
Nevertheless, banks and financial institutions may fail to serve the gatekeeper
function. Apart from the aforementioned monitoring and detection, enforcing bans on
money laundering involves policing costs which consist of training and personnel
expenditures as well as IT investment. In addition, banking and financial institutions
employing anti-laundering monitoring are likely to crowd-out certain clients, thus
losing additional business, lowering the volume of banking and financial transactions,
and suffering lower gross profits.151 Hence, it should come as no surprise that bankers
and other financial professionals may opt to turn a blind eye to their customers’
activities, thereby aiding in the camouflage of an illegal source of money. Confirming
this concern, the economic secretary to the U.K. Treasury accused financial advisers of
“’willful blindness’” to illicit funds and warned of their practice of “not asking too
many questions,’” which facilitated the rendering of services that “‘obscured the
relationship between the money and the man’” behind it.152
Coupled with indications that banking, accounting, and law firms in the U.K. were
perceived as being complacent with respect to laundering, these problems fueled the
U.K. government’s threat to legislate if banks and other financial institutions did not
voluntarily devise and adopt a stricter self-regulatory regime to control and prevent
money laundering. Reinforcing the government’s threat, the U.K. Treasury signaled
that it would consider a tougher, prescriptive approach to controlling the transfer of
gains from criminal activity if the private financial sector would not step up to the task.
To ensure the threat’s wide dissemination, members of the British Bankers Association,
the industry’s trade association, were informed of the government’s strict policy
objectives. According to the threat, the industry, which indeed started to review its
methods of detection, was expected to provide the Treasury revised plans for moneylaundering monitoring programs.153 However, if it was determined that these proposals

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, available at
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2005/49564.htm (last visited July 13, 2005).
151 See Donato Masciandaro & Umberto Filotto, Money Laundering Regulation and Bank Compliance Costs: What
Do Your Customers Know? Economics and the Italian Experience, 5 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 133 (2001)
(examining the link between the effectiveness of the anti-laundering regulations and the characteristics of the
relative compliance costs for banks, focusing in particular on the implications for bank-customer relationships).
152 See Legislation Threat to Banks’ Self-Regulation, PRIVATE BANKER INT’L, June 1, 1998 (reporting the
government’s concern over widespread money laundering and the financial sector’s perceived complacency).
153 The government not only threatened to introduce strict legislation but also to bring to an end the longstanding tradition of financial self-regulation. The risk of abolishing self-regulation in this sector may have
augmented the risk of strict legislation on money laundering and the adverse effects resulting from high
compliance costs that banks and other financial institutions will have to incur.
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were unacceptable, the government would legislate and replace self-regulation with
formal regulatory codes.

6. Hazardous Waste Recycling
As environmental hazards become widespread, policy concerns relating to disposal
of toxic materials, recycling of hazardous waste, and emissions of environmentallyharmful gasses, to take but a few examples, have attracted a great deal of legislative and
administrative attention in recent years. The ever-increasing interest in controlling such
problems and the complex task of prescribing economically-feasible measures, gave rise
to a widespread use of legislative threats on the national and state levels.
The personal computers industry, which uses lead, mercury, cadmium, and other
toxic metals to manufacture computers and other electronic devices, has been the target
of numerous legislative threats concerning the recycling of such hazardous components.
As environmental activists have repeatedly accused the industry of not doing enough to
curb the problem and of shirking a responsibility to safely dispose of the hazardous
materials it uses, state and national legislators realized that companies would not do
anything substantial unless they are required to. In turn, that has led legislatures to
introduce proposed legislative measures in more than twenty states. The European
Commission, too, has issued a draft directive with the goal of promoting the recycling
and recovery of electronic waste.154
As expected, “the threat of legislation has PC companies … scrambling to come up
with a system that is voluntary but still effective.”155 Specifically, companies have
realized that they, rather than legislators, are far better-positioned to devise effective
solutions.156 Precisely to that end, PC manufacturers joined forces to form the National
Electronics Product Stewardship Initiative, a working group designed to reach a
consensus on the recycling problems of hazardous materials.

7. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Greenhouse gas emissions have also become a reason for concern. Indeed, the
undesirable impact of gas emissions on global warming has occupied the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) regulatory agenda for quite some time
now.157 Seeking to reduce and control greenhouse gas emissions, the EPA entered into
agreements with semiconductor manufacturers that emit greenhouse gasses in

154

See The Lead-Free Movement: Environmentally Friendly Electronic Manufacturing Ch. 2 (2000), available at
http://www.techsearchinc.com/reports (noting the development of lead-free materials and other initiatives
sparked by legislative threats in the U.S., Europe, and Japan).
155 See Crayton Harrison, PC Industry Wary of Legislation on Recycling, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 8,
2002, available at http://www.texasenvironment.org. A Gateway Inc. spokesman said “’[w]e’re talking, trying
to come up with a way to do it.’” Id.
156 See Harrison, supra note 155. “PC makers say a voluntary approach gives them more opportunity to find
marketable ways to turn their industry green.” Id.
157 See Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2003, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
available at http://www.epa.gov (2005) (U.S. policy objectives concerning emissions).
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manufacturing integrated circuits.158 These agreements represent the industry’s
response to the EPA’s threat of inopportune legislation to control gas emissions.
Fearing the potentially-intrusive and economically-unfeasible requirements of
adverse legislative measures, companies in the industry seem to find refuge in
agreements they negotiate in the shadow of legislative threats. Such accords allow
them to adopt environmentally-responsible and cost-effective solutions. Echoing this
notion, a Lucent Technologies’ representative stated that “[o]ur collaboration with the
EPA will reduce greenhouse gases in a way that makes sense from both a business and
an environmental standpoint—without regulation or mandate.”159

8. Auto Air-pollution
Low air-pollution targets have been a long-standing environmental goal for the
auto industry. Underlying this goal is the understanding that carbon-dioxide, a
greenhouse gas which cars belch into the atmosphere, causes undesirable worldwide
climate changes. In early 2004, it was discovered that the auto industry was secretly
lobbying the European Commission to relax air-pollution targets, arguing that strict
targets would impose high costs, threaten the competitiveness of the car manufacturing
industry, and harm the EU economy.160
Responding to this untoward development, environmental groups demandedthat
the European Commission upholds previously-set targets and advocated resorting to
legislative threats. The groups reasonedthat “’[p]ast experience tells us that the threat
of legislation is the best way to stimulate real improvements and technological
innovations’” to achieve environmental targets.161 The industry’s representative body,
as I explain in Part III(C) below, plays an important role in ensuring compliance by
industry participants with the legislator’s demands.

9. Commercial Leases
During the 1990’s, the U.K. government grew concerned over unfair terms and
clauses in commercial leases in England and Wales which placed business tenants
under strict, potentially-harmful obligations. Of particular concern was the burden of
upward-only rent reviews.162 Responding to the government’s concerns, in 1995 a
cross-industry working group drafted a voluntary code of conduct that included 23
recommendations. The code guided both the conduct of landlords and tenants in
158

Leading semiconductor manufacturers, including Lucent Technologies, Advanced Micro Devices,
Hewlett-Packard, Intel, and IBM to name a few, have entered into such agreements with the EPA.
159
See Lucent Technologies Signs Voluntary Agreement with EPA, July 29, 1996, at
http://www.lucent.com/press/0796/960729.mea.html.
160 To advance its cause, the industry acts through a representative body, the European Automobile
Manufacturers Association, that represents all major car manufacturers. Members of the Association include
Ford, General Motors, DaimlerChrysler, BMW, Fiat, Renault, Peugeot, Citroen, Volvo, Volkswagen, and others.
161 See Rob Edwards, Car Makers Secretly Lobby EC to Reduce Air-pollution Targets: Leaked Memo Reveals Pressure
on Environment Commissioner, HERALD ONLINE, Mar. 21, 2004, at http://www.sundayherald.com/40665
(hereinafter: “Car Makers Secretly Lobby EC to Reduce Air-pollution Targets”).
162 See Janet Higbee, Cripps Alert: Commercial Property Law, at http://www.e-cripps.co.uk (June 2, 2004).
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negotiating new business tenancies and their behavior throughout the duration of the
lease. Designed to promote flexibility and fairness in business leases, the code
addressed a variety of issues including assignment and subletting, rent reviews,
insurance, default management, and dispute resolution.163
As the code was a non
- binding set of rules, its success depended on the
nonobligatory implementation by landlords and tenants. As one could have expected
,
the code was largely ignored, thus failing to achieve its intended objectives. In
response, the government issued a threat of legislation in 2001, according to which
minimum safeguards to protect the interests of business tenants will be enacted unless
property owners and tenants devise a voluntary solution to introduce more flexibility
into commercial leases.164 Seeking to convey a serious message to the property sector,
the government accompanied the threat with a clear, two-year trial period in which to
implement the code on a voluntary basis. If the code was not implemented within that
period to the government’s satisfaction, the government would move and pass formal
legislation. Furthermore, in order to monitor compliance with the legislative threat, the
government appointed various bodies to oversee code implementation.165 No doubt,
this explicit legislative threat engendered compliance with the code.

10. Illegal Substances
The use of illegal substances in sports is another area in which legislative threats
have been employed to regulate conduct and promote public policies. Representative
John Sweeney introduced in 2002 a bill to control the use of steroid-like substances. The
bill did not have much impact until the issue gained broad attention and threats to
legislate were made clear. The use of steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs
by professional athletes has become a major issue following the fatal overdose of a
baseball player. In hearings before the Commerce Committee and as congressional
clamor intensified, senators pressured baseball officials to take the actions necessary to
stop the widespread use of such substances. Senator John McCain, the chairman of the
Senate Commerce Committee, warned baseball officials that “he would begin looking
for legislative remedies because ‘the status quo is not acceptable.’”166 Senator McCain
explained that holding the high-profile hearings been an attempt to coerce the baseball
league to act. Clearly, the highly-visible hearings signaled to baseball officials the
seriousness of the threat and the keen interest of legislators to act on this issue.
163

See A Code of Practice for Commercial Leases in England and Wales (2d. ed., 2004), available at
http://www.commercialleasecodeew.co.uk.
164 See Angela Jameson, Threat of New Law on Property Leases, THE TIMES, Apr. 5, 2001 (“The property industry
faces the threat of legislation to outlaw the lease at the heart of the UK’s commercial property market”).
165 The government appointed Reading University to monitor code implementation. According to the
appointment, the University was to report to the government its assessment of the code implementation. In
addition, the British Property Federation was appointed to monitor implementation on behalf of the property
sector. See Monitoring Proforma for Commercial Leases Code of Practice, in BRITISH PROPERTY FEDERATION:
COMMERCIAL LEASES CODE OF PRACTICE RESOURCES, available at http://www.bpf.org.uk (last visited Jan. 2, 2006).
166 See Jim Puzzanghera, Congress Targets Sports in Crackdown on Steroids, MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 27, 2004,
available at http://www.mercurynews.com.
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Contributing to the legislative dynamics, in 2004 Representative Jim Sensenbrenner,
the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, sponsored the House bill banning
steroid precursors, thus reinforcing the social concern and augmenting the legislative
pressure on baseball officials.167
While Representative Sensenbrenner formally
disagreed with Senator McCain’s explicit threat to legislate in this area, his proposed bill
was in fact an implicit threat itself.168 Representative Sensenbrenner, who accused the
baseball players’ association of not responding to calls for tougher steroid testing, stated
“’I don’t think that the players’ union has gotten the message, but they’re getting it.’”169
Responding to the Committee’s legislative threat and the increasing squeeze from
Congress, the Baseball Commissioner announced that the baseball league had decided
to ban the use of THG, a steroid players use to evade detection in steroid tests.170
Yielding to these threats, baseball officials also undertook to institute stricter steroid
testing and to impose harsher sanctions on players using such substances.171

B. An Analytic Taxonomy of Legislative Threats
The case studies presented above, demonstrate the prevalent, strategic use of
legislative threats as regulators of social conduct across diverse sectors of society.
Mindful of the novelty of legislative threats, I devote the discussion that follows to
laying a solid conceptual basis and to offering an analytic system by which to classify
legislative threats as evidenced in the aforementioned case studies. Specifically, I
develop a workable, analytically-precise taxonomy of threats in order to better
understand observed variance in the landscape of legislative threats. Analytically, I
distinguish between three categories of legislative threats: (i) explicit, (ii) implicit, and
(iii) anticipatory. In the interest of practical and theoretical inclusiveness, this
classification is neither context-specific, nor is it uniquely-related to social control in any
particular legal system or rule-making hierarchy. Rather, the taxonomy encompasses
observations of legislative threats in various contexts of social and economic activity
and across different legal systems. This taxonomy renders the novel concept of
legislative threats a practical analytic tool that lends itself to investigating the intricate
landscape of modern social control, where formal legislative measures and informal
legislative threats partake in regulating social behavior.
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See Frederic J. Frommer, Political Pressure Gives Baseball a Push on Dealing with Steroids, SFGATE.COM, Mar.
22, 2004, at http://www.sfgate.com.
168 The analytic and functional differences between explicit, implicit, and anticipatory legislative threats are
analyzed and examined in greater detail in Parts II(B)(1)-(3) respectively.
169 See Frommer, supra note 167.
170 See Puzzanghera, supra note 166. Further demonstrating the government’s interest in bringing steroid
use to an end, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the indictments of several people charged with
providing illegal substances to athletes. Furthermore, the Food & Drug Administration ruled that THG was an
illegal substance; and Health & Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson publicly warned 23 companies
to stop selling and marketing a steroid known as androstenedione. Id.
171 In addition to the risk of adverse steroid legislation that ensures compliance with the legislative threat,
Major League Baseball is also subject to the risk that Congress may revoke its exemption from federal antitrust
laws. In fact, Congress has threatened to revoke the exemption in the past but has never followed through.
For this reason, “sport executives pay attention when Washington gets upset.” Id.
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This classification is not merely an intellectual exercise meant to enhance the
analytic precision and understanding of this legislative phenomenon. On the contrary,
this classification carries significant practical value in its ability to delineate the actual
boundaries of the concept and draw attention to the seemingly-disparate manifestations
of legislative threats. In other words, this taxonomy allows for the necessary inclusion
of the less obvious implicitand anticipatory threats (without which, any account of the
scope of legislative threats would have been limited to the more obvious explicit threats
and therefore would have remained incomplete). In sum, this classification aids in
clarifying the many instances of legislative threats that would otherwise go
unrecognized, thus illuminating the actual magnitude of this phenomenon.
While a common conceptual thread links all legislative threats, the observed
variance between these threats leads to the three analytically-distinct categories
mentioned above. As I will explain in Part III, this variance is outcome-determinative. That
is, the analytic taxonomy pinpoints the variables that determine (and that can be used to
predict ex ante) the likely effectiveness of a legislative threat in inducing a change in
behavior and, therefore, in achieving predetermined policy objectives. In other words,
the inducement effect of threats on behavior depends among other things, on whether
the threat qualifies as explicit, implicit, or anticipatory. Hence, this classification
derives insights without which the complex mechanism underlying the inducement
effect of legislative threats would remain inscrutable. It is precisely for these reasons,
that gaining insight into the various types of legislative threats and their respective
inducement effects is indisp
ensable in advancing this theoretical inquiry.

1. Explicit Legislative Threats
Explicit threats are the quintessential manifestations of legislative threats. As a
matter of definition, a threat qualifies as explicit when a legislator communicates an
unambiguous threat to a group of recipients. According to the threat, legislators will
introduce a bill and seek to enact adverse legislation unless the entities to which the
threat is directed, comply with the demands that are embodied in the threat.172
Doing precisely this, Homeland Security officials convened the captains of the
computer industry and leading trade groups to discuss government concerns of cyberattacks and to explicitly communicate a legislative threat.173 Similarly, in an effort to
ensure that the threat to legislate anti-money laundering measures be widely
disseminated, the U.K. Treasury informed members of the British Bankers Association
(the industry’s trade association), of the government’s strict policy objectives.174 In
172

A clear and unambiguous expression of a legislative plan to enact formal legislation in the absence of
compliance is not necessarily credible; in some circumstances, threats are merely “cheap talk.” The conditions
that make legislative threats credible or incredible are examined in great detail in Part III(B) below.
173 Underscoring the legislative threat, the officials blatantly stated that “[t]here are a lot of people who are
willing to legislate. If that’s what you want, I can promise you that’s what you’re going to get.” See Markhoff, supra
note 120, at C8 (describing the government-industry interaction and the exchange of information). For a
detailed discussion of this legislative threat see Part II(A)(1) above.
174 See Legislation Threat to Banks’ Self-Regulation, supra note 152 (describing the dissemination of information
to the financial sector to which the threat was directed).
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another example, the sponsoring legislator of an explicit threat to halt digital piracy
circulated draft versions of the proposed bill to high-tech and media companies. The
threatened Senator forewarned that “’[g]iven the pace of private talks so far, the private
sector needs a nudge. The government can provide that nudge.’”175
While their particular manifestations may vary from one case to another, explicit
threats have common characteristic features. Normally, legislators exerting explicit
threats reveal substantial and unambiguous information about their serious interest in
controlling the conduct in question. Legislators also express the social-desirability of
the reform that the threatened legislative measure is designed to achieve.176 In an
attempt to endorse the desired reform, legislators typically spell-out the significant
social stakes that will likely be affected if a change in behavior is not achieved.
Explicit threats convey both a legislator’s unequivocal concern with the negative
externalities of a given conduct and his intention to exercise his legislative mandate to
control that conduct and align it with the social interest.177 In other words, exerting an
explicit threat inevitably means that the legislator publicly commits himself to pursuing
the advocated reform by means of legislation in the event that the recipients of the
threat do not comply with the articulated demands.178
Moreover, explicit threats typically espouse—and, to a large extent, are predicated
on—a concrete and often well-developed contingent legislative plan.179 That is, the plan
of legislative action will be executed if and only if the recipients of the threat do not
voluntarily change their conduct and modify their practice in conformity with the
legislator’s demands. Often, these contingent plans outline implementation procedures
and set forth compliance deadlines, thus clarifying the steps and time-line that threatrecipients must follow in order to avert the risk of adverse legislation.180
For example, giving a clear signal that the FCC was keen on taking an action to stop
e-piracy, the FCC’s Commissioner warned that “‘industry stakeholders … have only a
small window to reach agreement … or they will face a solution imposed on them in the
near-term future.’”181 With respect to compliance procedures, the U.K. government’s
threat to legislate anti-laundering measures, required the financial sector to provide the
175

See Bill would Prevent Sharing of Digital Music, Video, supra note 136.
The reference to legislators’ interest does not suggest that the interest in controlling a given activity is
imputed to the legislative body as a whole. Rather, this interest may relate for example only to a few members
of the legislative body or to one party.
177 The analysis in Part III explains how the information that legislators convey to the recipients of the threat
signals the seriousness and credibility of the threat.
178 The legislator’s public commitment is not necessarily believable. In other words, the threat to enact
adverse legislation if the threat is not complied with is not necessarily credible. The conditions making a
legislative threat credible or, rather, incredible are examined and discussed in Part III below.
179 A legislative threat can be made at different junctures of the legislative process. For example, the threat
may accompany: a preliminary announcement of the interest in legislation; a blueprint legislative proposal; or
a proposed bill that (according to the threat) will be brought to a floor discussion before a plenary session of
the legislative body unless the demands are complied with.
180 In this respect, explicit threats are the end-product of measures that members of the legislative body have
taken to implement their social control agenda.
181 See Chiger, supra note 134. A detailed analysis of this threat is found in Part II(A)(2) above.
176
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Treasury with revised plans for monitoring programs, which were then to be reviewed
by the government in order to ensure adequate compliance.182
Nonetheless, explicit threats differ with respect to the amount of information they
divulge regarding the contents and features of the threatened legislation, thereby
potentially leaving a degree of uncertainty. While some legislators opt to describe the
contents of legislation or, in some cases, have already introduced a proposed bill that
inevitably reveals that information, others may choose to disclose only general
information. These observations confirm one’s intuition that legislators strategically
choose how much information to impart and, more importantly, what to make public
and what to keep private. As I explain in greater detail in Part III, the revelation of
pertinent information carries important strategic implications that bear decisive impact
on the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the legislative threat.
In summary, the hallmarks of explicit legislative threats include the following
elements: (i) explicit communication of an unambiguous threat; (ii) articulation of a
contingent legislative plan, typically laying out implementation procedures and setting
forth compliance deadlines; (iii) expression of the legislator’s intense interest in
controlling the conduct in question and the compelling case for the proposed reform;
and (iv) disclosure of certain information concerning the contents and features of the
proposed legislation.

2. Implicit Legislative Threats
Legislators seeking to induce a change in behavior need not necessarily exert a
legislative threat in explicit, overt terms. For, threats of any kind, legislative threats
included, can equally be of an implicit nature. Indeed, the strategic use of implicit
threats constitutes an interest for researchers in various fields of theoretical inquiry
including, among others, industrial organization and antitrust.183 Implicit threats can
be understood as nothing more than one particular instance of unspoken behavior.184
While it may be easier to illuminate the elusive notion of implicit legislative threats
by describing actions that do not qualify as such, I go further than this and describe the
182

See Legislation Threat to Banks’ Self-Regulation, supra note 152 (describing the terms of the legislative threat
that the U.K. government directed to banks).
183 Industrial organization and antitrust theorists, to take two examples, study the use of implicit threats by
incumbent firms. These firms may employ threats in order to implement a variety of strategies designed to
deter the entry of a potential rival into the market, to drive rivals out of the market, or to reduce the portent of
the rival. In addition, firms may use threats to force existing competitors into a collusive, price-fixing
arrangement. Firms may communicate such implicit threats through vigorous price cutting, which signals
their intention to engage in cut-throat price competition (i.e., predatory pricing) unless the firm (or firms) to
which the threat is directed, complies with the threat (e.g., avoids entry or enters into a collusive arrangement).
See Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 79-80, 333-61 (3rd ed. 2000) (firms
may use a variety of threats to maximize profits by improving their market position relative to their rivals).
184 Another example of unspoken behavior is tacit collusion—the coordinated actions of firms despite the
lack of an explicit, formal cartel agreement. A tacit collusion, in which firms refrain from undercutting each
others’ prices or from selling in each others’ areas, is necessarily implicit because antitrust laws (e.g., Section 2
of the Sherman Act) make explicit cartel agreements illegal and thus unenforceable. See Carlton & Perloff,
supra note 183, at 134 (defining tacit collusion). See also “Collusion,” in Black, supra note 50, at 65(same).
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presence of actions that constitute an implicit threat, so as to delineate the conceptual
perimeter. To put it simply, the notion of implicit threats refers to circumstances in
which the actions of legislators signal a threat without either an explicit exertion or a
communication of a contingent legislative plan (i.e., a commitment or promise to
legislate if compliance is not otherwise obtained).185 In such instances, the entities to
which the implicit threat is meant to apply neither face a formal demand to modify their
conduct (let alone a compliance deadline), nor are they warned that failure to do so will
put them at risk for unfavorable legislation.186
Of particular importance is the fact that, in contrast to their explicit counterparts,
implicit threats contain no publicly-stated promise to pursue a particular reform by
means of legislation.187 Whereas explicit threats necessarily involve the legislators’
commitment to pursuing the advocated reform by means of legislation (that is, if the
recipients of the threat do not voluntarily comply with the threat), implicit threats
encompass no commitment whatsoever. It can be said that implicit threats and pubic
commitments are mutually-exclusive.
Furthermore, legislators relying on implicit threats to advance their social control
agenda do not normally convey much information regarding their interest in regulating
a particular behavior or the gravity of the underlying concern.188 In keeping, legislators
normally do not disclose information concerning the contents and features of the
threatened legislation although, admittedly, this varies from one case to another.
Consistent with other instances of unspoken behavior, implicit threats can be
determined based on the acts and behavior of legislators at different temporal junctures.
Firms may infer the “issuance” of such threats from the legislator’s effort to further his
legislative agenda. A signal of an implicit threat can take the form of: introducing a
proposed bill; executing preparatory work necessary to enact legislation (e.g., gathering
data); and handing-out drafts to the targets of such legislation. These acts may be
particularly indicative of an implicit threat if the legislator has a track-record which
establishes his reputation for using such threats.189 Needless to say, not all proposed
bills necessarily signal implicit legislative threats. Whether an implicit threat exists or
not depends, among other things, on the information available to potential threatrecipients who may use it to ascribe practical meaning to the observed actions.
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In the absence of an explicit threat, a contingent legislative plan becomes virtually meaningless. Of
course, the legislator may pursue some predetermined legislative plan but that plan is not explicitly and publicly
conditioned upon the conduct of the entities to which the threat implicitly applies.
186 But see Markhoff, supra note 120 (“Federal officials made clear … that private industry must make
progress in voluntarily comply with the Bush administration’s national cybersecurity plan or face new
legislation requiring compliance”).
187 A contingent commitment to legislate is the hallmark of explicit threats. See, e.g., Jameson, supra note 164
(U.K. Planning Minister announced “he [would] impose legislation if a voluntary agreement is not reached”).
188 While legislators may express their significant interest in controlling the conduct in question, conveying
such information is not inconsistent with the concept of implicit threats insofar as the interest is not publicly
tied to any commitment to enact legislation.
189 In such instances, the implicit threat is simply a pre-mature explicit threat, that is, a threat that has not
been formalized into an explicit threat.
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Another way a legislator can express a threat is by sharing information in meetings
and conventions held with firms, organizations, and industry leaders.190 Providing
information in the shadow of a pending legislation proposal will likely reinforce the
implicit threat. In certain circumstances the slow pace at which legislators work to
advance legislation can be viewed as an opportunity (indeed, an invitation) to comply
with an implicit threat so as to dodge the risk of damaging legislation.
Because implicit threats are inferred, not explicitly communicated, uncertainty
concerning whether a threat has in fact been made is all but inevitable.191 In an attempt
to resolve this uncertainty—and, indeed, to play it safe in case a credible implicit threat
is actually at stake—firms may modify their conduct so as to bring it in line with the
implicit demands. Lowering the priority of a pending legislation or postponing the
legislative process in response to observed changes in the conduct of targeted entities,
will undoubtedly signal an unequivocal threat. In other words, freezing the legislative
process, even temporarily, in response to perceived behavior modification, reveal the
inverse correlation between the proposed legislation and the industry’s conduct. This
interrelation affirms that an implicit threat is at work.192
In light of the foregoing taxonomy, the choice between implicit and explicit
legislative threats merits attention. Why, and under which circumstances, would a
legislator favor one type of threat over the other?
Careful examination of the underlying motivations reveals that a number of factors
may affect this choice.193 For example, a legislator may be reluctant to exert an explicit
threat thereby putting his precious reputation to the test, in the fear that the risk of
failing to pass the promised legislation in Congress will adversely affect his
reputational capital. Surely, risking one’s reputational capital may involve harsh
consequences insofar as the legislator’s reputation is essentially a mechanism that
enables the making of credible (i.e., believable) commitments.194 Thus, in the face of
190

See Stephen Bell, ISPs Get Code but Not Everyone Likes It, COMPUTER WORLD, July 2, 2003, at
http://www.computerworld.co.nz (describing an information-exchange meeting and notes that “the mood of
the meeting appeared to be that it was better to play it safe”).
191 In analytic terms, uncertainty concerning whether an implicit threat has already been made is consistent
with an implicit threat scenario, uncertainty as to whether a threat will be made in the future gives rise to an
anticipatory threat. The latter kind of threat is analyzed in the Section that follows below.
192
Cf. Digital Rights Management: To Avoid Confusion, THE PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, at
http://www.publishers.org.uk/paweb/paweb.nsf/pubframe (last visited Jan. 10, 2006) (“As work on
standards progresses, [the] ‘threat’ is receding”).
193 Needless to say, the legislator’s choice of regulatory strategy is by no means limited to explicit and
implicit legislative threats, nor is it limited to threats alone. Rather, the legislator may choose to introduce
legislation without any recourse to legislative threats of any kind. While this is true, the present discussion
focuses on the binary choice between explicit and implicit threats. The general, binary choice between formal
legislative measures and informal legislative threats, and the various functional and institutional
considerations that shape this choice are discussed in great length in Part IV.
194 A discussion of how reputation can ensure the credibility of threats is presented in Part III(B)(2) below.
Reputation guarantees cooperation between special interests and legislators, as these parties cannot enter into
enforceable fee-for-service contracts. See Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Interest Group Competition
and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services’ Political Action Committees, 88 AM.
ECON. REV. 1163 (1998) (hereinafter: “Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress”).
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such consequences, the legislator may run the risk of inducing voter dissatisfaction,
losing corporate campaign contributions,195 or the ability to extract rents in the future,196
all resulting in a decreased probability of reelection. Clearly, a well-established
reputation (i.e., track-record for following through on threats), is a valuable strategic
asset that a legislator can call upon to prompt compliance with future threats, thus
further enhancing his reputation.197 As implicit threat involves no public commitment
to legislate, employing this strategy buys the legislator reputational immunity, which
guarantees no risk to the legislator’s reputational capital.198 For, in the absence of a
public promise, there can be no backlash for failing to take the necessary actions, let
alone for not neglecting to keep one’s word.
Likewise, a legislator may favor an implicit threat over its explicit counterpart in
order to reduce potential political repercussions, which an explicit threat may provoke
from fellow lawmakers. Such repercussions can serve to condemn what may be
regarded as an improper or illegitimate use of legislative power.199 The use of implicit
threats can be used to mitigate potential retaliation. Assuming all else remains equal,
these considerations militate in favor of implicit over explicit threats.
But rarely do other things remain equal. As a matter of fact, the choice between
explicit and implicit threats is outcome-determinative.200 Viewed from a legislator’s
perspective, not only does the type of threat affect the risks and expected losses
involved in exerting that threat, but it also strategically influences the likely inducement
effect and therefore the benefits from using that threat.

3. Anticipatory Legislative Threats
The notion of anticipatory threats encompasses instances in which no threat has
been made—neither explicit nor implicit—but where there is a risk that a threat may be
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Cf. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Congressional Committees as Reputation-building Mechanisms,
2 BUS. & POLIT. 35 (2000) (presenting data and showing that congressional standing committees foster repeated
interaction between legislators and interest groups and facilitate reputation-building, without which legislators
cannot maximize political contributions).
196 Cf. Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion (Harvard,
1997) (special interest payments are often made not in return for political favors but rather to avoid political
disfavors as part of a system of rent extraction).
197 Cf. Kevin T. Jackson, Building Reputational Capital: Strategies for Integrity and Fair Play that Improve the
Bottom Line (2004) (reputation for credibility, fairness, integrity, responsibility, and other virtues is a form of
capital often neglected in conventional business analyses).
198 Cf. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 727
(1999) (“[A]n official who considers a waste spill innocuous may shade her knowledge simply to avoid being
perceived as ‘weak on the environment’ in the event that the spill comes to be perceived as harmful”).
199 The discussion in Part V draws attention to normative dimensions of using legislative threats as
regulators of conduct, including, among others, the inadequate procedural safeguards, the problem of
democratic unaccountability, and the lack of institutional legitimacy. Hence, the use of legislative threats may
give rise to disagreement and provoke political backlash from fellow lawmakers.
200 That a legislative interest in controlling a particular conduct has not been formalized into an explicit
threat does not necessarily mean that such a threat is inevitably ineffective. The theoretical machinations that
engender the inducement effect and the variables that affect its magnitude are analyzed in Part III(B) below.
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issued in the future. In essence, these threats arise from a positive probabilistic
anticipation (i.e., risk) that a legislator or a group of legislators will at some future point
make a particular threat to enact adverse legislation.201 Hence, anticipated threats can
be viewed as premature explicit or implicit legislative threats.202
Conceptually, the notion of anticipatory threats captures a continuum of cases,
including instances in which the odds of a future threat are low (e.g., 20%) as well as
instances in which that the odds are relatively high (e.g., 80%). The probability
assessment of the underlying risk may vary significantly from one case to another,
depending on what information is available.203 Among others, factors affecting this
assessment include: the legislator’s policy interests; the legislator’s track-record of using
threats; and the potential consequences of the conduct in question. In this last case, the
magnitude of the conduct’s negative impact on certain social interests provides a proxy
for the social visibility of the issue and, thereby for the legislator’s expected interest in
issuing a threat to regulate that conduct. Based on this information, firms and other
entities anticipating a legislative threat are well-positioned to evaluate the probable
content of the potential legislation.
The magnitude of the underlying risk is important in determining the inducement
effect of the anticipatory threat. In certain circumstances, anticipatory threats induce
entities that anticipate being a target for the threat, to change their conduct and comply
with what they believe will be the content of the threat. Such preemptive behavior
modifications can lower the risk that a threat of legislation will be issued, therefore
reduce the risk of adverse legislation and thus avoiding the negative effect of the threat
on firm value and stock returns.204
A clear demonstration of the inducement effect of anticipatory threats, is the case of
McDonald’s, when in early 2004 it announced that it had decided to phase out its supersize portions in restaurants operated in the U.S. and U.K.205 Giant food portions on the
company’s menus, offering up to 50 percent more than a regular portion for just a few
cents more, triggered mounting waves of criticism from anti-obesity activists. This, as
the debate over health risks of obesity and concerns over the severity of this issue in
201

Analytically, that risk may involve the possibility that the legislator will issue a legislative threat (either
an explicit or an implicit threat) as well as the possibility that the legislator will seek to enact adverse
legislation without recourse to legislative threats.
202 Of course, it is possible that the risk on which an anticipatory threat is based will not materialize and,
contrary to expectations, no threat will actually be issued.
203 This probability cannot be assessed when no information is available, thus leaving room for speculation
and therefore rendering the possibility of a future threat entirely uncertain.
204 Cf. Roger Beck et al., Rent Extraction through Political Extortion: An Empirical Examination, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
217 (1992) (a sample of Canadian firms suffered negative stock returns following announcement of potential
adverse legislation).
205 See Laura Peek et al., McDonald’s Takes Supersize Portions off the Menu, THE TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004. See also
David M. Cutler et al., Why Have Americans Become More Obese?, 17 J. ECON. PERS. 93 (2003) (the switch from
individual to mass prepared food has lowered the time price of food consumption and led to an increased
quantity and variety of consumed foods); Maria L. Loureiro & Rodolfo M. Nayga, International Dimensions of
Obesity and Overweight Related Problems: An Economic Perspective, 87 AM. J. AGRI. ECON. 1147 (2005) (identifying
factors affecting higher caloric intake in OECD countries).
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developed economies gathered pace.206 The release of the award-winning documentary
Super Size Me further increased the negative attention on McDonald’s sales practices
- conscious
and the harmful impact on health of its food.207 Seeking to project a health
corporate image and in an attempt to avert the risk of a legislative threat,208 the
company’s decision to alter its product line conveniently came out just as the U.K.
government announced a national examination of public health and obesity.209 Indeed,
the McDonald’s case belongs to a sweeping trend among food companies around the
world. Worried by a potential threat of adverse legislation, these businesses are
encouraging well-being by offering healthier options and providing nutritional
information for their products.210

III. THE MECHANISM UNVEILED: HOW DO LEGISLATIVE THREATS
REGULATE SOCIAL CONDUCT AND INDUCE SOCIAL CHANGE?
The preceding case studies demonstrate the pervasiveness of legislative threats in the
regulatory landscape and offered an analytic classification of threats, pointing, among
other distinguishing features, to the legislator’s publicly-made commitment to legislate
(explicit threats); to the absence of a publicly-made commitment to pursue a particular
reform by means of legislation (implicit threats); and to the risk of a future legislative
threat (anticipatory threats).
Whatever threat is being employed, however, casual observations show that
legislative threats, including those exerted by a single legislator, can in certain
circumstances induce entities to change their behavior and alter their conduct so as to
comply with the threat and avert the risk of unfavorable legislation.211 Understood as
206

Obesity health-related problems are associated with high social costs, including high healthcare costs.
See, e.g., Jayanta Bhattacharya & M. Kate Bundorf, The Incidence of the Healthcare Costs of Obesity, NBER
WORKING PAPER NO. W11303 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com (obese workers tend to be sick more
often and spend more on health care). In the U.S., high obesity rates in certain socioeconomic classes are
associated with lower productivity. See John Cawley & Sheldon Danziger, Obesity as a Barrier to the Transition
from Welfare to Work, NBER WORKING PAPER NO. W10508 (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com.
207 The documentary chronicled the deterioration of the health of Morgan Spurlock, the film-maker, during a
month-long experiment during which he ate nothing but McDonald’s food. See A. O. Scott, Film Review: When
All Those Big Macs Bite Back, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004.
208 Indeed, “the decision to scrap the supersize portion was only taken in order to avoid any threat of
legislation which may harm the company.” See Kerri Dunne, Macs Will Not be So Big in Ulster, THE BELFAST
TELEGRAPH DIGITAL, Mar. 5, 2004, available at http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk.
209 The national consultation on public health was announced as a report from more than 100 organizations
called for statutory controls to protect children from unhealthy foods. See Peek et al., supra note 205.
210 See Emma Duncan, That Shrinking Feeling: Winning the Fight against Flab, THE ECONOMIST: THE WORLD IN
2006 93 (2005) (actions taken by food companies to reduce the caloric value of offerings).
211 Cases demonstrating the potent inducement effect of legislative threats abound. See, e.g., Edwards, supra
note 161 (“Past experience tells us that the threat of legislation is the best way to stimulate real improvements
and technological innovations”) (internal quotations omitted); Bob McDowall, UK Banking Competition: The End
of the Regulatory Privileges for the Banks?, IT-DIRECTOR.COM, July 3, 2000, at http://www.it-director.com
(“[T]hreat of legislation may be required to elicit changes” that enhance competition in payment systems);
Senate Democrats Back Off Calls for Price Cap Legislation, supra note 118 (a threat of federal legislation to impose
price caps on electricity for the western U.S. induced the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to extend
price mitigation measures for California and ten other states); News Release: U.S. Businesses Promise Security Plan

42

A Theory of Legislative Threats
such, legislative threats provide a powerful regulatory mechanism. What is more, the
impact of legislative threats on behavior is often socially-superior to that achieved by
enforcing formal legislative measures, even before taking into account the saving of
significant expenditures of social resources on law enforcement.212
Based on the prevalence of legislative threats, one can assume that legislators derive
benefits from exerting threats and, furthermore, that these benefits exceed the costs
undertaken by doing so, thus indicating the efficiency and desirability of this strategic
choice. The benefits to legislators can take different forms.213 While malevolent
legislators may benefit from employing threats as a means to extract political rents and
secure campaign contributions from special interest groups and political action
committees,214 benevolent legislators may benefit from using such threats to promote
socially-desirable regulatory policies and thus reaping personal rewards.215 Advancing
such regulatory objectives increases the legislator’s utility inasmuch as it enhances his
political reputation; heightens constituents’ satisfaction; makes campaign contributions
more probable; and improves the chance of re-election.216 In addition, social reward for
benevolence may include enhanced political visibility, thus promoting the legislator’s
reputational capital.
Whatever the benefits may be, however, no benefit will accrue unless the threat is
believed to be credible. In other words, the entities to which the threat is directed are
by March 1, 2004, supra note 124 (“It seems now the threat of legislation has kicked-started” the industry’s
effort to develop a cyber security plan); and Digital Rights Management, supra note 192 (“As work on standards
progresses, [the legislative] ‘threat’ is receding”).
212 The point here, to which I return in Part III(D), is the following: whereas enforcement of legislation is
confined to preventing violation of the statutory requirements, firms’ compliance with legislative threats may
result in a more efficient “regulatory” solution than the one that legislator can prescribe in a formal piece of
legislation. In other words, in contrast to formal legislation, legislative threats harness the virtues of threatinduced self-regulation. The functional advantages of self-regulation are discussed in Part II(B).
213 Cf. David D. Haddock, Foreseeing Confiscation by the Sovereign: Lessons from the American West, in Terry L.
Anderson & Peter J. Hill (eds.), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 129 (1994) (the sovereign’s
dilemma arises from his simultaneous power to create new wealth and to transfer wealth both to himself and
to social subgroups).
214 The ability to extract wealth effectively gives legislators the power (or, perhaps, the property right) to
charge individuals and entities for the right to keep the capital they have amassed and the wealth they have
produced. See McChesney, supra note 196, at 86. Hence, individuals and entities paying rents are essentially
compensating the legislator for not exercising his power and for not imposing undesirable costs or
expropriating wealth. Paying rents takes many forms, including campaign contributions, speaking and
appearance honoraria, and in-kind transfer of benefits. Id. at 45-53. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Medical Industry
Showers Congress with Lobby Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at A1 (“As Congress prepares to debate drastic
changes in the nation’s health care system, its members are receiving vast campaign contributions from the
medical industry, an amount apparently unprecedented for a non-election year”). See also Franklin G. Mixon et
al., Rent Seeking and Hidden In-Kind Resources Distortion: Some Empirical Evidence, 78 PUBLIC CHOICE 171 (1994)
(indirect benefits include trips, fancy meals or golf rounds provided to legislators and their families and staffs).
215 Cf. John W. Kingdon, Congressmen’s Voting Decisions 248 (1989) (“most members [of Congress] have their
conceptions of good public policy, and act partly to carry that conception into being”). See also Richard L. Hall,
Participation in Congress 69 (1996) (legislative activism is related to the belief that liberal members share in
federal action as an effective instrument for social betterment).
216 Building the legislator’s reputation increases his reputational capital which, in turn, enables the legislator
to make believable threats in the future and derive additional benefits.
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bound to remain indifferent unless they have reason to believe that (a) the legislator will
carry out the threat if they do not comply, and (b) the expected loss from enacting the
threatened adverse legislation is greater than the cost of compliance with that threat.
Yet precisely which conditions render threats credible (or incredible) and therefore
effective (or ineffective), has no straightforward answer. In fact, given the inherent
intricacy of the political process, the answer to this question is anything but intuitive.
Actually, one’s intuition (and lay experience) leads to the conclusion that threats and
promises made by elected representatives are inevitably untrustworthy and therefore
can hardly be afforded credibility. Attesting to the perplexing features of the legislative
process and consequent uncertainty, Woodrow Wilson correctly observed more than a
century ago that “[o]nce begin the dance of legislation, and you must struggle through
its mazes as best you can to its breathless end, – if any end there be.”217
The functional question that lies ahead—namely, how do legislative threats induce a
change in behavior so as to regulate social conduct?—is central to the theory of legislative
threats. The inquiry below attempts to answer precisely this question in order to
provide a comprehensive theoretical account of the inducement effect of legislative
threats, the elements that contribute to a threat’s effectiveness, and the response of
threat-recipients in equilibrium. Disentangling the inducement effect is the key to this
theoretical discussion inasmuch as it reveals the factors that determine how effective a
threat will be, and therefore allows for a precise prediction of the regulatory impact.
My analysis employs concepts and analytic methods from the field of noncooperative game theory to account for the strategic interaction between legislators and
threat-recipients.218 The theoretical inquiry unfolds in the following manner: Section A
models the use of legislative threats as a dynamic, non-cooperative game; and identifies
the sine quo non conditions of the threats’ inducement effect on the behavior of threatrecipients. Section B focuses on the credibility of legislative threats and identifies the
conditions that make threats credible or incredible. Section C considers the effects on
compliance of strategic interaction within organized and non-organized groups. Lastly,
Section D examines bargaining in the shadow of legislative threats.

217

See Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics, THE NEW ENGLANDER Vol.
45, Issue 192 (1886) (discussing the role of the legislator and the difficulties pertaining to crafting legislation
and regulating the economic system).
218 Game theory is the discipline of economics that focuses on the study of strategic interaction between
individuals and entities and helps understand and predict their behavior in various social contexts. The theory
of games comprises the distinct fields of non-cooperative and cooperative game-theory. Non-cooperative
strategic behavior encompasses actions that are designed to improve utility for one player while reducing
utility for the other; in contrast, cooperative games includes behaviors that increase (or decrease) the utility of
all players. Individuals in non-cooperative games may take actions that, in common parlance, would be
labeled “cooperative,” although such an action is taken because it is in the best interest of each player, for
example, due to fear of retaliation. For a non-formulaic primer on non-cooperative game theory see David M.
Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modelling 9-36 (1990). A more technical presentation of this subject is found in
Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict 1-31 (1991).
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A. A Game-theoretic Model of Legislative Threats
How and in what circumstances do legislative threats induce threat-recipients to
change their conduct so as to align it with the legislative demands as outlined in the
threat? In other words, when are firms expectedto comply and when is compliance
unlikely? In order to begin analyzing these issues, it is necessary to consider the use of
legislative threats as a form of strategic interaction, by modeling threats to legislate as a
non-cooperative game in which legislators and firms interact.219 In the game, the
predicted actions for each of the players constitute the equilibrium. As in models of
strategic behavior, the strategy a player employs in equilibrium, crucially depends on
what one player believes another player will do in a particular situation.
My discussion begins with constructing a model that: (i) accurately outlines the
rules of the game (i.e., how it’s played and who plays when); (ii) describ es the game’s
information structure (i.e., who knows what and when); and (iii) explicitly states the
underlying assumptions (i.e., what are the players’ preferences and what do they care
about). I begin the analysis with the consideration of a simple game, in which the
severity of the threatened legislation is fixed and known. I subsequently extend the
theoretical analysis to consider more complex strategic situations in which the legislator
can choose (i) the severity of the threatened legislation (i.e., lenient, moderate, and
severe), and (ii) whether or not to disclose that severity to the firm, distinguishing
between games of perfect and imperfect information, respectively.220

1. The Rules of the Game
At the outset of the game, the legislator (e.g., a single legislator, a group of
legislators, or the government as a whole)221 issues a threat to enact legislation that will
adversely affect a firm222 if it fails to change its conduct based on the legislator’s
demands.223 Implicitly coupled with the threat is the legislator’s inverse promise that if
the firm complies, he will forego seeking to enact the threatened legislation. The model
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A strategic game consists of a list of participants (i.e., players); an array of possible actions for each player
(i.e., strategies); and rewards or losses for those actions for each player (i.e., payoffs). See Avinash Dixit &
Susan Skeath, Games of Strategy 24-27 (1999) (defining strategies and payoffs).
220 The analysis of these more complex games is presented in Section 6 below.
221 For simplicity purposes, I do not distinguish between threats issued by one legislator; those issued by a
group of legislators acting together through a congressional committee or otherwise; and threats issued by the
government as a whole. In fact, assuming all else remains equal, whether the threat is made by one legislator
or, rather, by a group has no bearing on the model’s predictions.
222 Presently, the model focuses on a single threat-recipient though, in real life, this is not typically the case
except, for example, where a legislative threat is directed to an administrative agency or a mega-firm that
dominates the relevant market. See, e.g., Senate Democrats Back off Calls for Price Cap Legislation, supra note 118;
see also Puzzanghera, supra note 166 (warning the baseball commissioner that legislation would be imposed
unless use of steroids stopped). Section C below extends the analysis to more common scenarios where threats
are directed to numerous firms and organizations in an industrial sector or profession. See, e.g., Markhoff,
supra note 120 (describing a threat that was directed to 350 computer executives and software developers).
223 Legislators often set compliance deadlines and articulate implementation procedures that firms must
follow. See, e.g., Legislation Threat to Banks’ Self-Regulation, supra note 152 (the U.K. government specified
implementation procedures in the legislative threat it had directed to banks).
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assumes that the severity of the threatened legislation is fixed, such that the legislator
cannot opt to threaten the firm with a stricter or more lenient legislation.
If enacted, the threatened legislation will negatively weigh on a firm in direct
proportion to the severity of the terms and requirements. For example, the legislation
may impose stricter standards on conduct; increase the probability of enforcement
actions for violations of already existing laws (e.g., by providing individuals strong
incentives to bring suits); or raise fines and potential damages, which also make law
enforcement incentives stronger.224 Thus, the negative impact on utility can take many
different forms, such as: reducing or capping the prices of the firm’s products; revoking
business licenses and barring specific business practices; imposing measures that
augment operational and regulatory costs; increasing liability exposure and liability
risks; and enhancing competition in the market in which the firm operates.
Next, the firm decides whether to co
nform to the legislator’s demands or, rather, to
not respond so that the firm continues engaging in the same course of conduct.225
Although the firm can decide to comply or not, it does have the ability to decide the
extent to which it complies (i.e., compliance is indivisible).226
The legislator then makes a choice between carrying out the threat so as to enact the
legislation or not following through with the threat. Yet, the legislator’s decision to
carry out the threat does not necessarily mean that he will be successful in passing the
threatened legislation; rather, all it means is that the legislator will endeavor to enact the
threatened legislation to the best of his ability. In other words, implementing the threat
is tantamount to creating a risk(but definitely not certainty) that the adverse legislation
will be enacted into law.227 This feature of legislative threats reflects the inherent
uncertainty of the legislative enterprise. I postpone discussion of this feature until
Section 5, where I will re-introduce this issue in order to refine the model’s predictions.
In sum, the strategic interaction between legislators and firms is a dynamic, noncooperative game in which players adhere to a strict order of play.

2. The Information Structure of the Game
The key questions in strategic games is how much information does each player
know, and when does he know it. The information structure of a game depends on
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For example, the threatened legislator may appropriate public resources for enforcement of existing laws.
Likewise, the threatened legislation may create powerful private incentives to enforce the law on targeted
firms, thus subjecting these firms to greater liability exposure and higher liability risks.
225 As I show in Section D, the firm may either strictly comply with the legislator’s demands or commence
regulatory bargaining in the shadow of the threat in an attempt to reach a mutually-agreeable solution.
226 While the firm can determine the magnitude of resources it will invest in compliance, what matters is not
how much effort it made but, rather, whether or not it complied with the legislator’s demands. Of course
(though this is not the case presently under discussion), the legislator may choose to create an inverse link
between the severity of the threatened legislation and the degree of observable compliance, thus making the expected
negative impact of the threat contingent upon the level of compliance.
227 This type of threat, known as a probabilistic threat, is observed for example in the public international
relations scene, in which governments make threats that involve the infliction of economic or other harm with
some probability, but not with certainty. See Dixit & Skeath, supra note 219, at 302.
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what information is available to players, when it is their turn, at various junctures
throughout the game. This structure is important because the strategy a player uses in
equilibrium crucially depends on what one player thinks the other player knows in the
particular situation.
The present model describes a game with perfect information.228 Perfect information
refers to the idea that a player knows whose turn it is as well as the exact position the
game has reached in the game tree.229 In the context of this game, a firm can tell both
that a legislator has issued a threat and what the severity of the threatened legislation is.
For this very reason, the game also qualifies as one with symmetric information.230
Even though the legislator can tell whether or not the firm has complied with the
demands articulated,231 he cannot directly observe the various measures taken by the
firm in order to ensure compliance (e.g., internal controls, risk-reduction measures).
Here, the underlying intuition is twofold: first, the legislator can monitor the firm’s
processes and output for compliance using, among other things, testing, auditing,232
and agents to gather necessary information;233 second, the firm normally has a strong
incentive to divulge information exhibiting its compliance.

3. The Game’s underlying Assumptions
This theoretical model rests upon several intuitive and realistic assumptions, which
ought to be stated explicitly.
(a) Players’ Rationality
It is assumed that players are fully knowledgeable about the structure and rules of
the game; they are rational, meaning that they both seek to maximize a predetermined
228

Ordinarily, the information available to players in the game can be categorized in four ways: whether it
is, (i) a certain or uncertain game; (ii) a game with perfect or imperfect information; (iii) a game with symmetric
or asymmetric information; or (iv) a game with complete or incomplete information. A detailed explanation of
these categories is found in Eric Rasmusen, Games & Information 47-51 (3rd ed. 2001).
229 Technically, in a game of perfect information (e.g., chess), each information set is a singleton; otherwise,
the game is one of imperfect information. Id. at 47-48.
230 A game is one of symmetric information if one player has the same information that the other player has.
Id. at 49-50. In the present game, the legislator and the firm hold the same information. In keeping, I make the
realistic assumption that the legislator and the firm hold equal information (or, albeit, equal access to
information) that pertains to the probability that the threatened legislation will pass congressional muster.
Hence, both players are equally well-positioned to assess the probability that the bill will be enacted into law.
231 A more complicated scenario is one in which the legislator cannot tell with certainty whether or not the
firm has complied. Introducing this uncertainty into the model clearly increases the analytic complexity while
offering no added value. In any case, assuming such uncertainty exists and further that the firm complies, the
firm is expected to increase its investment in complying in order to reduce the risk that the legislator will carry
out his threat (due to an error in monitoring compliance which works to the detriment of the firm). Intuitively,
this conclusion assumes that the higher the investment in compliance, the lower is the risk of error.
232 For example, the legislator can check whether firms have reduced gas emissions, tested baseball athletes
for steroid use, or monitored digital obscenity in films. That being said, more often the legislator is unable to
directly observe what measures the firm has undertaken to ensure compliance with the legislator’s demands.
233 See, e.g., Monitoring Proforma for Commercial Leases Code of Practice, supra note 165 (in accordance with the
threat, the government appointed various bodies to monitor implementation in the property sector).
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utility measure;234 and they are aware of each others’ rationality. In other words,
rationality is common knowledge amongst the players such that they are both aware
that the other is also seeking to maximize utility.235
(b) The Legislator’s Utility
Consistent with public choice theory,236 a legislator’s utility increases both with his
success in advancing socially-desirable policies and with solidifying his political
reputation (e.g., for toughness, fairness, and policy stance).237 However, investment of
time and other resources in a complex and protracted legislative process decreases the
legislator’s utility, insofar as it reduces the time and resources available for the timeintensive activity of fundraising.238 Furthermore, as evidenced by empirical research in
political economy, it is assumed that constituents and political contributors reward
efforts to advance beneficial policies and good reputation, and penalize failures and
poor reputation. This, then, has the effect of either enhancing or degrading a
legislator’s reputational capital.239
(c) The Firm’s Utility
Another foundational assumption of this model is that a firm’s utility improves
with net expected profits and recedes with the rise of systematic risks (i.e., risks that
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More specifically, what this assumption means is that every player maximizes perfectly and completely
against the strategies of his opponents; that the character of those opponents and of their strategies are
perfectly known (and, where not, that the uncertainty in that respect is understood and accounted for); and
that players are able to evaluate all their options. See Kreps, supra note 218, at 139. Admittedly, however,
individual behavior is often boundedly rational (i.e., intendedly rational, but only limitedly so) or wholly
irrational. See Herbert Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, 59 J. BUSINESS 209 (1986). For a general
review see Richard A. Posner, Behavioral Law and Economics, in FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 252 (2001). Gametheorists have developed different research strategies to capture notions of bounded rationality in strategic
behavior. See Kreps, supra note 218, at 154-56.
235 In other words, I assume that there is complete information as to the structure of the game, the players’
rational decision-making, and the player’s respective objectives.
236 As a general matter, legislators conduct their political business so as to advance political self-interest. See
Lemieux, supra note 113, at 22 (arguing that when acting as voters, politicians, or bureaucrats, individuals
continue to be self-interested and try to maximize their utility).
237 See Kroszner & Stratmann, Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress, supra note 194; see
also Kroszner & Stratmann, Congressional Committees as Reputation-building Mechanisms, supra note 195.
238 See Neustadt, Foreword to the 2001 Edition, in Redman, supra note 112, at 8-10.
239 See Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Corporate Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the
Rewards to Legislator Reputation, 48 J. L. & ECON. 41 (2005) (using data on political contributions to members of
the House of Representatives during seven electoral cycles from 1983/84 to 1995/96 and finding that greater
reputational development is rewarded with greater political contributions). Notably, using votes and
contributions to reward legislators for good reputation may reflect constituents’ strategic and non-strategic
preferences for good political reputation. The strategic derivation of this preference is attributed to some form
of herding behavior, namely, that voters exhibit a preference for good reputation because they believe that
others prefer good reputation too (perhaps as a result of a non-strategic preference) and, therefore, assuming
all else remains equal, reputable legislators have higher chance of re-election. Lastly, fellow lawmakers may
also reward good reputation (e.g., higher cooperation) and penalize bad reputation (e.g., political backlash).
Hence, legislative threats and promises are not cost-free.
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cannot be diversified away including, in particular, the risk of harmful legislation).240
The execution of a threat by a legislator decreases the firm’s utility in two ways: (i) it
reduces expected profitability and firm value, thus negatively affecting the firm’s stock
returns;241 and (ii) it increases the systematic risk to which the firm is exposed (i.e., the
risk of adverse legislation), thus diminishing firm value even further.242
Furthermore, self-regulatory organizations established by law (e.g., NASD243) and
privately-ordered groups (e.g., NYC diamond dealers244), are bound to experience an
additional decline in utility. This, because the threatened legislation may abolish or
otherwise intrude upon their valuable self-regulatory privileges or limit their capacity
to self-govern by private ordering.245 The negative impact on utility in this context is
threefold: (i) the threatened legislation may introduce inefficient standards and
requirements (compared with those the firm may devise through threat-induced selfregulation); (ii) the threatened legislation may instate sweeping regulatory reforms,
going beyond what is necessary to address the issue in question (i.e., a spillover effect);
and (iii) the legislative intrusion may set a precedent, thus making additional regulatory
intervention in the future more likely (i.e., a regulatory avalanche). 246
(d) The Superiority of Self-regulation
Assuming that they adequately account for the potential externalities of their
conduct, firms are best-situated to regulate themselves.247 This is due to information
240

Depending on firm-specific characteristics, systematic risks affect all projects a firm engages in. Hence,
macroeconomic risks, including interest rate and regulatory changes, qualify as prime systematic risks.
Systematic risks are particularly undesirable because, unlike non-systematic or idiosyncratic risks, they cannot
be reduced by diversification. The firm therefore cannot guard against this risk by choosing different projects.
See “Systematic risk,” in Black, supra note 50, at 455. While greater certainty about the future facilitates private
planning and investment, systematic regulatory risks inhibit investment and reduce economic growth. See
Christian Gollier, The Economics of Risk and Time 32-34 (2001).
241 An event study using a sample of Canadian firms has shown that the announcement of potential adverse
legislation negatively affects the stock prices of firms covered by that legislation. See Beck et al., supra note 204.
242 Research in corporate finance documents the “Congressional Effect,” showing that stock returns are
lower and stock price volatility is higher when Congress is in session. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that firms face a more uncertain regulatory environment when legislative activity is under way. See Michael F.
Ferguson & Hugh D. White, Congress and the Stock Market (2005), at www.ssrn.com (strong link between
Congressional activity and stock market returns, consistent with the hypothesis that investors evaluate
Congressional activity over time and adjust their expectations accordingly).
243 For a detailed discussion of the NASD’s statutory self-regulatory status see Section I(B) above.
244 For a discussion of private ordering in the New York diamond industry see Section I(D) above.
245 The U.K. government’s plan to introduce anti-money laundering legislation not only threatened to
introduce adverse legislation but also to bring to an end the long-standing tradition of self-regulation in the
banking and financial sectors. See Legislation Threat to Banks’ Self-Regulation, supra note 152 (describing the
implications of the U.K. government’s anti-money laundering legislative threat). Indeed, the risk of abolishing
the self-regulatory legal status of financial institutions and, as a corollary, the potential for more regulatory
intervention, intensified the industry’s concern over the government’s threatened legislation and the negative
effects of high compliance costs that the financial institutions would have to incur.
246 Cf. Jonathan Prynn, Lloyd’s Facing New Legal Controls, THE TIMES, June 4, 1993 (“Lloyd’s of London has
until the end of the year to sort out its problems before facing legislation to end its jealously guarded selfregulatory status … [and] be brought within the City’s regulatory mainstream”).
247 The “uncertainties embedded in the regulatory process, and the assumptions the regulators must make in
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asymmetries between legislators and firms with respect to the nature of the targeted
conduct (e.g., the scope of the problem, the sources of the problem, and possible
solutions); the significant cost of obtaining such information ; and differences in the
institutional capacity and availability of resources necessary to devise cost-effective
regulatory measures. 248 In other words, compared with legislators and regulators, firms
incur lower transaction costs in discovering the correlation between processes and
outputs. Thus, firms are better-positioned to design cost- effective solutions and
socially-desirable policies for dealing with the very same concerns that legislators seek
to address through legislation.249 Hence, threat-induced self-regulation offers a superior
cost-effective method to achieving the regulatory objectives aimed at by the threatened
legislation.
(e) The Repeated Nature of the Game
A final assumption is that both legislators and firms are repeat players in such a
game, though not necessarily against each other. Legislators and firms often make
similar decisions in strategic environments in which the rules of the game remain
virtually unchanged.250 The only variable, however, is each player’s “history,” which
grows as time passes. Hence, both players are cognizant of (and, indeed
, care about)
the fact that any move made in one game shapes their reputation and may have
repercussions in future games.251 We therefore observe two-sided reputation-building.

4. Extensive Form Representation of the Game
Figure 1, shown below, represents the legislative threat game in what is known in

order to arrive at recommendations for actions despite those uncertainties” render the process of risk
regulation totally ineffective and therefore inefficient. See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle, supra note 118, at
42-50. In addition, problems emanating from tunnel vision, random agenda selection, and the use of
inconsistent risk-assessment methods render legislators virtually incapable of devising effective measures of
risk regulation. Id. at 10-29.
248 Members of Congress are typically thrust unprepared into a specialized milieu and confronted with a
massive volume of highly technical legislation, with most of which they can deal only superficially. See
Raymond A. Bauer et al., American Business and Public Policy 408-413 (1968). Likewise, committee members are
often rarely present or disinterested. See Lynette Perkins, Influences of Members’ Goals on their Committee
Behavior: The U.S. House Judiciary Committee, 5 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 373, 378-79 (1980) (two-thirds of the House
Judiciary Committee members hardly participated in the committee’s regular work and deliberations).
249 For a discussion of the functional advantages of self-regulation see Part I(B) above.
250 While the legislator’s term in office places a limit on the number of possible repetitions of the game, a
firm can repeat the game an infinite number of times because, at least in theory, a firm can exist forever.
Hence, it is a finitely repeated game for the legislator but an infinitely repeated game for the firm. See
Rasmusen, supra note 228, at 109-117. This asymmetry is of no immediate consequence except for the fact that
whether a game is finitely- or infinitely-repeated bears impact on the players’ behavior during the final game.
251 Indeed, zero-sum one-shot games can turn into win-win games if continued in the long-run. See Dixit &
Skeath, supra note 219, at 20-21, 257-66 (discussing one-shot, finitely-repeated, and infinitely-repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma games). See also Glenn Ellison, Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma with Anonymous
Random Matching, 61 REV. ECON. STUD. 567 (1994) (despite the inability to tell who one’s opponent is in large
populations, players in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas cooperate).
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technical jargon as an extensive form game (i.e., a “game tree”).252 I present the game in
extensive form because the strategic from does not depict the information structure of
the game, namely—what information every player knows at each juncture. The game
tree is read left to right, beginning at the initial node and branching out until the game
concludes and the players’ respective payoffs have been determined. Figure 1 reveals
the timing of each player’s move, and the information each player has when it is his
turn to take action. Each node represents a “position” in the game, a point at which a
player must choose and play a strategy.253 The arrows originating from each node
signify the available strategies to the player as a given moment in the game.
Any pair of numbers shown in parentheses near the arrows represents the end of
the game and the payoffs (i.e., the utility gains or losses) for each player. In each pair,
the legislator’s payoff appears first followed by the payoff for the firm. These payoffs
embody how players evaluate possible outcomes in the game: they reflect any gain or
loss that the players consider relevant, whether pecuniary or not.254 The firm’s payoff
reflects both the cost of compliance with the legislative threat (if the firm actually
complies),255 and the negative impact of the threatened legislation (if and when the
threatened bill is enacted).256 The legislator’s payoff reflects the cost incurred by
pursuing the threatened legislation257 and the benefits received if he is successful in
inducing the desired change in behavior.258 By issuing the threat and through
congressional and public appearances, the legislator ties himself to the legislative threat
and claims credit for a possible policy change. And, by associating himself with the
threatened legislation (e.g., by adding his name to the bill259), the legislator may
guarantee that if the threat is exercised and the bill is enacted into law, any benefits that
may accrue will be internalized.

252 There are two basic forms that are used to present non-cooperative games: the first and more simple is the
strategic form (or normal form), which consists of a matrix of payoffs and strategy profiles; the second and more
complex is the extensive form, which is presented as a tree of possible strategies and their corresponding
payoffs. See Fernando Vega-Redondo, Economics and the Theory of Games 4-16 (2003) (discussing differences
between extensive and strategic form models).
253 The first position in the game (in this case, the issuance of the legislative threat) is depicted by an open
dot; the other dots represent subsequent positions and are filled in.
254 For a discussion of the concept of payoffs see Vega-Redondo, supra note 252, at 7-8.
255 The cost of compliance is fixed at 5. It is assumed that in order to comply, the firm must incur some fixed
costs (e.g., installing a new technology), the magnitude of which does do not change across firms (i.e., installing
the technology costs the same irrespective of firm-specific characteristics). In addition, compliance has a binary
property, such that the firm can comply or not comply but not determine to what extent to comply. If,
however, there is a chance that a legislator could not tell whether or not the firm complies, the firm may
increase its investment in order to reduce the risk of error and the ensuing risk of the threatened legislation.
256 I assume that the negative impact of the threatened legislation is 20.
Generally, this cost reflects
expenditures that the firm must incur and the resources it must invest in order to comply with the new
legislation (e.g., switching costs from one regime to another, such as investment in new systems).
257 I assume that the cost of drafting, introducing, and enacting the threatened legislation is 5.
258 I assume that the benefit from inducing the firm (and, as we will see later, the entire industrial sector) to
change its undesirable conduct is 5.
259 This is a rather common legislative practice, of which the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is one example.
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Figure 1. Extensive form representation of the legislative threat game
with perfect information and one type of threatened legislation

5. Equilibrium Analysis: How are Players Expected to Behave?
Having modeled the strategic exertion of legislative threats as a dynamic, noncooperative game, I now turn to examine how the players are expected to behave in this
strategic interaction. Herein, two questions merit thorough examination. First, are
firms expected to respond to the legislative threat and comply with the legislator’s
demands or, rather, to remain indifferent? Furthermore, which conditions trigger
compliance or non-compliance? Second, are legislators expected to carry out the threat
and seek enactment of the threatened legislation if firms do not comply or, rather, to
retract the threat? And, under which conditions will they enact or retract? The
predictions concerning the players’ behaviorexpress the ability of legislative threats to
induce a change in conduct and, more generally, demonstrate their functioning as
regulators of social conduct.
Game-theoretic methods and, in particular, the Nash equilibrium solution concept,
can be used to generate conjectures as to how players are anticipated to act.260 The
prediction of what will ensue in equilibrium is often referred to as the game’s
“solution.” In essence, the Nash equilibrium concept postulates that the equilibrium of
a game consists of an array of strategies, one for each player, such that each player’s
260

Offering the fundamental solution concept for non-cooperative games, Nash equilibrium introduces an
appealing criterion for predicting the strategies that the players will choose in a game in which they choose
their strategies independently. See Dixit & Skeath, supra note 219, at 82-3 (demonstrating the Nash equilibrium
solution concept). The Nash solution concept presumes that all players are fairly clear about what they and
other players should do in order to maximize their utility. T
his “evident” course of action constitutes a Nash
equilibrium. See Kreps, supra note 218, at 29-30, 31-32.
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equilibrium strategy is his best response (in the utility-maximizing sense) given the
supposed strategy of the other player (who, also, plays the strategy that is his best
response). Thus, provided that players actually employ their Nash equilibrium
strategies, no player has any incentive (in the sense of seeking to improve his own
payoff) to deviate from his equilibrium strategy because he would not be better-off
choosing a different strategy. The intuition driving this analysis provides that if a mode
of behavior is self-evident, and each player believes it is self-evident (and if each player
believes that the other player believes it is self-evident, and so on), then each player
must be choosing a strategy that is his best response to what the other player is
evidently doing. This logic is precisely what underlies the Nash equilibrium concept.
How, then, does a firm determine what its best response is, once a legislator has threatened
to enact unfavorable legislation? Quite simply, the firm compares the costs and benefits of
playing a given strategy. Seeking to maximize utility (that is, by increasing expected
net profits and reducing systematic risks), the firm will choose the strategy that
maximizes its benefits and minimizes its costs. This, by definition, is the firm’s optimal,
or best response, strategy. Most importantly, what is optimal for the firm actually
depends on what the legislator is expected to do. The firm’s best response (i.e., comply
or not comply) therefore is contingent upon the firm’s belief whether or not the
legislator will carry out the threat if the firm fails to comply. In keeping, this response
also relies on its belief whether or not the legislator will keep the implicit promise to
forego enacting the threatened legislation if the firm does comply. In other words, the
firm’s optimal strategy depends on whether the legislator’s threat (as well as the
accompanying implicit promise) is credible or, rather, incredible (i.e., an empty threat or
an empty promise).
The legislator’s threat is incredible if it is expected that when called upon, the
legislator will not exercise the threat (irrespective of whether or not the firm complies),
thereby just making “cheap talk.”261 Clearly, the firm’s best response in this case is the
“don’t comply” strategy because, compared with the payoff for playing the “comply”
strategy, this one maximizes the firm’s utility.262 Stated differently, it makes no sense to
incur the cost of compliance when the threat is incredible, because doing so would not
improve the firm’s position. Either way, the risk of adverse legislation is zero.
Moreover, once a strategy has been chosen, there is no incentive to depart from it and
choose another strategy, thus satisfying the Nash criterion mentioned above. This
analysis generates the game’s incredible threat equilibrium in which the firm does not
comply and the legislator does not carry out the threat.
Conversely, a threat is credible when a legislator finds that it is in his best interest (in
the utility-maximizing sense) to carry out the threat if the triggering event occurs.263
261

See Douglas G. Bird et al., Game Theory and the Law 65-66 (1994); see also Kreps, supra note 218, at 49-50.
A numerical analysis of Figure 1 confirms the validity of this statement. Given that the legislator will not
carry out the threat, compliance makes the firm worse off because it requires the firm to incur the compliance
cost of 5 in return for practically nothing. Thus, whereas the payoff for compliance is (-5), the payoff for doing
nothing is 0 which shows that “don’t comply” makes perfect sense (utility-wise).
263 Analytically, the firm believes the threat is credible and that the legislator is rational. Given these beliefs,
262
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Similarly, a legislator’s promise is credible if it is in his best interest to keep his promise
and abstain from instituting the threatened legislation if the firm complies. In other
words, in the presence of credibility, the legislator will carry out the threat if the firm
fails to comply but keep his promise to avoid enacting the threatened legislation if the
firm does comply. Clearly, credibility alters the scene dramatically. The firm’s best
response in this case is the “comply” strategy, which maximizes the firm’s utility
insomuch as it spends relatively little on complying and thus avoids altogether the risk
and cost of unfavorable legislation.264 This is the case because once the firm chooses to
adhere to the legislator’s demands, the legislator’s best response is to do refrain from
realizing the threat. In contrast, were the firm to have chosen “don’t comply,” it would
have saved the cost of compliance but, at the same time, would have been subject to the
undesirable risk and expense of adverse legislation. Hence, provided that the
legislative threat is credible, it induces compliance with the legislator’s demands and as
a result avoids the need for enacting harmful legislation. This analysis produces the
game’s credible threat equilibrium, in which the firm complies and the legislator does not
carry out the threat.
In sum, a Nash equilibrium analysis derives two mutually-exclusive solutions: the
credible threat equilibrium and the incredible threat equilibrium. Practically, these solutions
suggest that players can play the game by selecting either of two sets of strategies
depending on the credibility of the threat. In other words, which of these predictions will
actually materialize depends on whether the legislative threat (and the accompanying implicit
promise) is credible or, rather, incredible.265 In the incredible threat equilibrium, the firm does
not comply with the legislator’s demands and the legislator does not carry out the
threat. In direct contrast, in the credible threat equilibrium the firm complies with the
legislator’s demands and thus the legislator does not carry out the threat.

6. Refining the Predictions: Incorporating Probabilistic Threats
The aforementioned predictions merit further consideration so as to adequately
examine the unique properties of legislative threats. The characteristic feature of the
legislative threat derives from the fact that executing the threat does not—and, in fact,
cannot—ensure the enactment of the threatened legislation. The legislator cannot
guarantee that the threatened consequences will actually materialize.266 Rather, carrying
out the threat to legislate simply means that the legislator will endeavor to enact the
the firm’s best response is compliance because the legislator will carry out the threat unless the firm complies.
264 A numerical example based on Figure 1 demonstrates the following point: if the threat is credible, it
makes perfect sense to “comply” and obtain a payoff of -5 rather than “don’t comply,” in which case the payoff
is -20. Hence, compliance is the firm’s best-response because it ensures that the firm’s total utility loss will be
limited to 5, whereas non-compliance would have resulted in a total utility loss of 20.
265 Technically, the credibility of the legislator’s threat can shift the solution of the game from the noncompliance equilibrium to the superior, utility-maximizing compliance equilibrium.
266 That, of course, would have become possible if transacting in the political market was cost-free. In other
words, the legislator would have been able to garner sufficient political support to enact the threatened
legislation if he could engage in Coasian bargaining over policy. Cf. Francesco Parisi, The Political Coase
Theorem, 115 PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (2003) (considering the applicability of the Coase theorem to political markets).
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threatened legislation. In other words, attempting to achieve something does not
ensure that the desired outcome is achieved, especially if it is contingent upon factors
other than one’s effort. Therefore, the threatened legislation is probablebut not certain.
In game-theoretic parlance, legislative threats qualify as probabilistic threats, threats
that create a riskbut not a certainty of a dire outcome.267 Upon further examination of
the concept of legislative threats, it becomes discernible that the underlying mechanism
is more subtle than previously suggested: carrying out the threat exposes the firm to the
risk—but not certainty—that the threatened legislation will be enacted into law. Surely,
the probabilistic nature of legislative threats is due to the inherent uncertainty of the
political enterprise that governs the legislative process.268
The probabilistic feature of legislative threats requires a refinement of the
predictions that constitute the credible threat equilibrium, in which the firm complies with
the legislator’s demands and the legislator avoids carrying out the threat. Incorporating
the threat’s probabilistic property into the analysis, compliance may or may not be the
firm’s best response. In each case, this depends on the probability that the threatened
legislation will be successfully enacted into law. More specifically, assuming the threat
is credible, a cost- benefit analysis indicates that compliance will be the firm’s best
response only insofar as the expected ex post negative impact of the threatened legislation
(which is equal to the loss in utility multiplied by the probability of that loss) exceeds the
cost of ex ante compliance with the legislator’s demands.
In other words, the firm’s cost-benefit analysis takes into account the following
variables: (i) the probability of the threatened legislation; (ii) the cost of ex ante
compliance with the legislator’s demands; and (iii) the ex post adverse impact of the
threatened legislation on utility (that is, if it is actually implemented in its originallycontemplated form). Mindful of the fact that enacting the threatened legislation into
law is by no means certain, the firm’s choice of best response strategy is driven by the
probability-discounted, negative consequences on utility.269
The present refinement shows that the inducement effect of legislative threats on
the behavior of a firm is qualified by an effectiveness condition. That is, a threshold
267

See Dixit & Skeath, supra note 219, at 302, 451-54 (examining and modeling probabilistic threats).
The legislative drama covers a wide variety of activities that legislators use to influence the ultimate
legislative product and get different interests represented. Among others, these include behind-the-scenes
negotiations, planning party voting strategy, negotiating with the administration, soliciting proxies, lobbying
other committee members, or negotiating amendments with outside groups. See Hall, supra note 215, at 41-44.
Clearly, this renders the legislative process and its end product all the more uncertain.
269 A numerical example demonstrates this point. The firm incurs a cost of 5 to comply with the legislator’s
demands, but if the firm does not comply and the threatened legislation is enacted, the firm will suffer a
definite loss of 20. Yet, if there is some chance that the legislator will not succeed in enacting the threatened
legislation, the expected loss will be proportionately lower than 20. In these conditions, it makes utility sense to
“comply” only if the probability that the threatened legislation will be enacted into law is equal to or greater
than 25%. The logic here is that risk exposure decreases the firm’s utility and, hence, the firm will comply even
if only to avoid the 25% risk of adverse legislation. Cf. Ferguson & White, supra note 242 (legislative activity in
Congress is correlated with lower stock returns, consistent with the hypothesis that higher regulatory
uncertainty reduces firm value). In all other cases, it makes sense to do nothing because the expected loss is
lower than the cost of compliance.
268
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probability below which a firm will not comply with the legislator’s demands given the
cost of compliance and the harmful burden of the threatened legislation, even though the
threat is (or merely believed to be) credible. It can be concluded that credibility is a
necessary albeit insufficient condition for inducing a firm’s compliance in equilibrium. In
other words, compliance with a legislator’s demands depends on the fulfillment of two
conditions: (i) the threat must be credible; and (ii) the probability that the threatened
legislation will be passed into law must exceed the effectiveness condition. Unless both
these conditions are strictly met, the firm will do nothing to comply and so the
legislator will be called to carry out the threat.
Clarifying the predictions that constitute the credible threat equilibrium, the present
analysis offers two mutually-exclusive predictions. First, when the probability that the
threatened legislation will be enacted into law exceeds the effectiveness condition, the
firm complies with the legislator’s demands and the legislator avoids enacting the
legislation (i.e., credible threat compliance equilibrium). Second, when the probability falls
below the effectiveness condition, the firm does not comply and the legislator carries
out the threat to enact the legislation (i.e., credible threat non-compliance equilibrium).
As one would expect, however, the probability that the threatened legislation will
be enacted into law may change from case to another. It is therefore prudent for a firm
to assess this probability so as to choose its best response wisely. To that end, a firm can
gather and analyze relevant data to gauge the likelihood of both favorable and
unfavorable voting scenarios in the House and Senate.
Inevitably, given the inherent intricacy of policy-making processes, a variety of
institutional, political, and reputational factors may influence legislative behavior in
Congress and therefore the likelihood of the threatened legislation.270 The composition
of the House and Senate, for example, is a significant determinant. In addition, the
membership and control of the relevant congressional committee is an overwhelmingly
important factor that can make or break the threatened legislation.271 Likewise,
differences in partisan preferences concerning the threatened legislation’s policy are
also important.272 Lastly, to the extent that it is observable to someone outside the
political arena, logrolling (i.e., vote-exchange agreements) can also shape the firm’s
probability assessment and, hence, its best response.
Co-sponsorship—which has been aptly dubbed “one of the lubricants of the
270

While credibility and probability are analytically distinct concepts, a threat’s credibility may affect the
probability of the threatened legislation, and vice versa. Here, the intuition is that the higher the stakes for the
legislator in carrying out the threat (e.g., higher potential to damage reputation), the more inclined he will be to
work to increase the chance of success of the legislation.
271 Cf. John Boyce & Diane Bischak, The Role of Political Parties in the Organization of Congress, 18 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 1 (2002) (parties appoint members to committees, taking into account how the committees’ membership
affects the legislation adopted by the legislature). Moreover, committees characteristics are an especially
important factor because, given their institutional design and agenda-setting mandate, committees are able to
enforce their policy wishes not only because they originate bills but also because they get a second chance to
shape the proposed bill after their chamber has worked its will. See Kenneth J. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast,
Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 85 (1987).
272 See David Epstein, Partisan and Bipartisan Signaling in Congress, 14 J. L. ECON. & ORG. (1998) (when
partisan differences over policy are small, bipartisanship is preferred to partisan policy making).
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legislative process”273—is another factor likely to increase the probability of the
threatened legislation. A solicitation for co-sponsorship carries an implicit offer that in
return for the co-sponsor’s support of the bill, the soliciting legislator will give the cosponsor an opportunity to be associated with the bill and thereby share the muchneeded political credit and publicity.274 As a result, co-sponsorship provides a medium
for political exchange, which enables a legislator to guarantee sufficient support of the
threatened legislation.275
Clearly, these factors are but a few of the more obvious considerations that bear on
the probability of the threatened legislation. Furthermore, political reputation and
established track-record of other legislators; legislators’ social group identification;276
special interests and potential legislative capture; the extent to which one’s party
controls individual legislators’ voting; the public opinion on the issue in question and
its impact on policy-making circles;277 and whether the threat is explicit, implicit, or
anticipatory may also play a significant role.
A legislator is rationally interested in securing the firm’s compliance so as to avoid
incurring the cost of carrying out the threat.278 The compliance equilibrium maximizes
a legislator’s utility and makes him better-off.279 However, to ensure that this
equilibrium transpires, the legislator must guarantee that compliance is the firm’s best
response.280 Practically, the legislator may do one or all three of the following: (i) lower
compliance costs; (ii) make the legislation’s adverse impact harsher; or (iii) strive to
render the probability of the threatened legislation greater than (or at least equal to) the
effectiveness condition.
Lowering the cost of compliance, which essentially requires that the legislator
relaxes her demands, is undesirable from a utility-maximization perspective.281 On the
other hand, increasing the severity of the threatened legislation282 and intensifying its
273

See Redman, supra note 112, at 78.
Id. at 79.
275 Cf. Barry Weingast & William Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress: or, Why Legislatures, Like
Firms, are Not Organized as Markets?, 96 J. POLIT. ECON. 132 (1988) (given the peculiar form of bargaining
problems found in legislatures, specific forms of non-market exchange are necessary).
276 For example, research shows, though not without controversy, that legislators’ policy interests and the
intensity of their revealed preferences are related to their personal identification with particular social groups,
defined by race, ethnicity, gender, and age. See Hall, supra note 215, at 70-71, 190-194.
277 Cf. Greg Winter, House G.O.P. to Drop Idea of Penalty for Steep Rises in Tuition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at
A14 (the threatened “legislation has been an ever-present part of the debate over the affordability of college
since [Representative McKeon] put forward the idea a year ago”).
278 Here, the implicit assumption is that carrying out the threat if and when called upon to do so is in the
legislator’s best interest, thus ensuring the threat’s ex ante credibility.
279 Figure 1 shows that whereas the payoff for carrying out the threat is (-5), the payoff the legislator receives
if the firm does comply is 5. Compliance therefore increases the legislator’s utility by 10 units.
280 Technically, the legislator must ensure that the ex post probability-discounted negative effect of the
legislation is greater or equal to the ex ante cost of compliance.
281 A partial relief for a firm from the demands to change its undesirable conduct is bound to reduce a
legislator’s benefits from inducing a desired social change.
282 Severity level encompasses any aspect of the threatened legislation that influences the magnitude of the
negative consequences experienced by the firm. Hence, stricter standards of conduct, higher penalties for
274
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negative impact is also unattractive.283 The intuition here is that the harsher the
threatened legislation is, the more difficult or perhaps impossible it will be to put it into
law. While passing lenient legislation may be probable, enacting severe legislation—
without any political compromise—is less plausible. Assuming all else remains equal,
there seems to be an inverse correlation between the severity and probability of a
threatened legislation.284 Following this logic, increasing the severity inevitably lowers
the probability of the legislation, thus leaving its anticipated negative impact virtually
unchanged and the firm’s incentive to comply insufficient.285 Hence, given the inverse
correlation between severity and probability, increasing severity is in and of itself
inconsequential.
Striving to make the probability of the threatened legislation greater than (or equal
to) the effectiveness condition (or attempting to convince the firm that the probability is
higher than it actually is286), is therefore the best strategic option. Increasing the
probability will satisfy the effectiveness condition and induce the firm to adhere to the
legislator’s demands. Here, logrolling provides one important way in which the
legislator can guarantee (or increase the likelihood of) sufficient political backing of the
threatened legislation and thus higher probability of its enactment.287
In an attempt to increase the probability of success, the legislator may also seek to
trigger an availability cascade, a self-reinforcing process of collective belief formation, by
which an expressed perception initiates a chain reaction that gives the perception
increasing plausibility through its rising availability in public discourse.288 Applied to
this context, educating the public of the importance of the underlying issues and
changing public opinion in favor of the legislation may garner political support and
strengthen the likelihood of the success of the threatened legislation.289
violating the standards, and more effective enforcement can all increase the level of severity.
283 Obviously, the assumption here is that the firm is made aware of such changes, simply because
information that is privately held by the legislator cannot influence the firm’s decision-making.
284 This correlation may be driven by several factors. First, harsher legislation creates antithetical policy
stands, thus making a political consensus harder to achieve, unless a compromise is reached. Second, harsher
legislation involves serious economic consequences, thus making it worth while for firms affected by the
legislation to counter-lobby the legislation, thereby rendering its enactment less probable.
285 More specifically, increasing the severity will predictably have no effect on the expected impact of the
threatened legislation, insofar as any alteration in the level of severity proportionately affects the probability.
286 Asymmetric probability assessments in which the legislator holds more accurate information than the
firm does, may also lead the firm to believe that compliance is its best response.
287 See Thomas Stratmann, The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1162 (1992)
(vote trading is an important determinant of congressional voting behavior); see also Francesco Parisi, Votes and
Outcomes: Rethinking the Politics-Like-Markets Metaphor, 13 EURO. J. L. & ECON. 183 (2002) (logrolling and
political bargaining increase the predictability of the outcome for those who are involved in the process).
288 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 198, at 715-27. Specifically, the legislator may act as an availability
entrepreneur and launch availability campaigns through the media and otherwise, all of which in order to
instigate an availability cascade and manipulate the public opinion on the policy issue at question. Id. 733-36.
289 Research reveals that Congress acts in response to changes in public opinion more than two-thirds of the
time. See Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, Effects of Public Opinion on Policy, 77 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 75
(1983). Reinforcing this finding, Congress is at least as responsive as any legislative body in other leading
democracies. See Joel E. Brooks, The Opinion-Policy Nexus in Germany, 54 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY 508 (1990).
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“Brinkmanship” is yet another tactic that increases the probability of enacting the
threatened legislation into law.290
According to game-theoretic terminology,
brinkmanship is the creation and gradual escalation of the risk of the threatened
consequences.291 Applied to this context, the legislator can take various, non
- mutuallyexclusive actions that gradually and steadily raise the likelihood of the threatened
legislation, continuing to the point at which the probability matches or exceeds the
effectiveness condition.292 However, in order to achieve their purpose, these actions
must be common knowledge. For example, negotiating with fellow lawmakers in order
to secure sufficient political support is one form of legislative brinkmanship. Moving
the legislative process forward is another. Inciting public opinion buildup concerning
the policy in question, thereby attracting other lawmakers and gaining their political
support, provides a third.293
Its strategic appeal notwithstanding, brinkmanship has one noticeable disadvantage
that reduces the legislator’s utility and negatively affects social welfare. While it may
ultimately induce a firm to comply (i.e., when the probability is sufficiently high), it also
gives an incentive incentives to at first follow a “wait and see” approach. Therefore,
mindful of the legislator’s brinkmanship tactics, the firm’s initial best response is “not
comply.” Yet, if the probability of the threatened legislation subsequently increases so
as to exceed, or at least equal, the effectiveness condition, compliance will then become
the firm’s best response. In contrast, viewed from the legislator’s utility perspective,
earlier compliance is preferable to delayed compliance.294 The logic here is that the
legislator’s utility depends on several factors: (i) whether or not he was successful in
inducing a change in a firm’s behavior; (ii) when that change was achieved;295 and (iii)
what was the cost incurred by the legislator to induce compliance. This temporal
preference is particularly pronounced when a legislator directs a threat towards several

290

President Kennedy’s actions during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 demonstrate nuclear brinkmanship,
as it increased the risk of an all-out war and thus made compliance with U.S. demands to dismantle the
missiles, Khrushchev’s best response. See Avinash Dixit & Barry Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically Ch. 8 (1991).
291 See Dixit & Skeath, supra note 219, at 451-59 (conceptualizing brinkmanship and examining the effects of
this practice on strategic behavior in games). More colloquially, it is the art or practice of pushing a dangerous
situation or confrontation to the limit of safety in order to force a desired outcome.
292 Brinkmanship turns the three-stage dynamic game (shown in Figure 1) into a multi-stage game, in which the
firm’s failure to comply leads the legislator to take action in an attempt to increase the probability of the
threatened legislation. Subsequently, the firm re-considers whether or not to comply. The firm’s failure to
comply leads the legislator to take another action, thus even further increasing that probability; and so on.
293 Insofar as taking these actions sink the cost of legislation ex ante, in whole or in part, these actions also
render the legislative threat credible (unless, of course, the threat is already credible). For a detailed discussion
of the interaction between sunk cost and credibility see Section B(1) below.
294 Observations confirm that in many instances firms have dragged their feet and basically done nothing to
comply for a considerable period of time. Clearly, non-compliance can be explained in several ways. First, the
threat may be incredible, thus making non-compliance the firm’s best response. Second, assuming the threat is
credible, delayed compliance may be due to the fact that the probability of the threatened legislation is lower
than the effectiveness condition.
295 This temporal dimension is substantial insofar as the sooner the firm complies and reforms its
objectionable behavior, the lower is the negative impact of its conduct on society and social welfare.

59

A Theory of Legislative Threats
firms (e.g., an industrial sector). In this case, strategic delays, free-riding, and holdouts
are widespread.
Seeking to guarantee early compliance, the legislator may threaten to increase the
cost of compliance as time progresses. That is, a legislator threatens that if the firm does
not comply early on, he will re-issue and extend the demands of the threat, thus making
later compliance more costly. In order to make certain of the threat’s effectiveness in
incentivizing early compliance, the forewarned increase in compliance expenses (per a
given period of inaction) must not surpass the increase in the expected negative impact
of the threatened legislation (as related to the legislator’s brinkmanship tactics during
the same period of time).
To conclude, in light of the preceding analysis, the assertion that “[l]egislative
sagacity reduces itself to a judicious use of strategic behavior” now has secured a solid
theoretical foundation.296

7. Extending the Analysis to Games with Perfect and Imperfect Information
In some cases, the legislator decides the contents of the threatened legislation such
that, in terms of severity, it can be classified as lenient, moderate, or severe legislation. If
enacted, the threatened legislation affects the firm in direct proportion to the leniency,
moderation, or severity of its terms. The legislator also decides whether or not to reveal
her choice. Hence, in an attempt to render the model as descriptive as possible of the
real legislative landscape, this Section extends the analysis in order consider two more
complex strategic situations in which the legislator decides (i) the severity of the
threatened legislation, and (ii) whether or not to disclose the chosen level of severity to
the firm.297 In turn, these choices give rise to games with perfect and imperfect
information, which I model and examine in this Section.
Figure 2, shown below, represents in an extensive form a game with perfect
information. The notion of perfect information captures the fact that both players hold
equal amounts of pertinent information. Consistent with some casual observations, the
game is predicated on the assumption that the legislator decides the level of severity
(e.g., lenient, moderate, or severe) and reveals this choice to the firm.298 The level of
severity is therefore a matter of common knowledge. The firm’s payoff reflects the cost
of compliance;299 and the negative impact of the threatened legislation (that is, if
enacted).300 The legislator’s payoff reflects the cost of enacting the threatened
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This statement is associated with Norwegian-American economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen.
The firm, it is understood, knows that any threatened legislation can be lenient, moderate, or severe.
298 See, e.g., Markhoff, supra note 120, at C8 (describing the information exchanged in the meeting between
government officials and industry participants, including a draft legislative proposal that would have required
companies to disclose their security status in the financial reports they file with the SEC).
299 The cost of compliance is fixed at 5 because I assume that the legislator’s demands remain unchanged
irrespective of the level of severity of the threatened legislation.
300 The negative impact of lenient, moderate, and severe threatened legislation is 10, 20, and 30, respectively.
The magnitude of these costs increases with the severity of the threatened legislation.
297
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legislation;301 and the benefits received if the legislator is successful in inducing the
desired change in conduct.302
This game is identical to the game I have discussed earlier (depicted in Figure 1),
with one exception: the legislator may choose between three levels of severity.
Consistent with earlier analysis, the equilibrium behavior depends on (i) whether the
threat is credible, and (ii) whether the probability that the threatened legislation is
enacted into law is higher or lower than the effectiveness condition. Surely, where the
threat is incredible (for reasons I explain in Section B below), the firm’s best response is
“not comply” and the legislator’s best response is to not carry out the threat. In
equilibrium, the threat is ineffective in inducing a change in behavior.
Credibility, however, may shift the equilibrium behavior from non-compliance to
compliance. When the threat is credible, the firm’s assessment of the probability of the
threatened legislation turns out to be the decisive factor underlying the threat’s
inducement effect, namely—that probability distinguishes between compliance (i.e.,
credible threat compliance equilibrium) and non-compliance (i.e., credible threat noncompliance equilibrium). The issue, therefore, is whether the threatened legislation
satisfies the effectiveness condition (which, as defined earlier, is the lower-bound
probability below which the firm will consider compliance an inefficient strategy, even
if the threat is credible or believed to be so).303 Given the probabilistic nature of
legislative threats, this condition is derived from (i) the cost of ex ante compliance with
the legislator’s demands; and (iii) the ex post adverse impact of the threatened
legislation which, we know, increases with severity. As the cost of ex ante compliance
remains fixed regardless of the level of severity, the higher is the level of severity of the
threatened legislation, the lower the effectiveness condition becomes; and vice versa. Here, the
intuition is that if the consequences of the threatened legislation are very harsh, it
makes perfect sense to comply and avert these consequences even if the probability that
they materialize is rather low.
Importantly, while the effectiveness condition derives solely from the level of
severity (and the fixed cost of ex ante compliance), the probability that the threatened
legislation will be enacted into law is contingent upon numerous factors, only one of
which is the level of severity.304 This insight explains why, when firms are perfectly
301

I consider that the cost of enacting the threatened legislation increases with severity and is 2.5, 5, and 10,
respectively. This cost grows in severity for a number of reasons. First, higher severity may require higher
investment of time and resources in research and drafting. Second, with higher severity, the opposition in
Congress may be stronger, thus requiring more time for securing adequate political support. It is no secret that
time is one of a legislator’s most precious resources. See Thomas O’Donnell, Controlling Legislative Time, in THE
HOUSE AT WORK 138 (Joseph Cooper & G. Calvin Mackenzie, eds., 1981) (it was said of House members’ that
their “ability to concentrate time on any single [issue] is severely constrained by the abundance and complexity
of the demands that confront them”). For further discussion see the text and references cited in note 248 above.
302 The benefit of inducing a firm to adopt desirable practices and abandon undesirable ones is 5.
303 Technically, the issue concerns the difference between the probability of the threatened legislation and the
effectiveness condition. The legislative threat’s inducement effect is bound to exist provided that that
difference is greater than or equal to zero.
304 Different factors that may influence legislative behavior in Congress and, consequently, the likelihood of
the threatened legislation are discussed in the text accompanying notes 270-277 and 287-293 above.
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informed, the threatened legislation is of high level of severity. Specifically, seeking to
maximize her utility—namely, by ensuring that compliance constitutes the firm’s best
response and thus avoiding the cost of carrying out the threat—the legislator may
threaten severe legislation, thereby lowering the effectiveness condition. Thus, assuming
all else remains equal, the lower the effectiveness condition becomes the higher is the
chance that the threatened legislation satisfies the effectiveness condition and the more
likely is the firm to comply. In other words, facing the firm with harsher threatened
legislation guarantees a more potent threat. Lastly, assuming all else remains equal,
choosing a higher level of severity increases the legislator’s expected utility from
issuing that threat, thus making her better off ex ante.
The legislative threat that was directed towards colleges and universities in 2003,
which threatened to impose financial penalties on institutions that raised tuition too
sharply, demonstrates these points. Amid the national debate over the threatened
legislation, universities and colleges—including, among many others, Harvard, George
Washington, and the University of Virginia—have announced voluntary plans to freeze
tuition, increase financial aid, or remove the burden of loans from some students.305
Consistent with the present theoretical predictions, even though the “chances for
passage were always questionable,” universities complied with the legislative demands
to curb tuition rise because the legislation “has stood out as the most punitive of the
federal proposals to contain sharp increases in college prices.”306 Consequently,
republican lawmakers at the House announced that they would withdraw the
threatened legislation which was “no longer necessary because universities seemed to
have gotten the message and were taking steps of their own.”307

305

See Winter, supra note 277, at A14 (“[I]nstitutions across the nation are making earnest efforts toward that
end. … Harvard said it would no longer ask for any financial contribution from parents earning less than
$40,000 a year and would scale back the amount it expected from those earning less than $60,000”).
306 Id. (the threatened legislation “would have stripped them of their eligibility for millions of dollars in
federal grants and programs”).
307 Id.
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Figure 2. Extensive form representation of the legislative threat
game with perfect information and three levels of severity

In contrast, Figure 3 represents in extensive form a game with imperfect information,
which captures situations where one player holds more information than the other. The
allocation of information in this game is imperfect because the legislator does not reveal
the level of severity, thus keeping it privately-held information.308 This assumption is
consistent with casual observations, according to which rarely do legislators divulge
such information. Even more, in some cases the legislator is in fact—or pretends to
be—undecided on the contents of the threatened legislation at the time she issues the
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For this reason, this too is a game with asymmetric information; one in which one player holds more
information than the other. See Rasmusen, supra note 228, at 49-50.
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threat.309 Absent specific information that indicates otherwise, there is an equal chance
that the threatened legislation will be lenient, moderate, or severe. Hence, the assumption
of imperfect information captures these situations, in which the legislator has not
decided what the threatened legislation would be like.
The dashed elliptic denotes imperfect information: while the firm knows that the
legislator has issued a threat310 and knows that, severity-wise, the threatened legislation
may be lenient, moderate, or severe, it does not know (and cannot otherwise observe) what
the level of severity actually is.311 Hence, the firm does not know which of the three
game positions it is at.312 The firm’s compliance (or non-compliance) decision is
therefore made in utter ignorance of the level of severity of the threatened legislation.
Consistent with the earlier analysis, the predicted equilibrium behavior depends on
the following: (i) whether the threat is credible, and (ii) whether the probability that the
threatened legislation is enacted into law is higher or lower than the effectiveness
condition. Where the threat is incredible (for reasons I explain in Section B below), the
firm’s best response is “not comply” and the legislator’s best response is to not carry out
the threat, thus constituting the incredible threat equilibrium. Absent credibility, the
threat is utterly ineffective in inducing an equilibrium change in behavior.
Credibility, however, may shift the equilibrium behavior from non-compliance to
compliance. Where the threat is credible, the firm’s probability assessment turns out to
be a decisive factor on which the legislative threat’s inducement effect depends. In
other words, higher or lower probability will distinguish between compliance (i.e.,
credible threat compliance equilibrium) and non-compliance (i.e., credible threat noncompliance equilibrium). Viewed from the firm’s perspective, the issue is whether the
probability is higher or lower than the threat’s effectiveness condition. Thus, in order to
choose its best response efficiently, the firm must figure out what the effectiveness
condition is. Butto do so the firm must be able to tell the level of severity, with respect
to which it is (presently assumed to be) imperfectly informed. Short of such
information, the level of severity remains uncertain.313 Given these circumstances and
309

Presumably, a legislator may not initially decide the level of severity in order to reduce the cost of
research and drafting and the cost of enacting the legislation if she is called upon to carry out the threat.
310 The firm can tell when the legislator has issued an explicit or implicit threat. In the case of anticipatory
threats, however, the legislator does not issue a threat at all; rather, there is some probability that a legislative
threat will be issued in the future. Thus, hard knowledge is replaced with probabilities that the firm assigns to
each of the possible choices the legislator can make, which need not add up to 1.
311 Of course, the firm can gauge the chance (i.e., risk) that the legislator will choose a lenient, moderate, or
severe threatened legislation. For example, there may be 15 percent chance of a lenient legislation, 30 percent
chance that the threatened legislation will be moderate, and a 5 percent chance it will be severe. Notably, in the
case of anticipatory threats these probabilities do not total 100 percent because these compound probabilities
account for the risk that a threat will be issued. Yet, in the absence of sufficient information and given
uncertainty concerning the level of severity, these probability judgments are nothing but a guess. Given this
uncertainty, there is no a priori reason to believe that these risks are not equal (e.g., 10%-10%-10%).
312 This is known in game-theoretic parlance as an information set. Meaning that, a player (here, the firm) is
unable to discriminate among positions when choosing an action because he cannot observe the prior choices
made by the other player. See Vega-Redondo, supra note 252, at 7.
313 In order to resolve this uncertainty, the firm may assess the likelihood of any particular level of severity.
Any such assessment, however, requires some information which the firm is presently lacking.
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absent specific information to the contrary, the firm rationally assumes that the chance
of lenient, moderate, or severe legislation is equal. Averaging out these chances, the
firm effectively facesa threat of moderate legislation and is able to derive the effectiveness
condition accordingly.314
How, then, does imperfect information affect the threat’s inducement effect and, in
turn, the firm’s equilibrium behavior? As a general matter, imperfect information may
induce the firm to comply in circumstances it would not have otherwise complied had it
been perfectly informed. In other words, imperfect information is strategically valuable
because it may trigger the threat’s inducement effect, thus making the threat an
effective means to induce a change in behavior, even where the prospects of the
threatened legislation in Congress are relatively insignificant. This effect is due to the
fact that the lower the effectiveness condition is, and assuming all else remains equal,
the higher the chance that the threatened legislation satisfies that condition.
To illustrate this point consider, for example, the case of lenient threatened
legislation, with respect to which the effectiveness condition is relatively high.
Compliance in this case is inefficient and therefore irrational unless the probability that
the threatened legislation is enacted into law is sufficiently high (i.e., it exceeds the
effectiveness condition) such that the expected negative impact of the threatened
legislation is at least equal to or greater than the cost of ex ante compliance. If, however,
the probability that the threatened lenient legislation can pass congressional muster is
sufficiently low (i.e., it falls below the effectiveness condition), “not comply” emerges as
the firm’s best response.315 This may be the case, for example, where the known
contents of the threatened legislation draw significant opposition, thus making its
enactment highly unlikely. Yet, keeping information strategically private and injecting
some uncertainty can induce the firm to comply notwithstanding the low probability
that would have otherwise prevailed. As explained above, if the firm is imperfectly
informed and thus uncertain about the level of severity, it will make its decision as if it
faced a threat of moderate legislation, with respect to which the effectiveness condition is
significantly lower (compared with the condition for lenient legislation). As the
contents of the threatened legislation remain undisclosed, the average probability of
that legislation becomes higher. Thus, driven by uncertainty, a lower-than-otherwise
effectiveness condition makes compliance more likely. Assuming all else remains
equal, there is a higher chance that the threatened legislation satisfies a lower-thanotherwise effectiveness condition, thus making the inducement effect more likely.

314

Given that the cost of compliance remains fixed, the higher the level of severity of the threatened
legislation, the lower the effectiveness condition becomes; and vice versa.
315 As I have explained, the probability of the threatened legislation may fall below the effectiveness
condition for a variety of reasons.
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Figure 3. Extensive form representation of the legislative threat
game with imperfect information and three levels of severity

B. The Inducement Effect: Conditions which Make Legislative Threats Credible
(or, Rather, Incredible)
The analysis presented above as well as casual observations confirm that legislative
threats can be highly effective in inducing sea-change reforms in the conduct of firms
and organizations, thus forcing them to abandon existing practices in favor of adopting
socially-desirable ones.316 The analysis has specifically shown that the inducement effect
316

It is telling that following the threat of legislation to protect consumer privacy and restrict the flow of
personally-identifiable information, it was reported that the retail “[i]ndustry is certainly doing more than it’s
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of legislative threats (or, rather, its absence) crucially depends on the credibility (or,
rather, the incredibility) of the legislative threat and the credibility (or, rather, the
incredibility) of the implicit promise to forbear from seeking to enact the threatened
legislation. In other words, unless the threat is credible (and the probability of the
threatened legislation becoming a law is sufficiently high), legislative threats are bound
to remain ineffective in regulating social conduct.317
Yet, to begin with, is there any reason to believe that legislative threats (and
legislative promises) are credible? Even more, in which circumstances does the threat
to enact adverse legislation qualify as a credible threat and the promise to forbear from
doing a credible promise? Lastly, are there any mechanisms that legislators can avail
themselves of so as to ensure the credibility of threats? The following analysis attempts
to answer these questions, thereby determining the conditions that render legislative
threats credible. Casual observations and several case studies are used throughout the
analysis to demonstrate these conditions.
Intuitively, the strategic choices that players make crucially depend on what one
player (i.e., the firm) believes the other player (i.e., the legislator) will do in a particular
situation (i.e., where the firm does not comply or where the firm does comply). Given
this inextricable linkage, strategic behavior includes all sorts of actions designed to
influence the beliefs and, as a corollary, players’ choice of strategies.
Research in the theory of games provides insights into the conditions that make
threats and promises credible or incredible.318 In general, a threat may become credible
ex ante and thereby lead the other player to believe and expect that his opponent will
carry out the threat if called upon to do so in three analytically-distinct situations.319
ever done before, but that’s because the threat of legislation is real.” See Stacy A. Teicher, Breaking Ground on
Privacy Rights, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 17, 1999, available at http://www.csmonitor.com.
Similarly, following the issuance of a legislative threat to reform the ways in which managed healthcare
organizations make benefit determinations and treat patients, it was reported that, “[f]aced with negative
public opinion (especially in cases where care has been denied) and the threat of legislation, many HMOs are
changing their procedures voluntarily.” See Melynda Dovel Wilcox, Hands-on Health Care is an Odds-on Favorite,
KIPLINGER’S PERSONAL FINANCE MAGAZINE, Feb., 1999, at 19-20. See also Charles Lane, Patients Can’t Sue HMOs,
Court Says, THE WASH. POST, June 22, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (“Health-care plans
abandoned many of their most restrictive benefit-determination practices during the 1990s, as … the threat of
legislation … pressured them to be more flexible”).
317 Cf. Hadi S. Esfahani & Jos E. Campos, Credible Commitment and Success with Public Enterprise Reform, 28
WORLD DEVELOPMENT 221 (2000) (arguing that many public reforms fail because governments have difficulty
making credible commitments to sustain the reform, as where the costs of carrying the reform further are
greater than the expected efficiency gains from doing so).
318 See Daniel B. Klein & Brendan O’Flaherty, A game-theoretic rendering of promises and threats, 21 J. ECON.
BEH. & ORG. 295 (1993) (using a game-theoretic framework to study promises and threats).
319 There is a fourth class of cases in which a threat is credible. In these cases it is ex post rational (in the
utility-maximizing sense) for the legislator to carry out the threat. Yet, given that exercising the threat in these
cases is the optimal thing to do after the fact, the threat does not lock the threat-maker into doing something
other than what he would have done anyway. In other words, the threat-maker will carry out the threat in any
case, even if the opponent complied with his demands, thus giving the opponent no incentive to comply with
the demands. See Dixit & Skeath, supra note 219, at 292, 301. Applied to the present context, if the legislator’s
payoff from carrying out the threat is greater than the payoff from not doing so, then the threat is ex ante
credible because it is ex post optimal for the legislator to exercise that threat. Yet, because we can predict that
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First, a threat is credible if it is accompanied in advance by an action that makes the
exercise of the threat after the demand had been violated (i.e., ex post) an optimal choice
because it maximizes the threat-maker’s utility (“pre-game commitments”).320 Second, a
threat may become credible because the threat-maker stakes her reputation on
fulfillment of the threat if called upon to do so (“reputation”).321 Third, a threat may also
be considered a credible threat where the threat-maker’s decisions (are believed by
others to) reflect irrational or emotional motivations that drive that player to undertake
activities beyond the bounds of pragmatic self-interest (“emotions”).322
In sum, unless the threat-maker makes a pre-game commitment, is known to have
reputation, or is known to be motivated by specific emotions, the threat will be
incredible.323 Seeking to gain credibility, legislators can employ a variety of practical
devices and exhibit different preferences that effectively bind them to carrying out the
threats ex post, thus making the legislative threat credible ex ante. Building upon these
analytic insights, the discussion that follows below delineates cases in which legislative
threats are expected to be credible.

1. Commitments
Ex ante commitment binds a player to carrying out his threat ex post because doing
so maximizes the player’s utility and is therefore optimal. In theory, effective (that is,
credible) commitment must satisfy two conditions, namely—(i) the commitment must
be irreversible; and (ii) the player must signal the commitment to the other player, thus
making it visible and known to the other player (or, otherwise, the commitment will
have no effect on the other player’s beliefs and none on his behavior in the game).324 If
these conditions are satisfied, the threat will be afforded credibility ex ante.

the legislator will carry out the threat in any case, the firm has no incentive to comply.
320 There are different ways to ensure that carrying out one’s threat and keeping one’s promise becomes the
optimal choice ex post. For example, one can increase his ex post expected payoff from exercising the threat,
thus rendering the “exercise the threat” strategy a utility-maximizing one.
321 See Kreps, supra note 218, at 45-53, 65-77 (discussing various conditions in which strategic threats and
promises are credible, including the use of commitment mechanisms and reputation).
322 See Jack Hirshleifer, On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises, in John Dupré (ed.), THE LATEST
ON THE BEST: ESSAYS ON EVOLUTION AND OPTIMALITY 307, 308-309 (1987) (arguing that emotions that drive
people to act beyond the bounds of pragmatic self-interest facilitate credibility and are therefore not necessarily
adverse to that person’s self-interest). See also Rasmusen, supra note 228, at 101-102 (enumerating strategicallyvaluable emotional motivations in games, including righteous anger).
323 Yet, in a limited set of circumstances, a threat can become credible even in the absence of a commitment,
reputation, or emotional motivation. See Steven Shavell & Kathryn Spier, Threats without Binding Commitment,
NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 5461 (1996), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5461 (where exercising a threat is
beneficial to the threat-maker, a threat becomes credible if it can be repeated an infinite number of times).
Moreover, when credibility is uncertain, the more the firm would lose from the legislation, the less plausible is
the strategy of calling the legislator’s bluff. See David Laband, Stoplight Sales and Sidewalk Solicitation, 7 J. ECON.
ORG. & BEHAVIOR 403 (1986) (finding that the threat of extortion of windshield-washers at intersections are
more credible and thus more effective against women who fear more of physical harm).
324 See Dixit & Skeath, supra note 219, at 294-98 (discussing the use of commitment mechanisms and the
conditions in which commitments are credible).
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More concretely, a player can ensure that exercising a threat will be the optimal
choice ex post and thereby commit himself ex ante to carrying out the threat in three
different ways, namely—(i) by reducing the cost of carrying out the threat; (ii) by
increasing the benefit from carrying out the threat; and (iii) by limiting the freedom of
choice so as to eliminate any option other than carrying out the threat. Whereas the first
two methods are designed to increase the expected payoff from exercising the threat (so
as to make that choice truly optimal),325 the third method eliminates potentiallyattractive strategies (in the utility sense) that the player would have been able to choose
from and, essentially, obliges the threat-maker to carry out the threat (which, by
definition, is a self-harmful strategy).326 In reality, eliminating the other options does
not mean that the threat-maker will actually suffer the harm or incur the loss for, if the
threat is credible (which, expectedly, it will be if the commitment is effective), then the
threat-recipient will comply and the threat-maker will need not exercise the threat. In
other words, an effective commitment is designed to prevent the exercise of the threat.
Applying these insights to the landscape of legislative threats, legislators may—
and, in reality, often do—use a number of practical devices to credibly commit
themselves to carrying out their threats.
To begin with, legislators can reduce the cost of carrying out the threat. To that
end, they may join co-sponsors, enter into political coalitions, and establish alliances
with fellow lawmakers which, conceivably, can reduce the cost that each legislator
incurs in enacting the legislation. Legislators may also opt to sink the cost of enacting
the adverse legislation in advance (that is, prior to making the threat).327 In particular,
the legislator and her staff can do the preparatory work necessary to enact the
threatened legislation, including gathering relevant data, drafting the proposed bill,
consult the Office of Legislative Counsel on drafting matters, negotiate with other
legislators to ensure political support, hold committee hearings, and take other actions
that will streamline and reduce the remaining cost of the legislative process.328 Having
sunk these costs, the cost-benefit of carrying out the threat (which, as stated above, is
otherwise costly to the legislator) changes dramatically.329 In other words, the higher
325

Here it is rationality (or, more precisely, rational utility-maximization) that works as a mechanism that
commits the legislator to exercise the threat. However, if the legislator was to behave irrationally, higher
payoffs would not guarantee that he actually carries out the threat.
326 The latter method embraces the counter-intuitive notion that in the realm of game theory fewer options
are of strategic value insofar as they shape the beliefs and expectations of the other player as to what his
opponent’s future response will be.
327 Because what matters in this context is what the other player believes his opponent will do after the fact
(that is, carry out the threat or do nothing), the legislator can pretend to have sunk the cost of enacting the
adverse legislation and make the firm believe that the cost is by and large sunk. Whether or not this strategy is
successful, however, depends on whether the legislator can convey this impression credibly and on whether or
not the firm can verify such information.
328 A detailed account of the legislative process is found in Legislative Process: How a Senate Bill Becomes a Law,
U.S. SENATE, at http://www.senate.gov (last visited Feb. 17, 2004) (chronicles in details the various stages of
the legislative process). See also Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 65-66 (legislative process in Congress).
329 See Rasmusen, supra note 228, at 98-99 (discussing the strategic use of sunk costs). I assume that
introducing and passing a bill entails some fixed costs, including the cost of research and data-gathering, the
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the sunk costs (relatively to the total cost of enacting the threatened legislation), and
assuming all else remains equal, the more attractive (in the utility-maximizing sense)
does carrying out the threat become. Lastly, to ensure that such actions gain public
exposure and forewarn targeted firms of the threat’s credibility, legislators often handout drafts of the threatened legislation to targeted firms and trade organizations and
publicly discuss their effort to further policy objectives.330
Taking actions that increase the expected benefits from carrying out the threat (and,
hence, ensure a positive net payoff) is yet another way in which legislators can render
their threats credible ex ante.331 The idea here is that increasing expected benefits from
carrying out the threat so as to exceed expected costs, turns the exercise of the threat
into a utility-maximizing choice (that is, compared with not exercising the threat).332 To
the extent that the benefits to the legislator from carrying out the threat derive from
enhancing her reputation (e.g., for promoting responsible policies333), then educating the
public about the policy concern in question and building up the public’s interest in the
particular reform will increase the legislator’s reputational and consequential
benefits.334 Such benefits may include high constituency satisfaction, higher chance of
re-election, and increased campaign contributions.335
In an attempt to strategically condition the public’s opinion, a legislator may induce
an availability cascade, a process by which an expressed concern initiates a reaction that
gives that concern increasing visibility through rising availability in policy discourse.336
cost of drafting the proposed bill, and the cost of negotiating with fellow lawmakers. Hence, incurring these
costs in advance means that the costs component necessary to enact the legislation after the fact (that is, if the
threat is carried out) becomes smaller. Of course, the enacting of the threatened legislation may also involve
some variable costs that change from one case to another.
330 See, e.g., Markhoff, supra note 120, at C8 (reporting that government officials handed-out a draft
legislative proposal to industry representatives with whom they met to discuss policy concerns).
331 Viewed from another perspective, these actions are different forms of investment which the legislator
makes in order to make carrying the threat out optimal. Once the investment is made, the legislator can recoup
returns on the investment only if he carries out the threat, thereby guaranteeing the credibility of the threat.
See Tai-Yeong Chung, On Strategic Commitment: Contracting versus Investment, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 437 (1995).
332 As shown in Figure 2 above, the payoff for carrying out the threat is always lower than the payoff for
doing nothing. Thus, increasing the expected benefits from carrying out the threat so as to exceed the payoff
from doing nothing will make the former strategy an optimal choice and the latter an inferior.
333 Cf. John W. Kingdon, Congressmen’s Voting Decisions 248 (1989) (“most members [of Congress] have their
conceptions of good public policy, and act partly to carry that conception into being”). See also Hall, supra note
215, at 69 (legislative activism is related to liberal members’ belief in federal action as an effective instrument
for social betterment).
334 Raising the visibility of the social interest is one way of doing so. For example, Rep. McKeon, who
successfully used a legislative threat to curb college and university tuition increases, “brandished the threat of
legislation for seven months before actually introducing a bill” and stated that he had wanted “to raise the
visibility of the issue because we just can’t keep going on as we are.” See Winter, supra note 277, at A14.
335 Cf. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Corporate Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the
Rewards to Legislator Reputation, 48 J. L. & ECON. 41 (2005) (greater reputational development is rewarded with
greater political contributions). Research also shows that maintaining a pivotal status in Senate is associated
with a fundraising advantage of $2.12 million in total contributions per 2-year election cycle. See Franklin G.
Mixon et al., Pivotal Power Brokers: Theory and Evidence on Political Fundraising, 123 PUBLIC CHOICE 477 (2005).
336 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 198, at 715-27.
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Hence, using committee hearings and meetings with industry representatives to
publicly convey the weighty policy concerns the threatened legislation is designed to
address, a legislator may be able to strategically condition the public’s opinion337 and
increase political support for the threatened legislation.338 In this respect, highly-visible
hearings may signal the seriousness of the underlying concern and the keen interest in
acting on the issue.339 Furthermore, gathering and publicly presenting data that
demonstrate the negative consequences of the targeted practices for social welfare and
other national interests and, as a corollary, establish the considerable interest in
reforming these practices serves precisely the same purpose.340 In sum, making the
effort to maintain a tough stance on policy issues and demonstrating a benevolent,
proactive approach to social affairs renders the legislator’s threats credible and
therefore pays off.
Moreover, a legislator can commit herself to carrying out the threat by limiting her
ex post choice of strategies, namely—by eliminating any option other than carrying out.
In order to render the threat credible, the firm must be made aware of this “hands
tying.” One way to limit the legislator’s choices ex post is to enact the threatened
legislation as a slightly modified “sunset law.”341 Specifically, the legislator can enact
the threatened legislation, adding a deferral clause and a sunset clause: (i) the deferral
clause defers the act’s effective date so as to allow threat-recipients sufficient time to
comply with the legislator’s demands;342 (ii) the sunset clause provides that the act will
337

Pre-game communications, including congressional committee hearings and meetings with industry
leaders and trade organizations, are just two of the more visible ways in which legislators “condition” the
public’s opinion and interest in the proposed legislative reforms. For example, seeking to convey the national
concern over cyber security, Tom Ridge, the then-secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, convened
about 350 computer executives and software developers to discuss these issues, share information on the risk
of cyber-attacks, and learn of the insufficient efforts currently undertaken. In that meeting, Secretary Ridge
said that “’[i]t only takes one vulnerable system to start a chain reaction that can lead to devastating results.’”
See Markhoff, supra note 120, at C8. Notably, that took place at the National Cyber Security Summit was
sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security.
338 Cf. Page & Shapiro, supra note 289 (showing that Congress acts in response to changes in public opinion
more than two-thirds of the time).
339 Following the hearings before the Senate Commerce Committee on the use of steroids in professional
sports, Senator McCain explained that holding the high-profile hearings had been an attempt to pressure the
baseball league to act. See Puzzanghera, supra note 166.
340 Introducing a proposed bill is accompanied by elaborate publicity, as is customary on Capitol Hill. See
Redman, supra note 112, at 93-97 (describing legislative public relations, speeches, and media coverage).
341 By definition, a “sunset law” automatically terminates itself unless it is expressly renewed by a new act of
legislation. See Vern McKinley, Sunrises without Sunsets: Can Sunset Laws Reduce Regulation?, 18 REGULATION 57
(1995) (a sunset law is a statute or provision in a law that requires periodic review of the rationale for the
continued existence of the particular law, administrative agency, or other governmental function). For
example, Section 224(a) of the USA Patriot Act, provided that several Sections of Title II relating to enhanced
foreign intelligence and law enforcement surveillance, were set to sunset on December 31, 2005. See Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, PUB. L. NO. 107-56, 224, 115 STAT. 272, 295. See also Cindy Skrzycki, Sunset
Law for Agencies on the Horizon, THE WASH. POST, July 26, 2005, at D01 (discussing a general sunset law
according to which federal agencies would cease to exist unless Congress renewed their statutory mandate).
342 See, e.g., Winter, supra note 277, at A14 (the threatened legislation that sought to curb tuition increases
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expire (i.e., complete sunset) or be suspended (i.e., pro tempore sunset)343 if and when
predetermined observable compliance criteria are met.344 While it might be impossible
to directly observe compliance measures the firm has taken (e.g., internal controls, riskreduction measures, etc.), it is certainly possible to monitor the firm’s processes and
output for compliance using, among other things, testing and auditing.345 In any event,
the firm has strong incentives to give a signal showing it has adequately complied.346
Yet, because the “sunset law” can be repealed at any point of time, this commitment is
not irreversible and hence does not guarantee complete credibility.
Similarly, delegating the power to exercise the threat (as well as the responsibility to
keep the implicit promise to forgo the threatened legislation) to a subordinate agent
who is required to follow preset rules and procedures can also be used to limit the
legislator’s ex post choice of strategies and thereby render the threat credible ex ante.347
Such delegation can only be effectuated by statute. In order to ensure credibility, the
legislator may choose, for example, to delegate the power to a reputable agency (e.g.,
that is known for its subservient performance) or, alternatively, to one captured by a
special interest consistent with the threatened legislation.348 Delegation does not
guarantee complete credibility, however, because theoretically the delegation of power
can be revoked at any point.349

provided that “if the offending institutions did not curb costs with a few years, the bill would have stripped
them of their eligibility for millions of dollars in federal grants and programs”).
343 From the legislator’s perspective, temporary suspension is preferable to expiration because once the act
has expired and can only be reinstituted by legislation the threat of adverse legislation ceases and, assuming all
else remains equal, the firms to which the threat was directed have no incentive to maintain compliance.
344 This modified sunset law employs the intuition of automatic fulfillment, which serves as a commitment
device: a threat-maker can relinquish her freedom of choice by devising an independent, self-executing
mechanism that determines whether or not to exercise the threat. See Dixit & Skeath, supra note 219, at 308.
345 For example, it is possible to check whether firms have reduced greenhouse gas emissions or whether
steroid use by professional athletes has subsided. Cf. Monitoring Proforma for Commercial Leases Code of Practice,
supra note 165 (U.K. government appointed monitors to ensure implementation of the code in the property
sector, in accordance with the legislative threat).
346 Cf. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model 68-9 (2002)
(discussing a situation in which a contract can be conditioned on observing ex post a signal that provides useful
information on the underlying state of affairs).
347 See Dixit & Skeath, supra note 219, 301, 308-309 (discussing the strategic role of delegation in reducing a
player’s ex post freedom of choice and in facilitating credibility).
348 See Dixit & Skeath, supra note 219, at 301-302 (delegating power to exercise the threat to an agency
captured by special interest is strategically valuable). See also Sebastian Krapohl, Credible Commitment in Nonindependent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of the European Agencies for Pharmaceuticals and Foodstuffs,
10 EURO. L.J. 518 (2004) (agency’s institutional structure is a determinant of the credibility of delegation).
349 Furthermore, delegating power to a captured agency is problematic because it creates the risk that the
agency will exercise the threat irrespective of whether or not threat-recipients comply, thus stultifying the
threat’s purpose. While such delegation may facilitate the threat’s credibility, it may also undermine the
credibility of the implicit promise to forbear, thus diminishing ex ante incentives to comply. See Ernesto Dal Bo
& Rafael Di Tella, Capture by Threat, 111 J. POLIT. ECON. 1123 (2003) (when policy-makers are threatened by
“nasty” interest groups, good policies are less likely to be chosen or implemented).
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2. Reputation
Maintaining good reputation for honesty, integrity, toughness, benevolence, or
simply for carrying out a threat if and when predetermined triggering conditions are
met will make the threat a credible threat ex ante. Here, the intuition is that given the
threat-maker’s good reputation, it is in her best interest (and, therefore, her best
response) to avoid doing anything that adversely affects her reputation and reduces her
utility.350 In that respect, failing to carry out a threat despite non
- compliance clearly
damages one’s reputation and reduces expected payoffs from future games. This is
because the existence of reputation creates an implicit linkage between the acts taken in
the present game and the payoffs received in future games.351 Under these conditions,
the threat is ex ante credible because given that the threat-maker stakes her reputation
on carrying out the threat, and given further that carrying out the threat in the present
game maximizes her utility in the long-term, this is precisely what she is expected to do.
Logically, the existence of this reputation also ensures the credibility of the implicit
promise to forbear from exercising the threat if the threat-recipient complies. In other
words, given the existence of reputation, past behavior guides future behavior.
More concretely, in the course of her political tenure, the legislator may develop
and maintain good reputation for promoting consistent policies; for taking a tough
stance on defined policy issues, including a given one presently in question; for
advancing specific causes; and for high integrity (that is, for keeping her words and
promises). As Gordon Tullock has noted, albeit in a different context, “politicians may
sometimes have to enact legislation … just as the Cosa Nostra occasionally burns down
the buildings of those who fail to pay its protection levies.”352 The legislator’s good
reputation credibly commits her to pursuing the threatened legislation if the firm does
not comply and, conversely, to foregoing the legislative measure if her demands are
adequately met.353 Mindful of this reputation, firms are expected to believe that the
legislative threat is indeed credible. These firms will comply with the legislator’s

350

It makes sense (utility-wise) to forgo a small cost-saving in a particular game in order to avoid negative
repercussions in future games which, by definition, are greater. For a non-formal explanation of the strategic
value of reputation and its effect on behavior see Kreps, supra note 218, at 65-72.
351 In other words, the payoffs from future games are contingent upon behavior in earlier games. Hence,
when considering any one of these games, the threat-maker should adjust expected payoffs to account for
potential repercussions for damaged reputation.
352 See Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking 74 (1993).
353 This discussion focuses on the legislator’s good or bad reputation for carrying out the legislative threat
(that is, reputation is assumed to be a one-sided issue). The discussion does not consider, however, the firm’s
or the industry’s good or bad reputation for complying with legislative threats (that is, where the role of
reputation is two-sided). See Rasmusen, supra note 228, at 117-18. Developing such reputation is not
implausible because, as repeat players, firms are routinely subject to threats of legislation. Developing good
reputation is valuable because it reduces the cost of regulatory bargaining and enables the legislator and the
firms to devise a mutually-efficient solution. Cf. Jackson, supra note 197 (a firm’s reputation is essentially a
form of capital). Moreover, whether repeated threats (targeting different behaviors) are made by the same
legislator or, rather, by others is inconsequential because the behavior of the firms in these games and hence
their reputation (or lack thereof) can be observed by all legislators (theoretically, even in future congresses).
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demands because, given the threat’s credibility, compliance will maximize the firm’s
utility and make it best-off, thus making this strategy the only prudent choice.354
Clearly, investing in reputation-development and maintaining that reputation
makes the legislator better-off in a several ways.355
First, maintaining good reputation is worth more than any short-term benefits that
the legislator may obtain by sullying her reputation. For example, the credibilityassurance of good reputation enables the legislator to promote public policies without
enacting the desired policy into law and without incurring the significant cost of doing
so.356 In other words, the legislator’s reputation guarantees the threat’s inducement
effect on behavior; makes the threatened legislation unnecessary and its costs
redundant; and increases the legislator’s utility. Hence, good reputation is crucial for
securing threat-induced compliance.
Second, given that the legislator’s reputation is normally widely-known public
information, it stands to reason that current, potential, and repeat threat-recipients
should be able to take notice of that reputation, appreciate the credibility of the
legislator’s explicit, implicit, and anticipated legislative threats, and behave accordingly,
thus reinforcing the legislator’s political status and enhancing her political capital.357
Third, putting effort towards advancing a policy agenda and maintaining a good
reputation is in the best interest of the legislator insomuch as failure to do so has an
electoral price (e.g., lower chance of re-election). Indeed, empirical research shows that
legislators’ campaign contributions are positively correlated with their reputation.358
Taken together, these points explain why legislators with better reputation are generally
more successful and are more likely to win re-election than legislators who have no
reputation at all (e.g., junior legislators with short track-record) or those who are known
to have bad reputation.
354

Notably, legislative threats will remain credible as long as the legislator has reputation to protect and as
long as maintaining that reputation is efficient, namely—insofar as the future benefits from that reputation
exceed the short-term cost of maintaining it (i.e., the cost of enacting the threatened legislation). Thus, if there
are no more opportunities to use that reputation—namely, where the legislator’s term in office ends—the
threat will necessarily turn incredible. Assuming the firm is mindful of the game’s last round, it will have no
incentive to comply. See Kreps, supra note 218, at 70.
355 In the present game, the legislator’s investment (in utility terms) in reputation-development is equal to
the cost (i.e., the negative payoff) of exercising the threat when called upon to do so. The case of lenient,
moderate, and severe legislation is 2.5, 5, and 10, respectively (i.e., the payoffs from exercising the threat are 2.5, -5, and -10, respectively). These payoffs are shown in Figure 2 above.
356 Numerically, enacting the threatened legislation (when the firm does not comply) is costly to the
legislator (e.g., the payoff for lenient threatened legislation is -2.5). If the firm complies, the legislator benefits
from achieving the desired policy reform while doing nothing (e.g., the payoff is 5). Hence, having no
reputation of any kind or having bad reputation entails a loss of 7.5 utility units. See Figure 2 above.
357 The repeated nature of the game ensures that any type of reputation will be widely known. See Dixit &
Skeath, supra note 219, at 310-311 (reputation becomes valuable if future players can observe actions the threatmaker has previously taken in games played with others).
358 See, e.g., Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Corporate Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the
Rewards to Legislator Reputation, 48 J. L. & ECON. 41 (2005) (reputational development is rewarded with political
contributions). Legislators’ reputation also guarantees cooperation between legislators and constituents. See
Kroszner & Stratmann, Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress, supra note 194.

74

A Theory of Legislative Threats
Good reputation for honesty, integrity, toughness, benevolence or simply for
keeping one’s words and promises evolves over time as firms, organizations, and other
potential threat-recipients observe the ways in which the legislator has acted in
previous strategic interactions and learn of the legislator’s reputation. The longer and
more intensive is the interaction between the legislator and the firms (i.e., currently or
potentially targeted), and the fartherawaythe time horizon, the more likely is it that the
legislator will acquire good reputation. Indeed, research shows that legislators sitting
on congressional standing committees avail themselves of repeated interaction with
firms which foster reputation-building.359

3. Emotions
Intuition and casual observations reveal that emotions may wield formidable
impact on behavior, thus compelling individuals to take actions that at first glance seem
inconsistent with their utility-maximizing self-interest.360
Confirming this bare
intuition, social psychologists demonstrate the power of consistency and other
emotional motivations in directing human behavior. For example, experiments show
that individuals exhibit a tendency for behaving in ways that are consistent with their
earlier statements and positions.361 It follows that commitment (this time, in its
ordinary literal sense) has the capacity to constrain future behavior.
Formalizing these insights into refined economic models, economists Jack
Hirshleifer362 and Robert Frank363 explain why certain emotions, passions, and moral
sentiments—including, among others, righteous anger, vengeance and meanness,
vanity, the desire to satisfy public outrage,364 altruism and public spirit,365 decency, and

359 It is argued that congressional standing committees foster repeated interaction between legislators and
constituents, thus facilitating reputation-building without which legislators cannot maximize contributions.
See Kroszner & Stratmann, Congressional Committees as Reputation-building Mechanisms, supra note 195
(presenting empirical data that support this argument).
360 Brining a legal action against a transgressor despite the near-zero probability of winning that suit is a
common example that demonstrates such “emotional” behavior. Cyclical attacks and actions of revenge,
which are common in some communities or where the rule of law is ineffective in maintaining the social order,
provides additional example of “emotional” conduct. Refraining from cheating, even when one knows he
cannot be caught or punished, makes the same point.
361 See Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion 67-75 (rev. ed. 1993) (“If I can get you to make
a commitment (that is, to take a stand, to go on record), I will have set the stage for your automatic and illconsidered consistency with that earlier commitment”).
362 See Hirshleifer, supra note 323, at 307, 308-309 (emotions that drive people to act beyond the bounds of
pragmatic self-interest facilitate credibility and thus are not necessarily adverse to that person’s self-interest).
See also Rasmusen, supra note 228, at 101-102 (enumerating various emotional motivations).
363 See generally Robert H. Frank, Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (1988).
364 The Rodney King trials in the early 1990s demonstrate the role of emotional motivations.
State
prosecutors brought cases against the policemen who beat Rodney King regardless of the merits of these claims
in order to satisfy public outrage. See Rasmusen, supra note 228, at 101.
365 See Thomas C. Schelling, Altruism, Meanness, and Other Potentially Strategic Behaviors, 68 AM. ECON. REV.
229 (1978) (arguing that altruism and meanness are of strategic value insofar as they influence others by
affecting their expectations of what the altruist or mean individual will do).
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care for fairness366—commit individuals to undertaking activities beyond the bounds of
pragmatic self-interest.367 Paradoxically, while emotion-driven behaviors ordinarily
appear to be in conflict with one’s self-interest (and, hence, irrational), such behaviors
actually promote self-interest.368 Indeed
, emotions and other seemingly-irrational
motivations may serve one’s narrow self-interest very well precisely because specific
emotions act as commitment devices that bind a person to behaving in a particularly
predicted way (namely, that is in line with that emotion, passion, or preference).369 To
illustrate, where others believe that the threat-maker with whom they are dealing is
motivated by a given emotion or preference (say, pride and vengeance), they will soon
realize that that person will carry out the threat even if the costs of doing so are
prohibitive. In fact, given this emotion or preference, the benefits from exercising the
threat are far greater than those that would have otherwise accrued (that is, absent the
ensuing emotional sense of fulfillment).370 It is precisely this sort of belief—namely, that
the threat will be carried out even if it is not in the threat-maker’s material interest to do
so—that makes the threat a credible threat. Mindful of these emotions, the threatrecipients will have strong incentives to comply with the threat-maker’s demands.
Emotions, preferences, and other mot ivating sentiments are certainly not at odds
with the province of legislation and public policy. In keeping, Nobel laureate economist
James Mirrlees wrote that “government ministers [ought] to try to maximize utility,
even if their personal sense of achievement is gravely compromised, their crazy
industrial dreams unfulfilled.”371 It follows that a legislative threat may turn credible if
the firms towards which the threat has been directed correctly or erroneously believe—
based on public information and previous behavior or due to the legislator’s attempts to
strategically change their mind372—that the legislator is driven by specific emotions and
motivations that the threatened legislation (of failure to comply with the legislator’s
demands) can affect. Different emotions and preferences, including benevolence, public
spirit, equality, toughness, accountability, consistency, and the care for fairness among

366

The care for fairness encompasses different preferences and notions of fairness, including that of keeping
one’s promises. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare 38-45 (2002).
367 The effects of passions and emotions on human behavior and social interaction have occupied social
theorists and moral philosophers for ages. See generally Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests:
Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (1977) (arguing that capitalism was originally supposed to
accomplish exactly what was soon denounced as its worst feature, namely—the repression of the passions in
favor of the “harmless,” if one-dimensional, self-interest). Indeed, even Adam Smith, who subscribed to the
credo of perfectly rational self-interested behavior, was concerned with how human nature constrained the
pursuit of self-interest. See Ronald H. Coase, Adam Smith’s View of Man, 19 J. L. & ECON. 536, 542-43 (1976).
368 See Hirshleifer, supra note 323, at 308 (“A person can sometimes best further his self-interest by not
intending to pursue it”) (emphasis in original).
369 See Frank, supra note 363, at 4-7.
370 Cf. Dixit & Skeath, supra note 219, at 312 (apparent irrationality is strategically rational when the
credibility of a threat is in question).
371 See James A. Mirrlees, The Economic Uses of Utilitarianism, in Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams (eds.),
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 71 (1982).
372 For an insightful discussion of how politicians change the minds of others see Howard Gardner, Changing
Minds 69-89 (2004) (different techniques politicians use to effect change of mind in diverse populations).
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others, may guarantee the credibility of the legislative threat and the implicit promise
provided, however, that threat-recipients actually believe that the legislator cares about
these preferences or is generally motivated by these emotions. Mindful of the threat’s
credibility, firms will realize that unless they comply the legislator will seek to enact the
threatened legislation, notwithstanding its significant costs. The belief in the threat’s
credibility will set in motion the inducement effect of the legislative threat, thereby
leading firms to comply with the legislator’s demands.

C. The Effect of Strategic Interaction within Groups on Threat-induced
Compliance
A legislative threat that aims to change the behavior of a single firm is rather an
exception, certainly not a commonplace scenario. For in most cases, threats are directed
towards numerous entities, including businesses in a specific industry (e.g., automakers,
computer manufacturers); firms of a particular status (e.g., publicly-traded companies);
participants in a given market (e.g., commercial landlords and tenants); organizations
operating in a certain sector (e.g., universities, institutional investors); participants in
specific activities (e.g., professional baseball players); and members of a certain
profession (e.g., physicians, bankers). For the purpose of this analysis, I refer to any
such pool as a group of threat-recipients. While some groups are homogenous, others are
heterogeneous (e.g., firms of different size, different investment horizons). And, while
some groups are organized (e.g., trade associations, industrial alliances, labor unions),
in others group members may act in an uncoordinated fashion. In addition, groups
may vary in size, ranging from a mere few members (as in an oligopoly) to several
hundreds and beyond (as in a profession).
In order to better understand the inducement effect of legislative threats on
behavior, the analysis focuses on the effects on compliance of strategic interaction
within organized and unorganized, homogeneous and heterogeneous groups.
Common to all these situations, is that the legislator threatens to pass an unfavorable
legislation unless all members of the group comply with his demands.373 Anything
short of group-wide compliance will result in the threat being exercised.374 The latter
condition presupposes that the legislator is able by himself—or through an agent—to
373

Theoretically, the legislator may condition the threat on compliance by any predetermined share of the
group members (e.g., 80 per cent of the group members). In order to make this threat operative, however, the
legislator must be able to determine which entity has complied and which has not. Yet, in these cases,
compliance with the legislator’s demands is in essence a form of public good because sufficient compliance will
avert the risk of legislation, a result that will benefit all the members of the group (who cannot be excluded
from receiving that benefit). Absent effective in-group enforcement mechanisms, widespread free-riding may
defeat compliance altogether and make the group and the legislator worse-off. See, e.g., Matthias
Cinyabuguma et al., Cooperation under the Threat of Expulsion in a Public Goods Experiment, 89 J. PUBLIC ECON.
1421 (2005) (member participation increases significantly when threatened by expulsion or ostracism).
374 Imposing this strict condition makes good game-theoretic sense: if the legislator has ex post discretion to
take account of how many entities complied with the demands before determining to carry out the threat,
salami tactics used by threat recipients will likely defeat the legislator’s attempt to carry out the threat and
subvert the threat’s inducement effect altogether. Salami tactics encompass measures that entities may use,
such as partial compliance, to whittle down the threat. See Dixit & Skeath, supra note 219, at 315.
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discretely observe whether or not group members have complied.375
The strategy a player chooses in equilibrium crucially depends on what one player
believes the other player will do in the particular situation. Applying this insight to
groups, the best response strategy of any single entity depends on what that entity
believes is the legislator’s best response to the behavior of members of the group. In
turn, the entity’s belief regarding what the legislator will do depends on what that
entity believes is the best response of other entities in the group to what the legislator
will do; and so on. In other words, viewed from a single entity’s perspective, the choice
of strategy becomes a two-dimensional strategic decision: First, it depends on what the
entity believes the legislator will do in response to the behavior of the members of the
group; and, second, it depends on what the entity thinks the other entities in the group
believe about what the legislator will do in the particular situation, and in turn, on what
they will do in response. Hence, the thrust of the argument is that an entity’s
compliance or non-compliance decision is driven in part by the compliance, or noncompliance (e.g., free-riding, holdout) of other entities in the group. Every entity plays
therefore two games: one with the legislator; the other with its group cohorts.

1. Homogeneous Groups
Homogenous groups consist of entities whose interests, insofar as they affect their
incentive to comply (or not comply), are identical.376 Entities’ interests are identical
when their expected payoffs in the game are the same. Specifically, when the entities
are similarly-situated—e.g., market power is equally distributed, all firms are of similar
size, all have similar manufacturing capacity—no payoff variability arises. Thus, when
equilibrium analysis indicates that compliance with the legislator’s demands is the
entity’s best response, compliance will logically also constitute the group’s best response.
The latter squarely derives from the fact that the interests being identical: avoiding
unfavorable legislation is equally-beneficial to every member in the group.
Having said that, are group members expected to comply given that compliance is
in their best interest? As members of the group are mindful of the fact that the
legislator will execute the threat unless they comply, the answer to this question
crucially depends on the size of the group.
In sufficiently small groups, such as firms in an oligopoly, members may contract
with one another, implicitly or explicitly, to ensure that each member complies and that
the group as a whole averts the risk of legislation.377 Intra- group threats of ostracism or
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In one case, the U.K. government appointed a university to monitor compliance on behalf of the
government. The university was required to report to the government its assessment of the state of
compliance. See Monitoring Proforma for Commercial Leases Code of Practice, supra note 165.
376 That entities, like firms in an industry or members of a profession, may compete against each another on
business and market shares does not suggest that their interests, as they relate to compliance, diverge.
377 This applies the notion of a cartel, where each firm abides by the agreed-upon discipline of the cartel
because each does better than if each firm acts on its own will. See Kreps, supra note 218, at 74. The only
difference, however, is that firms are not confined to implicit contracting (i.e., tacit collusion), which is due to
the illegality of cartel agreements.
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cross-punishments may guarantee that members abide by their agreements. It is also
reasonable to assume that the legislator is capable of telling whether or not the entities
have duly complied, thus reinforcing members’ incentives to comply.
As groups grow in size, however, contracting becomes costly and unavoidably
impractical. 378 Moreover, collective action problems that inhere in group behavior
militate against voluntary group-wide compliance, even though compliance—to the
utter exclusion of anything else379—is certain to maximize the utility of the members of
the group.380 Whether or not the group is organized therefore becomes a decisive factor:
the existence of a representative body, which by virtue of its formal rules (e.g., charter,
bylaws), informal rules (e.g., social norms), and resources can impose non-legal
sanctions to enforce certain actions,381 may reduce hold
- outs and secure group-wide
compliance necessary to keep the risk of legislation at bay (that is, provided it functions
as it should so as to further the interests of its members).382 Put differently, because
monitoring each entity for compliance is extremely costly and burdensome, the
legislator may “delegate” the responsibility to a body that represents the group and
enforces compliance on its members. Most often, this representative body will also
conduct on behalf of the group regulatory bargaining (in lieu of strict compliance).
Moreover, in a limited set of circumstances compliance may ensue even though a
group is not (formally or informally) organized. Specifically, when compliance affects
the reputation of members in the group (e.g., for being good corporate citizens), and
when members value their reputation,383 the incentive to comply—in the absence of
formal, centralized intra-group enforcement—may be sustained by sanctions imposed
by individual members on each other in an attempt to maintain and enhance their
reputational capital, thus inducing a reputational cascade.384 The argument, more
precisely, hinges on the fact that non-compliance by one member is, in essence, a
negative reputational externality with respect to the remaining members of the group.
What is more, the issuance of a legislative threat (and the advent of collective action
problems) often reinforces the tendency of unorganized groups to organize. Indeed,
378

See Avinash K. Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance 59-67 (2004).
Of course, this is true except for a Pareto-improving bargaining, which in itself is a form of compliance.
Potential Pareto-improving regulatory bargains are discussed and explained in Part III(D) below.
380 See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1971) (given
collective action problems, public goods are produced at sub-optimal levels, less than what is desirable for the
group as a whole).
381 See Laurence R. Iannaccone, Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes and Other
Collectives, 100 J. POLIT. ECON. 271 (1992) (showing that efficient groups may use stigma in order to reduce freeriding); see also Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective
Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 165-76 (1996) (discussing various sanctions informal groups employ to enforce
discipline on group members).
382 Organized groups may also establish a monitoring mechanism in order to keep track of members’
compliance. See, e.g., Monitoring Proforma for Commercial Leases Code of Practice, supra note 165 (the British
Property Federation was appointed to monitor implementation on behalf of the property sector).
383 See generally Jackson, supra note 197 (reputation for responsibility and other virtues is a form of capital).
384 Cf. Kuran Timur, Ethnic Norms and their Transformation through Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623
(1998) (explaining how reputational cascades may bring together group members behind one position).
379
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threat-driven effort to organize has been observed in many cases. For example, in
response to a threat to legislate stringent recycling requirements, “PC companies …
scrambling to come up with a system that is voluntary but still effective,” joined forces
to form the National Electronics Product Stewardship Initiative, a working group
designed to develop proper solution.385 Similarly, responding to the government’s
threat to legislate cyber security standards, network companies formed an industrywide group—the National Cyber Security Summit Alliance—to study the problem and
devise proper measures. The Alliance, which undertook to deliver initial solutions
within a short time,386 was the first step towards averting the risk of legislation.387
Given the important role of organizations in ensuring group-wide compliance (and,
as I explain below, in facilitating efficient bargaining), legislators often encourage—in
word and in deed—the process of organizing. For example, legislators may do so on an
ad hoc basis by convening the targeted entities and thus reducing the transaction costs of
organizing.388 Legislators may also provide statutory funding for group participation in
congressional committee hearings, thus subsidizing the cost of organizing otherwiseunorganized groups.389 Lifting the cost of organizing makes good sense: organizations
may secure group compliance and reduce the cost of bargaining, increasing in turn the
legislator’s payoff and enhancing his utility.
Group organization increases the likelihood of group-wide compliance and
therefore renders legislative threats more useful in regulating social behavior. The
tendency towards organization also reduces the transaction costs of regulatory
bargaining (e.g., lower information costs), thereby enabling legislators and industry
representatives to negotiate and design superior regulatory measures. In turn, this
effect further reinforces the legislator’s incentive to use threats and the group’s impetus
to organize. The growing use of legislative threats and the increased probability of
repeated threats against certain groups also suggest that repeat threat-recipients will be
better-off investing the one-time fixed cost of organization as early as possible.390 On
the whole, insofar as legislative threats increase groups’ propensity to organize, the
widespread regulatory use of threats may counter social and economic processes that
contributed to the gradual weakening and disintegration of organizations.391
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See Harrison, supra note 155.
See News Release: U.S. Businesses Promise Security Plan by March 1, 2004, supra note 124.
387 Id. (the Alliance created a public-private regulatory partnership).
388 Having threatened legislation to impose cyber security standards, federal lawmakers convened 350
computer executives at the government-sponsored National Cyber Security Summit. See Markhoff, supra note
120, at C8. In response, the industry formed the National Cyber Security Summit Alliance.
389 See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, PUB. L. NO. 93-637, 88
STAT. 2183 (1975).
390 The costs of organization are akin to start-up costs. “Once they are borne, they do not affect marginal
costs [and] [g]roups that have already borne these start-up costs … will have a comparative advantage” in
ensuring compliance, in fending off the risk of legislation, and in shaping the regulatory environment in which
they operate. See Robert E. McCormick & Robert D. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy: An Inquiry
into the Interest-group Theory of Government 17 (1981).
391 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 167-69 (1995) (hereinafter: Simple Rules)
386
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2. Heterogeneous Groups
Groups qualify as heterogeneous when the effects of legislative threats on entities in
the pool are not uniform. Asymmetric payoffs may be driven by a variety of factors.
When a threat is directed to an industrial sector, smaller firms may suffer more onerous
consequences than larger firms: if compliance requires investment of a fixed
expenditure (e.g., to purchase a new technology), smaller firms—which benefit from
lower economies of scale and incur higher costs of capital—may find this expenditure
economically-unfeasible.392 Here, compliance may force relatively small firms out of the
market (and so will the legislation). In other cases, however, smaller firms may be
better-situated to comply with the threat. This is likely when switching costs (i.e., the
cost of switching from one regulatory regime to another) increase with firm size.
Moreover, payoff differences may arise from the firm’s position in the market.
When a threat attempts to eliminate barriers to entry and make a market more
competitive, a dominant firm that enjoys quasi-monopolistic rents will suffer harsher
consequences than a laggard firm operating on the fringe of the market.393 Furthermore,
difference in the legal status of entities may also produce payoff disparities, as when the
threatened legislation brings to an end the valuable SRO status of several entities in the
pool.394 Differences in attitudes towards risk and in risk-bearing capabilities may
similarly produce payoff variations. In addition, differences in entities’ investment
horizons and discount factors may also affect their perception of the game’s payoffs.
In light of the foregoing, the question is whether or not members can be expected to
comply and if so, under what conditions? As the entities know that the legislator will
execute the threat unless they all comply, they may opt to use compliance and noncompliance strategically in order to shape the regulatory environment in which they
and their existing and potential rivals operate; to strategically impose cost on rivals or
to reduce their profits; and to improve their ultimate position in the market. Ultimately,
whether or not group members comply depends on: (i) the size of the group; (ii) the
group composition and the distribution of economic power within the group; and (iii)
the availability of enforcement mechanisms to unify members behind one position
(whose availability and use is also affected by distribution of economic power).
When a group is relatively small, members can contract to ensure compliance.
Often, the group may negotiate a regulatory deal with the legislator, in lieu of strict
compliance. Yet, unequal distribution of economic power may shape the bargaining
process and ultimately take its toll: the negotiated measures may create an uneven, anticompetitive playing field.395 Demonstrating this concern, it is reported that “ISPs are
(discussing market forces responsible for the gradual decline of labor unions).
392 The model assumes that the (direct) costs of compliance are fixed (5), because their magnitude does do
not change across firms (e.g., installing technology costs the same irrespective of firm-specific characteristics).
393 See McDowall, supra note 211 (“[T]hreat of legislation may be required to elicit changes” that enhance
competition in U.K. payment systems).
394 Cf. Prynn, supra note 246 (reporting a legislative threat that in addition to imposing stringent standards
of conduct will, with respect to Lloyd’s, end its jealously guarded self-regulatory status).
395 See Voluntary Codes: A Guide for their Development and Use, CANADA OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 6 (1998),
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concerned [that the threat-induced negotiated code of practice will be] carefully
structured as a ‘balanced team,’ … giving neither dominance to the big players nor the
small ones an influence disproportionate to their size.”396 In contrast, larger groups—
for which contracting is not a viable option—may employ various enforcement
mechanisms, similar to those discussed above, in an attempt to guarantee compliance
and ensure that the risk of legislation is dissuaded.
In the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms, however, compliance and noncompliance may be used strategically as a tool to promote members’ idiosyncratic
interests. Hence, while in some circumstances strategic interaction within groups may
undermine compliance, in certain others it may counter-intuitively reinforce compliance.
For example, an incumbent firm may engage in predatory compliance, wherein the
incumbent complies in order to lower market prices and drive rivals out of the market.
Compliance may lower the price when, for example, the legislator’s demands are
designed to increases competition in the market.397 Alternatively, a dominant firm may
engage in predatory non-compliance so as to prompt the adverse legislation and raise
rivals’ costs, ultimately hoping to snatch their market shares and crowd-out active firms
from the market.398 An incumbent firm may do the same in an attempt to deter entry of
potential rivals. Rationally, the firm may be willing to suffer the long-term negative
impact of the unfavorable legislation (as well as the short-term negative returns
associated with the risk of legislation) because these costs are outweighed by the longterm gains from entry deterrence.399 Lastly, when compliance requires cooperation
between two or more sectors—as when in order to ward off the threat of legislation,
Silicon Valley technology firms and Hollywood entertainment firms needed to agree on
a standard to stop digital piracy400—one sector may strategically delay compliance or
even avoid compliance altogether so as to increase the risk of potential harm for the
other party and improve its bargaining position.401

D. Bargaining in the Shadow of Legislative Threats: The Effects of Threats on
Transaction Costs and Contractual Efficiency
Compliance with legislative threats is, in essence, a form of implicit and informal
available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/volcodes (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
396 See Bell, supra note 190.
397 See McDowall,, supra note 211 (legislative threat intended to enhance competition in payment systems).
398 See Carlton & Perloff, supra note 183, at 353-57.
399 Research confirms that established firms in an industry can affect the disadvantages facing potential
entrants, the magnitude of entry costs, and the existence of entry barriers. See Kofi O. Nti & Martin Shubik,
Noncooperative Oligopoly with Entry, 24 J. ECON. THEORY 187 (1981) (discussing strategic behavior designed to
erect entry barriers).
400 See Bill would Prevent Sharing of Digital Music, Video, supra note 136; see also Boliek, Lawmakers Push Fastforward to Settle DVD Dispute, supra note 140 (compliance required cooperation needed between the Directors
Guild of America, a representative body of directors and film studios, and a Utah-based DVD manufacturer
that edited-out profanity, violence, and foul language from films).
401 See, e.g., Jameson, supra note 164 (“The deadlock is being blamed on some of the UK’s major retailers. …
‘It’s clear that they would like to see intervention. It’s hard to see any basis for agreement now”).
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political transaction, in which the legislator barters the non-use of legislative power
with respect to a particular issue in return for the firm’s commitment to change its
conduct. Drawing the attention to this aspect, game theorist Thomas Schelling
observed that “[t]o study the strategy of conflict is to take the view that most conflict
situations are essentially bargaining situations.”402 But bargaining in the shadow of
legislative threats is often far more explicit and formal, such as where legislators and
firms convene (e.g., in committee hearings), negotiate the terms, and devise possible
solutions to address the specific social concerns towards which the threat was directed
in the first place.403
Focusing on this bargaining process spotlights two important effects of legislative
threats. The present discussion advances two interrelated propositions pertaining,
respectively, to the transaction costs associated with that bargaining and to the
efficiency of the negotiated measure. Specifically, the first proposition concentrates on
the effect of legislative threats on reducing transaction costs and, in turn, on facilitating
“regulatory” bargaining with the legislator (or regulator) in the shadow of the threat.
Building on this insight, the second proposition highlights the functional and welfare
superiority of the negotiated measure in dealing with the policy concern to which the
legislator directed the legislative threat initially.
The earlier analysis established that, where the probability that the threatened
legislation will be enacted into law is sufficiently high, credible legislative threats will
induce the firm to comply with the demands that the legislator has presented, whatever
these happen to be.404 Viewed from the firm’s perspective, the inducement effect of
legislative threats provides strong economic incentives, thus leading the firm to reform
its conduct so as to bring it in line with the legislator’s demands. In other words, facing
the threatened negative consequences of coercive regulatory intervention, compliance
inexorably becomes the firm’s rational best response.405 Nevertheless, incurring the cost
of compliance qualifies as the firm’s best response only insofar as there is no other way
in which the firm can address the legislator’s demands or respond to the underlying
policy concern more efficiently.406
Lo and behold, other options certainly exist. In particular, bargaining with the
legislator or other social planners enables the firm to explore, negotiate, and agree on

402 See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 5 (1963) (“conflict situations … are situations in which the
ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that
the other participant will make. … The bargaining … may involve threats of damage“). See also John F. Nash,
Jr., The Bargaining Problem, in ESSAYS ON GAME THEORY 1-8 (1996) (bargaining is a non-zero two-person game).
403 See, e.g., Dave Sheinin, Pro Sports Leagues Pitch Steroids Proposals on Hill; Plans Touted as Better than Fed
Policy, THE WASH. POST, May 19, 2005, at DO1 (“Faced with the increasing threat of legislative action from
Congress, the leaders of four of the nation’s major professional sports leagues touted their steroids testing
programs” while bargaining with legislators in a hearing before the House Commerce subcommittee).
404 This statement captures predictions that are based on the credible threat compliance equilibrium.
405 The negative impact of lenient, moderate, and severe threatened legislation is 10, 20, and 30, respectively.
The magnitude of these costs increases with the severity of the threatened legislation.
406 The cost of compliance is fixed at 5 because the demands that the firm changes its conduct and policies
remain unchanged irrespective of the level of severity of the threatened legislation.
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cost-effective, self-regulatory measures. Compared with the fixed cost of complying
with the legislator’s demands for reform, any measure that reduces this cost or that
further increases the benefit to the firm (i.e., beyond the benefit of strictly averting the
threatened legislation407), and which can be achieved through bargaining clearly makes
the latter the best response strategy from the firm’s profit- maximizing perspective.
The legislative threat shapes the relative bargaining powers of the respective
parties, leaving the power in the hands of the legislator.408 Moreover, because
exercising the threat provides the legislator with a credible fall-back option, transaction
costs of bargaining are expected to be kept to a bare minimum. Reducing the
magnitude of transaction costs—including, but not limited to, exchanging information,
projecting, negotiating, and drafting—facilitates bargaining and, presumably, ensures
that the bargaining is more likely to produce efficient measures.409 In that respect,
lowering transaction costs enables the parties to negotiate specific and long-term social
control arrangements, thus increasing the durability of such agreements and
eliminating in turn much of the deadweight transaction costs of dickering in the
future.410
Even more, given the impending threat on the one hand and the expected efficiency
gains from bargaining on the other, the firm is strongly motivated to pursue the
bargaining option; share with the legislator sufficient information that is necessary to
remove otherwise existing asymmetries; devise mutually-beneficial measures; and
ultimately enter into a voluntary, threat-induced agreement. In that respect, threats
serve as an information-revelation mechanism, which remedies the legislator’s inability to
obtain this information directly.
Legislative threats may also facilitate cooperation between the targeted entities.411
Applied to professions and industrial sectors, the use of legislative threats provides
strong incentives to organize in groups. Legislative threats may therefore reinforce

407

Averting the risk of the threatened legislation is desirable because, in addition to the superior costeffectiveness of self-regulation, it reduces uncertainty about the firm’s future business, which lowers returns on
equity, increases price volatility, and raises the firm’s cost of capital. For further discussion of the effects of risk
of legislation see Beck et al., supra note 204 (potential adverse legislation negatively affects the stock prices of
firms covered by legislation); and Ferguson & White, supra note 242 (the “Congressional Effect” shows that
stock returns are lower and stock price volatility is higher when Congress is in session, consistent with the
hypothesis that firms face a more uncertain regulatory environment legislative activity is under way).
408 Cf. Russell B. Korobkin, Bargaining Power as Threat of Impasse, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, LAW & ECONOMICS
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 04-6 (Mar., 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com (bargaining power stems entirely
from the negotiator’s ability to credibly threaten to reject unsatisfactory offers).
409 Cf. Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and
Assessment, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 335 (1995) (specifying the source of the relevant actors’ transaction costs in
different bargaining contexts).
410 In other words, higher contractual durability reduces the likelihood and cost of renegotiation that may be
necessary to revise the agreement when the circumstances change in the future.
411 See, e.g., Mr Baker Gets Tough, THE TIMES, Nov. 1, 1986 (“[T]he threat of legislation to restructure the
[teaching] profession will concentrate minds wonderfully when unions and employers meet”); Unions See Signs
of Breakthrough in Consultation Law, 3 EURO. REV. 3 (Sept. 1998), at http://www.tueip.dircon.co.uk/er3page3.html (a legislative threat is necessary to bring a party to the negotiating table).
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groups’ tendency to organize.412 Specifically, these economic incentives force industry
participants to organize, cooperate (e.g., minimize holdouts), and share information that
the legislator or other social planners would not have otherwise obtained because,
presumably, organizing and sharing such information increases the likelihood of
reaching an efficient agreement and consequently makes these entities better-off.
Moreover, industry-wide information is particularly valuable because it aggregates
firm-specific information (e.g., instances and preferences related to numerous firms in
the group), thus reducing potential errors in designing reform measures.
Viewed from another perspective, lowering transaction costs decreases the degree
of contractual incompleteness.413 Where transaction costs are low, the parties are better
positioned to (i) think ahead and plan for various contingencies that may arise; (ii)
negotiate about these plans and devise proper measures; and (iii) write the contract in
clear, unambiguous language that leaves little room for vagueness and uncertainty.414
Conceivably, drafting the firm’s contractual obligations in clear, unambiguous language
makes it easier for the legislator to monitor the firm’s performance, ensure that it stands
by its contractual obligations,415 and deter possible breaches, the result of which will be
reinstatement of the threat of legislation.416 In other words, low transaction costs reduce
ex post “enforcement” costs. Lastly, lowering contractual incompleteness also decreases
the likelihood of future revisions and renegotiations, which reduces in turn the level of
uncertainty. And, when uncertainty about the future is lower, the firm is better
positioned to make long-term investments in self-regulatory reforms.
Notably, by issuing a credible threat, the legislator implicitly pledges to address the
social concerns affected by the conduct towards which the threat is directed. The
legislator thus promises to undertake actions needed to induce the firm to comply or, if
necessary, to carry out the threat to legislate. Against this backdrop, bargaining makes
the legislator, too, better-off for it enables the parties to flexibly explore various
measures and choose those that maximize their mutual gains.417 More specifically, as

412 While organizing is certainly not cost-free, it has substantial effect on reducing the transaction costs of
bargaining with the legislator and, therefore, on increasing the likelihood and efficiency of the negotiated
measures. Cf. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971) (transaction costs of
regulatory bargaining include, but are not limited to, the costs of organizing).
413 The notion of incomplete contracts captures the idea that contracting is a costly process in and of itself,
and that this cost affects the ultimate features, scope, precision, and quality of the contract.
414 See Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 21-24 (1995) (discussing different sources of
contracting costs and the inevitable contractual incompleteness for which contracts may contain gaps, are
missing certain provisions, and are silent about the parties’ obligations in some future circumstances).
415 Cf. Negotiated or Voluntary Agreements, ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, at http://www.environmentagency.gov.uk (Jan. 1, 2004) (“The regulator may be involved in monitoring progress, especially if regulatory
action will be taken if the voluntary agreement fails to deliver the required improvement”).
416 In other words, re-issuing the threat or, in some cases, carrying out the threat ensures that firms do not
neglect their contractual obligations. See Winter, supra note 277, at A14 (Representative McKeon, who issued a
legislative threat in an attempt to curb tuition increases, “warned he would restore the bill’s penalties if
universities appeared to slack off in their efforts to curb costs”).
417 Cf. Mosquera, supra note 132 (reporting that industry groups told lawmakers that “sweeping regulations
governing the collection and use of data” are not necessary).
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legislative threats elicit firm- and industry-specific information, bargaining provides an
opportunity to tailor the best practicable reform measures to achieve the social interest
in question.418 Thus, bargaining is preferable from the legislator’s perspective because
the negotiated measures can improve upon the legislator’s initial demands for
reform,419 correct market inefficiencies,420 achieve cost-effective social control, better
allocate scarce resources, and maximize social welfare.421 It turns out that bargaining
may produce social control measures that are not only Pareto
- superior to the threatened
legislation and the legislator’s demands but that may also approach the Pareto
frontier.422 Certainly, doing that is expected to increase the legislator’s rewards for
securing and optimizing the given policy reform.423

IV. LEGISLATION VS. THE THREATS OF LEGISLATION:
FUNCTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS
Having examined the concept, pervasive use, and economic underpinnings of
legislative threats, I presently focus on differences between formal legislative measures
and informal legislative threats, as alternatives means of social control. This choice entails
functional and institutional considerations pertaining, respectively, to the comparative
capacity of legislative threats to effectively control behavior in an increasingly-complex
social reality; and to various political, constitutional, and democratic implications
arising from the use of legislative threats. Highlighting these considerations not only
advances the understanding of the phenomenon, but is also essential to evaluating on
normative grounds the ubiquitous use of legislative threats and to assessing their social
welfare implications against explicit normative criteria, to which I return in Part V.

A. Functional Dimensions
Legislators and regulators confront the overwhelming responsibility for
maintaining order and effecting social control in an increasingly complex and dynamic
418

Moreover, given imperfect information as to the level of severity of the threatened legislation, the firm is
likely to reveal information it would not have otherwise shared if it were to be perfectly informed.
419 The benefit for the legislator from inducing a firm to comply with the legislator’s initial demands and
abandon its undesirable practices is 5. Bargaining with the legislator may result in higher benefits, however.
420 Indeed, the chief objective of regulatory measures (whether super-imposed or induced by threats) is to
eliminate market inefficiencies and promote efficiency. See Carlton & Perloff, supra note 183, at 652.
421 See, e.g., Commission Communication on the Community Strategy to Reduce CO2 Emissions from Passenger Cars
and to Improve Fuel Economy, SELECT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN LEGISLATION, at http://www.parliament.thestationery-office.co.uk (July 21, 1998) (recommending voluntary agreements with car manufacturers to
improve fuel efficiency of new cars).
422 The Pareto criterion of efficiency provides an analytic standard for ranking different results according to
their effect on utility. Resources are allocated in a Pareto-optimal fashion—and are therefore located on the
Pareto frontier—if and only if any further reallocation can enhance the utility of one person only at the expense
of another. Thus, an allocation of resources is Pareto-superior to an alternative allocation if and only if no one
is made worse-off by the allocation and the utility of at least one person is improved. See Jules Coleman,
Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, in MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 95-132 (1988).
423 Research in political economy confirms that constituents and political contributors reward effort that
legislators put to advancing desirable policies and good reputation but penalize failures and bad reputation.
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society. In the process, they are called upon and expected to succeed in dealing with
numerous rather insurmountable challenges, such as highly limited data or, alas, a
wealth of unorganized information; inability to accurately assess risks and predict
future outcomes;424 insufficient understanding of relevant economic processes, scientific
relationships, and technological methods;425 rapidly changing social circumstances and
bewildering behavioral patterns; and, above all, a lack of time and resources.426 These
severe limitations explain the failure of the legal system in many areas of public policy
and highlight its severe shortcomings as a social governance mechanism.427
Reinforcing one another, these problems permeate highly complex legal rules that
render government intervention virtually inefficacious.428 For example, whereas
legislators attempt to promote expansive programs for cleaning up the environment or
for increasing job safety, the legislative measures they devise to implement these
programs are so convoluted that results are unlikely to be delivered.429 The increased
complexity of legal rules—which, inevitably, increases uncertainty430—and the
consistent failure of legal intervention to advance social goals has fueled the interest in
sweeping reforms, thus casting doubt over conventional methods of social control.
Against this background, I argue that legislative threats can and should be viewed
as an inevitable measure that emerged in response to the systemic limitations of
lawmakers and the inherent limits of the law. Indeed, the regulatory virtues of
legislative threats become apparent when juxtaposed with the severe limitations of
legislators that impede their capacity to discharge social control responsibilities. In that
respect, legislative threats echo Derek Bok’s detailed observations indicating that in
many areas governmental intervention is not only ineffective,431 but often makes matters

424 See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle, supra note 118, at 42-43 (“Predicting risk is a scientifically related
enterprise, but it does not involve scientists doing what they do best, namely developing theories about how x
responds to y, other things being equal. Rather, it asks for predictions of events in a world where the ‘other
things’ include many potentially relevant, rapidly changing circumstances, requiring the expertise of many
different disciplines to reach a conclusion”).
425 For example, “[a] waste site evaluation … may require knowledge of toxicology, epidemiology,
meteorology, hydrology, engineering, public health, transportation, and civil defense, disciplines with different
histories, different methods of proceedings, and different basic assumptions.” See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious
Circle, supra note 118, at 42-43.
426 The overwhelmingly high demands on legislators’ time are well-documented. See, e.g., Bauer et al., supra
note 248, at 408-413. Time constraints affect the work of Committee members as well. See Perkins, supra note
248, at 378-79 (two-thirds of the House Judiciary Committee members hardly participate in regular meetings).
427 See Peter H. Schuck, The Limits of Law: Essays on Democratic Governance ix (2000) (“Law confronts
unprecedented challenges today as it seeks to order an astonishingly dynamic American society”).
428 See Epstein, Simple Rules, supra note 391, at 16, 21-36 (documenting the massive increase in complexity of
rules that govern society and advocating a greater reliance on simple rules: “[T]he increasing complexity of
legal rules[is] a rough sign that something has gone badly astray”).
429 See Derek Bok, The State of the Nation: Government and the Quest for a Better Society 411 (1996).
430 See Schuck, The Limits of Law: Essays on Democratic Governance, supra note 428, at 9 (“Meant to increase
certainty, regulation actually reduced it on balance because of its great ambition”).
431 See Bok, supra note 430, at 129-131, 411 (discussing, respectively, the costs and benefits of environmental
and healthcare legislation suggesting that government intervention is ineffective).
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worse.432 In fact, compared with formal legislative measures (e.g., command-andcontrol statutes and regulations that command the use of specified technologies or
processes that legislators and regulators believe will achieve social goals), legislative
threats offer a qualitatively different approach for guiding and controlling social
behavior, even if highly complex. As I demonstrate below, legislative threats are often
functionally superior in achieving predetermined policy objectives and in advancing
national interests. The superior regulatory capacity of legislative threats arises from its
capacity to shift social control responsibility to the regulated entities; to alleviate the
information shortcomings of lawmakers; to rapidly and flexibly accommodate the
changing demands of social control; and to economize on the significant spending
necessary to shoulder the social cost of law enforcement. Taken together, these features
suggest that legislative threats are well-positioned to deal with the increased complexity
of social activities.

1. Information: Asymmetrically Informed Social Planners
Legislation and regulation are data-intensive undertakings, for in order to devise
effective measures of social control lawmakers must possess and process significant
amount of information concerning the nature of the targeted conduct, the scope and
sources of the problem, and the range of possible solutions. Advanced scientific
research indicates the relevancy of ever more data, further increasing the information
demands of social control.433
Furthermore, as the regulated activities become
increasingly more complex, the amount of data necessary to effect social control
increases as well. Absent sufficient and credible information, the legislative measure
will rest precariously upon unrealistic assumptions, thus creating the risk of
unintended economic consequences,434 possibly making matters worse.435 Predictably,
“uncertainties, knowledge gaps, default assumptions, guesses … spell trouble.”436
These information prerequisites notwithstanding, lawmakers ordinarily face highly
limited data or a wealth of unorganized information, which is costly or virtually
impossible to process. Hence, the central problem undermining any attempt to set

432 See Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance 190-95 (2000) (even though
securities markets are potentially prone to consistent inefficiencies, regulation can make matters worse).
Government intervention is particularly abusive where political and economic elites coincide. See generally
Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and their Cures (1998).
433 Reinforcing the demand for information, legal doctrine provides that science-based regulations adopted
by administrative agencies are subject to judicial review, where courts can exercise the authority to question
the sufficiency and credibility of scientific information the agency relied upon to promulgate its rules. See
Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America 69-78 (1995).
434 See Higbee, supra note 162, (the government admitted that the threatened legislation which would have
enacted minimum safeguards to protect the interests of business tenants, could have unintended side-effects
affecting the complex commercial property market); Mosquera, supra note 132 (the “legislation may have
unintended consequences, such as pushing prices higher and creating fewer choices).
435 Absent sufficient information, even benevolent intervention can makes things worse and should be
viewed with skepticism. See George Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market, 37 J. BUSINESS 117 (1964).
436 See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform 48 (1982).
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efficient standards and devise effective measures of social control is the gathering and
processing of necessary information because “[m]ost of the scientific information
needed [is found] in the hands of the industry to be regulated.”437 Moreover, while the
regulated entities hold the information, they normally assert attempt to prevent its
disclosure on the grounds of confidential business information or, alternatively, use it to
tilt the legislative or administrative rule-making process in their favor. Legislators, it
seems fair to say, are asymmetrically and imperfectly informed about the very activities
they seek to regulate. Of course, legislators and regulators may attempt to gather the
relevant information, but that may prove to extremely costly. Irrespective of the cost of
information, however, data-gathering processes—including, but not limited to, in-house
research, testimonies, scientific studies and independent expert opinions, and public
comments—cannot guarantee that lawmakers receive sufficient and credible
information for a variety of other reasons. For instance, the information received may
be incomplete or tainted by bias, self-interest, or lack of expertise.438 Moreover,
scientists may hesitate to publicly state conclusions that are not premised on
scientifically-accepted evidence.
Strategic reliance upon legislative threats, however, lessens the scope of information
asymmetry. First, legislative threats elicit information from threat-recipients, thus
remedying the legislators’ inability to obtain the necessary information directly and
cost-effectively. Given the impending threat, firms are strongly motivated to share with
the legislator sufficient information that he would not have otherwise obtained, and use
that information to negotiate and devise mutually-beneficial measures. The incentive to
reveal information is further reinforced because sharing such information increases the
likelihood of reaching an efficient regulatory agreement. Second, reliance upon
legislative threats to induce social change and implement a desired policy requires
substantially less information than what is necessary to legislating standards of
conduct. Internalizing the “regulatory” responsibility to targeted entities that possess
pertinent information, threat-induced self-regulation alleviates the information burden
that the legislator would have otherwise faced.
Lastly, the use of legislative threats not only reduces information asymmetries but it
also improves the amount and accuracy of information which is used in turn to devise
policy measures. As I have explained, legislative threats provide threat-recipients with
strong incentives to divulge relevant information and reveal their preferences. Directed
towards groups (e.g., industrial sectors), threats are expected to elicit information from
numerous threat-recipients (e.g., firms), thus providing the legislator with a wealth of

437

Id. at 109-112.
“Developing information within the agency avoids the taint of industry self-interest, but the agency may
lack the requisite technical ability. … [The agency’s staff was] able to develop models based upon existing
industry-wide statistical information, but they lacked firm-specific information. They could not determine
how a particular standard (applied to an individual firm) would affect that firm’s costs or fuel economy.” See
Breyer, Regulation and its Reform, supra note 437, at 110-111 (observing that experts who could have provided
the necessary scientific and technical information are often with the industry and that using adversary
proceedings to gather information from a hostile industry often proves very difficult and inefficient).
438
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industry-wide data and aggregate firm-specific information. Statistically, as the
legislator receives more information about more firms (i.e., a larger sample comprising
more variables), the risk of error decreases and the accuracy of information increases,
thus ensuring more efficient policy measures.439 Moreover, extracting firm-specific
information can also be viewed as a form of social control experimentation, wherein an
attempt is made to draw conclusions (relating, for example, to dealing with certain
problems) from the manifold experiences of individual firms. In these circumstances,
the legislator “serves as information clearinghouse of successful strategies.”440 Along
the same lines, Derek Bok has insightfully noted that “[w]ith thousands of separate
initiatives scattered across the country … government agencies [should] adopt the best
practices of others.”441

2. Adaptability: The Superiority of Threat-induced Self-regulation of Conduct
There is hardly any doubt that “Congress is not institutionally well suited to write
detailed regulatory instructions that will work effectively.”442 This concern is similarly
valid with respect to the numerous regulatory agencies to which Congress has
delegated rule-making power.443 For, in addition to information asymmetries and
incompleteness, legislators lack the expertise, acumen, time, and finesse necessary to
devise cost-effective measures and set rational standards of conduct.444 A statement
made by a U.K. Member of Parliament, “I am opposed to imposing fresh rules, and in
particular I believe you cannot legislate for common sense,”445 plainly illustrates these
shortcomings. Even more, highlighting the lawmaker’s tunnel vision and inherent
inability to consider related problems that may benefit from a unified approach,
Woodrow Wilson observed that “the task of the legislator to embrace in his view the
whole system, to adjust his rules so that the play of the civil institutions shall not alter

439

The law of large numbers supports this point: where individual members of a group are subject to
idiosyncratic differences, the average behavior of the group is more predictable than that of individual
members. This tendency increases with the size of the group. See Law of large numbers, in Black, supra note 50,
at 265. Hence, the larger the sample size and the lower the standard error, the more reliable the information is.
440 See Lucent Technologies Signs Voluntary Agreement with EPA, supra note 159.
441 Cf. Bok, supra note 430, at 414 (“One advantage of our federal system … is the scope it offers for
experimentation and innovation. With its great size, decentralization, and respect for individual effort,
America offers fertile ground for new ideas. No nation is better at devising ingenious solutions to problems”).
442 See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle, supra note 118, at 42. See also John V. Tunney, The Federal Legislative
Process: Misinformation, Reaction, and Excessive Delegation, 7 ENVTL. L. 499 (1977) (major regulatory efforts
between 1962 and 1976 responded to perceived crises, paid hardly no attention to cost-benefit analysis of
regulation, and were voted on by members of Congress who did not know what they were voting on).
443 See Breyer, Regulation and its Reform, supra note 437, at 109-119 (highlighting problems inherent in the
regulatory process, such as deficient data, lack of coordination with other agencies, and unintended effects).
444 “Only painstaking and continuous study can give a legislator command of the often complex details of
any one of the many proposed pieces of legislation. [T[he best-informed of our lawmakers are fully acquainted
with only a fraction of the bills that come before each session.” See Bauer et al., supra note 248, at 412.
Committee members are also minimally present. See Perkins, supra note 248, at 378-79 (two-thirds of House
Judiciary Committee members hardly participate in the committee’s deliberations).
445 See Hamilton, supra note 146 (legislator reluctant to impose intrusive D&O compensation standards).
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the play of the economic forces, requires more training and more acumen.”446
Nowadays, policy issues become increasingly more complex, posing in turn
formidable challenges the solution of which frequently requires ingenuity and
innovation. In response to the government’s concern over cyber attacks, for example,
Microsoft’s Chief Security Strategist noted that “the government plan was short on
specifics [and] acknowledged that many of the challenges industry and government face
would take years to address.”447 Yet, because lawmakers are not capable of competently
handling such matters, unilateral regulatory measures are not up to the task.448 The
manifold failings of “top down” policy measures are particularly relevant to the U.S.
regulatory system which, unlike many industrialized nations, invariably acts through
formal lawmaking proceedings, thus limiting the extent to which companies, unions,
and other interested parties can participate in the lawmaking process.449 Furthermore,
owing to the abrasive modus operandi in the U.S. regulatory sphere, statutes and
regulations are less likely to take account of the specific circumstances of the regulated
entities, thus increasing compliance costs and weakening the incentives to comply.450
Given differences in the capacity and availability of resources, it seems that firms,
not legislators, are better-situated to regulate themselves (assuming they properly
account for potential externalities).451 Thus, by inducing compliance with the
legislator’s objectives, and by internalizing (to the firm) the responsibility to tailor firmspecific measures most useful to achieve these goals, legislative threats harness these
functional advantages.452 Moreover, firms possess regulatory expertise that legislators
are lacking (but do not enjoy similar economies of scale in devising rules of conduct453).
Compared with formal legislation, threat-induced self-regulation is therefore
functionally superior in dealing with increasingly-complex and data-intensive policy
446

See Wilson, supra note 217.
See Markhoff, supra note 120 (reporting the government’s concern over cyber attacks) (emphasis added).
448 Homeland Security Department officials are reported to have said that “the federal government will back
away from issuing new security mandates to industry, and instead let private companies take the lead
[because] [w]e cannot secure the homeland from Washington, D.C.” See Chris Strohm, Homeland Security Looks
to Industry to Secure Nation’s Infrastructure, GOVEXEC.COM, Jan. 12, 2004, at http://www.govexec.com (internal
quotation marks omitted).
449 See Bok, supra note 430, at 415. In Bok’s view, “[t]his procedure shifts decision making from the parties
to officials who are not intimately familiar with the conditions of the firms they seek to regulate.” Id. Pointing
to some sources of inefficiency, Bok states that “[i]n such an atmosphere, … rule-making is highly contentious,
… generates widespread dissatisfaction, while costing so much money that the government can attend to only
a fraction of the problems subject to its jurisdiction.” Id.
450 Id.
451 For a discussion of the functional advantages of self-regulation see Part I(B) above.
452 Given that policy measures are essentially public goods, the responsibility for devising policies should
rest with the party that values them the most. Cf. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Government versus
Private Ownership of Public Goods, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1343 (2001) (documenting the change in the division of
responsibility between the state and the private sector for the delivery of public goods with an increasing trend
towards contracting out to the private sector and public-private partnerships, and arguing that if contracts are
incomplete then ownership of a public good should lie with a party that values the benefits relatively more).
453 See Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History 27 (1981) (“The economies of scale
associated with devising a system of law, justice, and defense are the basic underlying source of civilization”).
447
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concerns, thus providing the sought-after panacea.454 In keeping with the previous
point, research shows that, compared with the state, securities exchanges are betterpositioned, have stronger incentives, and therefore more likely to devise optimal
regulations that minimize the cost of regulation and maximize the benefits from
investor protection and prevention of abuses in securities markets.455
Using threats to induce a change of conduct is advantageous for at least three other
reasons. First, depending on the particular stakes, the inducement effect of legislative
threats may spur firm-specific and industry-wide investment in R&D insofar as such
investment may produce cost-effective compliance measures.456 The impending threat
provides the firm with strong incentives to make investment, ensuring in turn inventive
solutions and higher regulatory efficiency.457 Indeed, “experience tells that the threat of
legislation is the best way to stimulate real improvements and technological
innovations.”458 Second, compared with intrusive formal legislation, market-driven
solutions prompted by threats run a lower risk of unintended and therefore undesirable
consequences,459 and avoid legislative spill-over that results from the fact that legislation
cannot be made sufficiently targeted.460 Government intervention in the provision of
health care demonstrates the potential for such damaging consequences: “Congress
[veered] from market-oriented remedies, such as encouraging health maintenance
organizations, to regulatory solutions, such as mandatory fee schedules for doctors,”
the result of which was “40 million Americans without health insurance but enough
government intervention to push up physicians’ fees.”461 Third, the use of legislative
threats facilitates a cooperative, bilateral regulatory process.462 Compared with formal
454 The FCC’s regulatory threat directed to the media industry in an attempt to halt unauthorized sharing of
copyrighted digital content “represents new government pressure for industry groups to create [a] system on
their own for digital rights management.” See Chiger, supra note 134.
455 See Adam C. Prichard, Self-Regulation and Securities Markets, 26 REGULATION 32 (2003).
456 It is precisely to that end that PC manufacturers joined forces and formed the National Electronics
Product Stewardship Initiative, a working group designed to develop solutions to the recycling problems of
hazardous materials. See Harrison, supra note 155 (“PC makers say a voluntary approach gives them more
opportunity to find marketable ways to turn their industry green”).
457 In response to the threat to legislate cyber security standards, four major business associations formed an
industry-wide group, the National Cyber Security Summit Alliance, to study the problem and devise measures
to reduce vulnerability. See Markhoff, supra note 120, at C8. Microsoft, through its Chief Security Strategist,
led the most important working group in charge of putting together necessary technological measures. Id.
458 See Edwards, supra note 161 (legislative threat directed to auto manufacturers to reduce air-pollution).
459 See Mosquera, supra note 132 (“legislation may have unintended consequences, such as pushing prices
higher and creating fewer choices”); see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective
Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L. & E. REV. 1, 3-4 (2002) (where the state does not know what the firm’s
prevention costs are, including direct expenditures to abate the externality and forgone profits from reduction
in output, using quantity regulation makes things worse off because the state cannot prescribe the optimal
level of production).
460 See Voluntary Agreements, at http://www.eupolitix.com (last visited May 1, 2004) (discussing Volvo
Corp.’s approach to voluntary agreements with regulators).
461 See Bok, supra note 430, at 411.
462 See Tobacco White Paper: Action on Smoking and Health ‘Delighted’, at http://www.ash.org.uk (Dec. 10, 1998)
(“Introducing a Bill would have caused an almighty fight with both sides [i.e., the hospitality trade and the
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legislative measures, the process of regulatory bargaining, in which lawmakers and
regulated entities work together, is better suited to yield constructive regulatory
measures. In one case, a Lucent Technologies’ representative stated that “[o]ur
collaboration with the EPA will reduce greenhouse gases in a way that makes sense
from both a business and an environmental standpoint—without regulation or
mandate.”463

3. Elasticity: Accommodating the Rapidly-changing Demands of Social Control
Legal norms must be adjusted over time (through both revisions and additions) in
response to nascent social conditions and emerging behavioral phenomena, so as to
address newly-arising public concerns and promote social welfare. In this respect, the
use of legislative threats to induce a change in conduct is particularly well-suited to
accommodate rapidly-changing social circumstances.464 Assuming other things remain
equal, the capacity of threat-induced self-regulation as well as regulatory bargaining in
the shadow of the threat to swiftly conceive new policy measures that account for
shifting demands of social control enhances society’s ability to achieve policy objectives.
The comparative flexibility of legislative threats over formal schemes of social
control (i.e., state-mandated regulation, self-regulation pursuant to statutory
authorization, and regulation through litigation), squarely derives from the informal
property of bilateral regulatory bargaining and the internal property of threat-induced
self-regulatory on which legislative threats are predicated. The significant reduction in
transaction costs of threat-induced bargaining increases the likelihood of timely and
well-adapted regulatory measures. Furthermore, coupled with an effective threat,
relatively short compliance deadlines induce prompt changes.465 In one case, Disney
Chief Executive Officer, Michael Eisner, commented that the threatened legislation
“provide[d] the needed discipline of a deadline for the conclusion of industry
negotiations.”466 Lastly, the ability of the firm to influence a particular measure through
bargaining enables it to devise such schemes that minimize the switching costs it incurs
in implementing these measures, thereby facilitating a rapid change in conduct.

4. Enforcement: Economizing on the Social Cost of Law Enforcement
Enforcing the law on non-law-abiding entities consumes vast resources. Ever more,
enforcement costs are particularly high given the increased complexity of legal rules

health advocates] digging in around their arguments”).
463 See Lucent Technologies Signs Voluntary Agreement with EPA, supra note 159.
464 Employing a threat of legislation to coerce public companies to expose boardroom compensation
resolutions to shareholders voting, U.K. ministers have reasoned that “[t]hese are matters best left to market
forces or, at worst, to codes of practice. Legislation is not flexible enough to keep up with changing trends, as
every past Companies Act has soon demonstrated.” See Patience Wheatcroft, Funds Should Vet Boardroom Pay,
THE TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, available at http://www.lexis.com.
465 It is not infrequent that given a credible, impending threat, firms vow to produce “initial deliverables” by
a specific date. See News Release: U.S. Businesses Promise Security Plan by March 1, 2004, supra note 124.
466 See Bill would Prevent Sharing of Digital Music, Video, supra note 136 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and the information-intensity of the subject activities. Thus, using legislative threats to
control conduct may economize on the direct and indirect costs of law enforcement.
The reduction in direct enforcement costs (e.g., cost of criminal prosecution, civil
litigation, and administrative monitoring programs) is twofold: First, inducing
negotiated or self-imposed standards of conduct, legislative threats reduce the body of
formal law (that would have otherwise been needed) and substitutes it with invisible law,
thereby decreasing the volume of litigation and other enforcement actions. Second,
effective legislative threats, wherein exercising the threat lurks as a credible fall-back
option, instill strong disciplining incentives that ensure self-execution of the standards
of conduct. In this respect, drafting the negotiated accord in clear, unambiguous
language makes it easier for the legislator to monitor the firm and to ensure that it
stands by its promises.467 Along the same lines, continuing the threat of legislation or
restoring the threat (that is, where it has been retracted in response to initial
compliance) guarantees that firms do not drag their feet in implementing such
measures.468 In keeping, Representative McKeon, who issued a legislative threat to curb
tuition increases, “warned he would restore the [threatened] penalties if universities
appeared to slack off in their efforts to curb costs.”469
The use of legislative threats also reduces indirect enforcement costs. Opting-out of
the law enforcement system prevents the social costs due to subversion of justice470 and
regulatory capture.471

B. Institutional Dimensions
Institutional considerations, which illuminate the choice between formal legislative
measures and informal legislative threats from a different perspective, encompass manifold
ways in which, by using legislative threats, legislators evade procedural safeguards,
institutional constraints, and substantive controls designed to limit their power to make
law and effect policy changes. Importantly, while depraved legislators may favor
legislative threats over formal legislation as a means to evade these constraints, such
motivations, in and of themselves, are inconsequential to assessing the desirability (or
undesirability) of threats on either functional or normative grounds.472

467

Cf. Negotiated or Voluntary Agreements, supra note 415 (the regulator may monitor progress especially if a
regulatory action follows a failure to comply).
468 See Richard Ford, Government to Public Revised Plans; Legal Reforms, THE TIMES, July 8, 1989 (“”[W]ithout …
continuing threat of legislation, the [legal] profession will have little impetus to take action to reform itself”).
469 See Winter, supra note 277, at A14.
470 Cf. Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 85 (courts are prone to subversion).
471 See Laffont & Tirole, supra note 86 (explaining regulatory capture). For empirical evidence showing the
distorting effects of regulatory capture on behavior and social welfare see Slinko et al., supra note 86.
472 Motivations may vary. Being aware that their power is sometimes limited by public opinion, legislators
may issue a legislative threat in lieu of formal legislation in order to avoid negative public opinion. See
Puzzanghera, supra note 166 (“legislation isn’t the only way federal officials can have an impact on an issue
they are keenly aware may resonate with voters”).
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1. Disenfranchising Fellow Legislators: Non-majoritarian Policy-making
Legislative threats bypass the lawmaking process, thereby effectively
disenfranchising legislators at the House and Senate. In doing so, the legislator evades
floor discussion and potential input from competing perspectives; hinders committee
hearings and deliberations; and sidesteps a plenary voting on the final passage of the
bill in both houses of Congress—all of which comprise a standard legislative process.473
Indeed, legislative threats are inconsistent with the fundamental notion that the
“Constitution provides a basic framework which provides for order and liberty [and]
allows the majority of the people to make economic, social and political decisions about
life in America which are binding on everyone.”474
Along the same lines, by using legislative threats, legislators avoid potential
filibusters (or the threat thereof), ordinarily used to delay the debate on the proposed
bill or block the legislation altogether. When successful, the filibuster tactic increases
the bargaining power of legislators who oppose the legislation and seek to influence the
contents of the legislation.475 A legislative threat that was issued in an attempt to ban
gambling on collegiate athletics, demonstrates this point, in that the threat was issued
after “[t]he resolution … was passed by the Judiciary Committee with an encouraging
margin … was delayed by a Nevada filibuster in the Senate until the end of the term.”476
Moreover, even where legislators apparently adhere to the rules of the legislative
process (e.g., introduce the proposed bill, hold a committee hearing), they do so
strategically—that is, only to the extent that doing so enhances the credibility of the
threat or increases the perceived probability of the threatened legislation. Senator
McCain, who threatened legislation in an attempt to curb steroid use in baseball, is
reported to have said that holding the high-profile hearings before the Senate
Commerce Committee has been an attempt to coerce the baseball league to act.477
By using a legislative threat to opt-out of the political policy-making process and to
avoid the majoritarian decisional rules (which are used to aggregate social preferences
on a particular policy concern), the legislator acquires the power to induce policy
changes notwithstanding the lack of congressional support.478 Thus, lawmakers
increasingly become individualistic policy entrepreneurs. The exercise of this policy473

See generally Legislative Process: How a Senate Bill Becomes a Law, supra note 328 (the legislative process).
See Earl Warren, A Republic, If You Can Keep It 71 (1972).
475 Filibuster, the tactic of holding the Senate floor to debate a bill in an effort to delay or prevent an action
on that bill, has long congressional history. See Filibuster and Cloture, U.S. SENATE POWERS & PROCEDURES, at
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (last visited Feb.
17, 2004). Legislative threats are particularly troubling where using cloture—namely, a two-thirds vote
necessary according to Senate rules to end a floor debate and override a filibuster—is unlikely.
476 See Edwards, supra note 118. The threat led the Nevada Gaming Commission to recommend bet limits.
477 The hearings signaled the seriousness of the legislators’ intention to act. See Puzzanghera, supra note 166.
478 Notably, a threat may induce compliance even in the absence of a majority in support of the threatened
legislation because the threat’s inducement effect depends on the firm’s belief that the following conditions are
satisfied: (i) the threat is credible; and (ii) the probability that the threatened legislation is enacted into law is
sufficiently high. In other words, where the legislation is sufficiently harmful, compliance with the legislator’s
demands may become a rational choice even in the absence of the minimally-necessary congressional support.
474

95

A Theory of Legislative Threats
making power is neither institutionally-regulated nor democratically-accountable.
Consequently, these threats prevent fellow legislators from filling their democratic
function to serve as bulwarks of deliberation and representation. And, as legislative
threats are premised upon a non-majoritarian mechanism, their use becomes patently
anti-democratic.479 Viewed from a social planning perspective, the prevalent use of
threats to control social behavior runs afoul the fundamental principles of a political
society that aspires to representative democracy, in which representatives in both
houses of Congress are “constitutionally empowered to deliberate together and figure
out statutory solutions to emerging problems.”480

2. Disenfranchising the President: Preventing Possible Veto of Legislation
Once a bill is approved by a majority vote in both the Senate and the House, it is
presented to the President, who may sign the bill into law or exercise his veto power.481
If the President objects to the legislative measure, he may return it to the chamber of
origin together with a veto message, stating his objections. Congress must then muster
a two-thirds majority (in both houses) in order to override the President’s veto and
enact the bill into law.482 In this respect, the capacity of legislative threats to bypass the
political process and to promote a new public policy without resort to formal legislation
clearly impedes the President’s constitutional veto power. This is particularly
disconcerting nowadays, where frequent and resolute use of veto power has become an
important vehicle used by the President’s to influence federal policy-making.483
Using legislative threats to force a change in behavior disturbs the institutional
allocation and separation of powers in one more way. Ordinarily, the power to make
law (which is entrusted to legislators) does not encompass the power to enforce that law
(which is entrusted to the government). In this respect, legislative threats bypass the
Executive Branch and thereby usurp its discretionary law enforcement power, which
would have otherwise rested with the Attorney General and other government officials.
This unilateral, extra-legal assumption of power runs afoul fundamental separation of
powers, thereby running the risk that law-makers become overly powerful.

3. Disenfranchising the States: Redrawing Federal-State Allocation of Powers
Legislative threats can induce targeted entities to modify their

behavior in

479 See Donald Wittman, The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient 152-161 (1995)
(discussing the role of majority rules in aggregating individuals’ preferences). By counting numbers, majority
rules do not give weight to the intensities of individuals’ preferences, consistent with democratic principles.
480 See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 260 (1991).
481 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7. If the subject matter of the bill is within the jurisdiction of a department of the
government or affects its interests in any way, the President may in the time allotted refer the bill to the head of
that department for opinion and report thereon.
See Enactment of a Law, U.S. SENATE, at
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/Enactment_law.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
482 See Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 66. If the President does not sign the bill or exercise his veto power
outright (i.e., within ten days), the bill becomes law automatically. See also Redman, supra note 112, at 235-36.
483 Cf. Ackerman, supra note 480, at 260-61 (“[T]he President’s aggressive use of his veto power in the
modern republic is radically different from its use in the early republic”).
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accordance with the legislator’s demands. Yet, the targeted conduct may be one that
lies beyond Congress’ Article I powers and that therefore is exclusively subject to states’
sovereign regulatory power. Hence, the policy-making power that arises from the use
of threats can disturb principles of federalism, in that it redefines federal-state allocation
of regulatory responsibilities in violation of the Tenth Amendment.484 Because the use
of legislative threats is entirely unregulated and most often not as visible as ordinary
legislative business is, federal legislators may use the power these threats confer to
control behavior and induce a policy change in areas exclusively reserved for the states,
thereby usurping state sovereign interests. And, that threat-induced policy changes
evade judicial review (as I explain below)further reinforces this problem.
Similarly violating state sovereignty, national legislators may employ legislative
threats to comandeer state legislatures and state executive officials.485 Specifically,
legislators may direct a federal legislative threat to state lawmakers, according to which
they will legislate unless state lawmakers regulate the targeted conduct themselves.
Along the same lines, legislators may threaten adverse legislation unless state officials
and administrative agencies comply with the legislator’s demands (e.g., that they
enforce a particular federal law). The comandeering effects of legislative threats clearly
intrude upon the state sovereignty, which the Supreme Court has invoked in a number
of cases to hold that Congress could neither comandeer state lawmaking processes by
forcing states to regulate, whatever the substantive field might be,486 nor can “[t]he
Federal Government … issue directives requiring the States to address particular
problems [or] command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”487

4. Disenfranchising the Constitution: Evading Judicial Review of Legislation
Judicial review of statutes imposes an important external constraint on the scope of
legislative power, necessary to prevent political majorities from abusing their legislative
power so as to oppress political minorities.488 Yet, effective legislative threats, which
produce no formal legislation but give rise to informal norms of conduct, are not subject
to this institutional constraint. Specifically, threat-induced policy changes (whether
they are achieved through self-regulation or regulatory bargaining) practically foreclose
potential judicial review. The resulting standards of conduct compromise the
protection of constitutional rights and adherence to constitutional principles. In other
words, legislative threats give rise to a body of invisible law to which fundamental
constitutional principles practically cannot apply. In the process, the targeted entities
484

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST., amend. X. See Tribe, supra note 45, at 860.
485 While the reverse scenario, where state legislators direct a state legislative toward Congress, is a theoretic
possibility it is practically not a viable option.
486 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). See also Tribe, supra note 45, at 878-80.
487 See Printz v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997). See also Tribe, supra note 45, at 880-94.
488 See Tribe, supra note 45, at 207-213 (discussing the role of the judiciary in interpreting and applying the
Constitution to determine constitutional validity of legislation).
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are forced to conduct themselves and their business according to standards that do not
necessarily meet requisite constitutional protection of rights and liberties.489 In this
respect, the use of legislative threats to control social conduct creates a constitutional
duality, wherein formal norms are subject to external constitutional constraints while
informal ones are not. To be sure, such a duality is blatantly inconsistent with the key
societal role of the Constitution, which “[f]or the past two centuries, … has been as
central to American political culture as the New Testament was to medieval Europe.”490
Even worse, this problem reaches far beyond constitutional protection per se. In
effect, limiting the operative reach of the Constitution and excluding a body of “norms”
from constitutional jurisprudential discourse work to the detriment of the long-term
functioning of the courts and adversely affect the function the Constitution serves in
regulating the use of legislative power. The point here is the following: the depth,
extent, and sophistication of constitutional jurisprudence and doctrine depend (among
other things) on the aggregate legal experience of courts and on the case-law they
develop. Hence, as more constitutional cases are brought before the courts on the
grounds that a norm is unconstitutional, the more well-developed will constitutional
jurisprudence and doctrine become; ands vice versa. In other words, constitutional
challenges benefit from network effects, wherein the quality and depth of the applicable
doctrine increase with the frequency and volume of judicial review.491 Fewer norms
and fewer challenges necessarily mean that pertinent constitutional doctrine is bound to
remain less developed—and, therefore, more uncertain—than it would otherwise have
been.
Moreover, the erosion of constitutional doctrine, which increases legal
uncertainty, may further reduce the frequency of constitutional challenges and the
volume of cases brought. Furthermore, the use of legislative threats and the resultant
constitutional duality not only expose threat-recipients to possibly-unconstitutional
standards of conduct but also degrade constitutional protection afforded to others
(whose conduct is subject to legitimate legal norms). Taken together, these trends are
likely to counter the trend towards juristocracy, wherein by virtue of constitutional
rights and judicial review of legislation and regulation, courts become an important
regulatory institution and play an ever more powerful role in policy-making.492
Counter-intuitively, the ex ante prospect that (if and when enacted) the threatened
legislation may be held unconstitutional and void does not automatically water down
the threat’s inducement effect on behavior. Such constitutional challenge may bear on
the probability that the threatened legislation remains legally-effective notwithstanding
489

See, e.g., Sheinin, supra note 403, at DO1 (suspicionless drug testing requirements with which threat
recipients comply violate the Fourth Amendment protection against searches without probable cause).
490 See Daniel Lazare, America the Undemocratic, 232 New Left Review 3, 21 (1998).
491 Network effects arise when a product’s value to a user increases as the number of users of a product
grows. The fundamental idea is that the act of joining a network confers a benefit (externality) on all other
participants in the netwrok. See William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, Network Externalities, in Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest (eds.), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, Vol. II. 952 (2000).
492 See Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 169-172
(2004) (discusses the trend towards judicial empowerment through the constitutionalism of rights and the
establishment of procedures for judicial review).
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constitutional challenges (or, rather, held unconstitutional and void).493 In other words,
constitutional challenges are merely one factor among many that influences the firm’s
assessment of the efficacy of the threat (i.e., whether or not the probability that the
threatened legislation becomes a law exceeds the effectiveness condition). If the
threatened legislation entails sufficiently harmful impact, compliance with the
legislator’s demands may qualify as the firm’s best response despite a possiblymeritorious constitutional challenge. In any event, the strength of these challenges and
their bearing on the effectiveness of the threat depend on a variety of factors, including
the court’s composition and the constitutional jurisprudence on the issue under review.
Precisely this counter-intuitive effect seems to explain the repeated resort to
legislative threats as a means to control freedom of speech in America.494 Over the
years, lawmakers have had a significant impact on self-censorship, profanity, and other
forms of otherwise-protected speech.495 Using legislative threats, legislators exerted
pressure to shape the content of films, comic books, and popular music and TV
broadcastings notwithstanding Congress’ highly limited mandate to regulate speech
under First Amendment jurisprudence. In one case, President Clinton’s administration
directed a threat of federal legislation towards the entertainment industry in an effort to
stop the marketing of violent movies to kids, reasoning that the measure was intended
to “encourage the industry … to do some self-regulation.”496 Illustrating the appeal of
legislative threats as a means to force constitutionally-invalid policy changes, Dick
Cheney is reported to have said “[t]hey know that you cannot enact legislation or
regulation to take care of this matter without running afoul of the First Amendment.”497
In line with this response, Hillary Rosen, the President of the Recording Industry
Association of America stated in a testimony before the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and the Internet that the legislation would force the creative
industries to adhere to certain standards based on value judgments made by the
government about content and that “this legislation [is] blatantly unconstitutional.”498

5. Disenfranchising the Judiciary: Circumventing Judicial Interpretation
The use of legislative threats to control social behavior disturbs the institutional
493

Yet, potential constitutional challenges do not affect the credibility of the legislative threat.
See, e.g., Giles Whittell, Hollywood Hype Adds Sizzling Raunch to Family Values, THE TIMES, Feb. 14, 1994
(“The American film industry faces the threat of legislation to curb sex and violence in its output if it fails to
control them itself”); Discipline of the Press, THE TIMES, Aug. 10, 1991 (“The ethical performance of national
newspapers has … been gradually improving [as they] have taken the threat of legislation sufficiently seriously
to adjust their behavior”).
495 See generally Tracey DiLeonardo & Juliet Dee, Discouraging “Objectionable” Music Content: Litigation,
Legislation, Economic Pressure, and More Speech, 25 COMM. & LAW 13 (2003).
496 See, e.g., McCain Wary of Gore’s Proposal to Sanction Entertainment Industry, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 18,
2000, at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=3589.
497 Id.
498 See Testimony of Hillary B. Rosen, President and CEO, Recording Industry Association of America, HOUSE
SUBCOMMITTEE
ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND
THE
INTERNET,
July
20,
2001,
at
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/press2001/hilary_upton_testimony.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
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allocation of responsibilities and the political separation of powers in one more way.
Because effective legislative threats are not carried out and produce no formal
legislation (nor a legally-enforceable agreement499), the forced changes in the conduct of
entities towards which the threat is directed fall beyond the reach of the legal system
and out of the purview of courts. In fact, given the absence of formal legislation, policy
changes forced by legislative threats—far-reaching as they may be—cannot give rise to
recognized legal actions. Thus, viewed from an institutional perspective, legislative
threats disenfranchise the judiciary, which is ordinarily entrusted with the
responsibility to adjudicate legal controversies. And, absent adjudication of legal
controversies, courts cannot do what they do best—namely, laying precedent-setting
interpretations and “shaping the rules of law [and] heed[ing] the mores of [the] day.”500

V. NORMATIVE ANALYSIS: ASSESSING THE DESIRABILITY
OF LEGISLATIVE THREATS AS REGULATORS OF SOCIAL CONDUCT
Threat-induced behavior is all but omnipresent. Deterrence of wrongdoing, for
instance, is predicated upon a threat of ex post liability for the harm caused. Similarly,
out-of-court settlement is often observed in response to a party’s threat to litigate the
case.501 And, in 2002, Bayer A.G. lowered the price of Cipro, at the time a highly
demanded antibiotic, following the federal government’s threat to revoke its patent and
manufacture the drug itself.502 Having said that, nowhere are the effects of threatinduced behavior as controversial and socially-costly as those associated with
legislative threats.503
Specifically, the preceding analysis has established that,
notwithstanding the superior functional capacity of legislative threats to control
behavior in an increasingly-complex and information-intensive society, the
institutionally-unregulated and politically-unaccountable use of implicit and explicit
threats poses formidable normative challenges for the most treasured attributes of
American constitutional democracy. Contrasting these considerations underscores the
intrinsic, possibly-irreconcilable tension between the potential welfare gains and the toll
on democratic principles arising from the prevalent use of legislative threats as a means
of social control. This conflict therefore raises the ultimate normative question,
namely—Is the use of legislative threats as regulators of social conduct socially desirable?
The analysis that follows aims to address this question against two well-defined
normative criteria—(i) democratic legitimacy and (ii) social control efficacy—and to
carefully examine how the use of legislative threats measures up against these criteria.
499

Arguably, agreements that the parties enter into in the shadow of the threat are not enforceable because,
among other things, they are consummated without authority and provide no legally-effective consideration.
500 See Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 103-104 (1921) (emphasis in original).
501 See, e.g., I.P.L. P’ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. ECON. 539 (1983).
502 See Clyde Haberman, New Urgency on Anthrax, Bombs and Blunders, the Ripple Effect, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2001, at B1.
503 Regulation through litigation has been subject to criticism on the grounds that devising regulatory
policies in settlement of large-scale litigation disenfranchises constituencies and is therefore anti-democratic.
As I show below, the anti-democratic effects of legislative threats pose even graver concerns.
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In order to maximize social welfare, the deployment of any regulatory mechanism to
control social conduct must satisfy two conditions: (i) it must minimize the intrusion
upon democratic legitimacy; and (ii) it must maximize regulatory efficacy. In other
words, the social benefits from social control must exceed the social cost of using the
particular mechanism to promote social interests.
Against these criteria, the normative analysis outlines the best domain of legislative
threats: that is, a set of conditions and circumstances where the use of legislative threats
is socially-desirable. In keeping, the discussion offers an alternative mechanism that,
while responsive to pressing challenges of social control, is also designed to optimize
the inevitable trade-off between democratic legitimacy and social control efficacy.

A. The Effects of Legislative Threats on Social Control Efficacy
The regulatory efficacy of legislative threats cannot be underestimated. The case
studies examined in Part II and the discussion presented in Part IV have demonstrated
that threat-induced self-regulation and threat-induced co-regulation (i.e., regulatory
bargaining in the shadow of a legislative threats) are functionally-superior to formal
means of social control. Without rehashing the earlier discussion, these comparative
advantages arise from the instrumental capacity of legislative threats to flexibly and
effectively secure vital social interests in circumstances where formal legislation and
regulation are invariably destined to founder. Hence, legislative threats can be viewed
as an inevitable response to the systemic limitations of lawmakers and the inherent
limits of the law.
Indisputably, the efficacy of legislative threats improves upon society’s ability to
control social behavior, increases individual well-being, and enhances social welfare,
thereby making everyone better-off. The corresponding reduction in the social cost of
lawmaking and the significant cost of law enforcement further increases social welfare.

B. The Effects of Legislative Threats on Democratic Legitimacy
Threats to use legislative power to enact unfavorable legislation enable legislators
to force entities—without any resort to law enforcement and adjudication—to comply
with non-majoritarian, possibly-unconstitutional standards of conduct. The use of
legislative threats therefore runs afoul fundamental democratic tenets, including in
particular those upon which the American constitutional democracy is premised. The
hefty toll on the foundations of democracy derives from various effects of legislative
threats on procedural safeguards, institutional constraints, and substantive controls
designed to limit legislative power, heighten the quality of policy-making processes,
and ensure that constitutionally-protected rights and principles are not violated.
Several effects, which I have identified in Part IV, are particularly noteworthy.
First, legislative threats induce compliance with non-majoritarian standards of conduct
that neither reflect the preferences of electoral constituencies, nor incorporate
competing views.504 Second, legislative threats impede the President’s veto power and
504

Commentators maintain that regulators are unquestionably better-positioned than judges to devise
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weaken the White House’s capacity to influence federal policy-making. Third,
legislative threats obviate disputes that might have arisen if the threatened legislation
were enacted, thus precluding adjudication, statutory interpretation, and doctrinal
development. Fourth, legislative threats undermine the judiciary’s ability to ensure that
legislative power is used in accordance with constitutional limits.505 Fifth, legislative
threats disrupt the fine-tuned allocation of powers between the national and state levels
of government, thereby facilitating excessive federal intrusion in state sovereign affairs.
Taken as a whole, these effects empower legislators who, by virtue of threats, are
able to usurp the functions and responsibilities that ordinarily rest with other branches
of government. In other words, by employing legislative threats, legislators encroach
upon the constitutionally-defined territories of Congress, the President, and the
judiciary. Such excessive legislative power is clearly at odds with the most
fundamental principles at work in a system that adheres to separation of powers, where
the use of power is subject to reciprocal checks and balances. Moreover, augmented
legislative power is further irreconcilable with the basic precept that popularly
responsive institutions, not a singular representative, should be in charge of making
substantive value choices.506 For these reasons, such power remains unwarranted
notwithstanding that, (i) the separation of powers and the tendency for Republicans
and Democrats to control different branches of government help produce occasional
policy stalemate; and (ii) that persistent partisan differences may result in awkward
policy compromises and flawed regulatory programs.507 Therefore, even though
legislative threats enhance the society’s capability to control increasingly-complex
conduct and increase social welfare, the legitimacy problem is inevitable. This becomes
ever more palpable in light of Earl Warren’s unambiguous admonition that “[t]he
foundation of our society is the Constitution. It establishes our institutions, defines
their procedures, limits the power of government, guarantees our rights as citizens, and
imposes responsibilities on all of us commensurate with them.”508
Predictably, infringements on democratic ideals and violations of constitutional
principles are viewed unfavorably and therefore decrease social welfare.509 Specifically,
public policy. See, e.g., Schuck, Why Regulating Guns Through Litigation Won’t Work?, supra note 78. Along the
same lines, the legislature is better-positioned than a single legislator to craft public policy and social control.
505 As explained in Part IV(B)(4), legislative threats negatively affect constitutional discourse more broadly. I
submit that even those who believe that worrisome politicization of the judiciary (which expands its power to
adjudicate moral dilemmas and intervene in political controversies) should be dealt with, would concede that
using legislative threats to make public policy and to sidestep the courts is not the proper solution. While
other solutions are certainly conceivable (e.g., judicial nomination procedures), foreclosing judicial review
jeopardizes the institutionally-important function of the judicial pillar of the system.
506 Notably, however, this argument about which branch of government should be doing what does not lend
itself to say anything about which branch is better at doing what, for the allocation of power in a democratic
system does not necessarily mirror the comparative competence of the different institutions but, rather, is
premised on legitimacy considerations. See Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination
of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 159-162 (1993).
507 Cf. Bok, supra note 430, at 410, 418.
508 See Warren, supra note 474, at 165.
509 Several reasons explain why such infringements are patently undesirable. First, infringements may harm
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such intrusion is perceived as a threat to the society’s democratic credo,510 according to
which legal rules allocate decision-making power among government branches.511
Attesting to its importance, “Americans use the rule-of-law idea as a tuning fork to test
not only the performance of their officials but also the quality of their society.”512
Lastly, the democratically-unaccountable and institutionally-unregulated power
that arises from the use of legislative threats distorts private incentives to invest and
innovate, and undermines sustained economic growth.513 Specifically, as power
increases and institutional checks and balances weaken, the societal framework within
which all economic activities take place commensurately becomes less stable. Rising
instability intensifies the risk of economic harm and wealth appropriation to which one
is exposed, alas without a compensatory increase in the rate of return on investment
(which is necessary to offset the effects of increased instability). Under these conditions,
private investment incentives stifle. In other words, break-down in the orderly rule of
law framework, which is necessary to facilitate private investment, is inevitably
followed by a decline in economic growth and diminishing social welfare. Along these
lines, history shows that when given a choice between a state (however exploitative it
might be) and anarchy, individuals have decided for the former, for any set of rules is
better than none.514

C. Normative Assessment and Reform Proposals
How, then, does the pervasive use of legislative threats measure up against the
social interest in maximizing regulatory efficacy and minimizing intrusion upon
democratic principles and institutional legitimacy? On balance, it seems that even
though the benefits of legislative threats may exceed their short-term cost (thus
becoming efficient in the short-term), in the long-term the reverse is true, thus
suggesting that the best domain of legislative threats consists, in fact, of an empty set.515
Stated differently, any increase in individual well-being and aggregate social welfare—
due to the improved efficacy of social control—is inevitably outweighed by a higher
commensurate decrease in well-being and social welfare, reflecting in turn the toll of
violating constitutional and democratic principles; the negative impact on societal
stability and the disincentive on private investment; and the consequential decline in
economic growth.
various interests that individuals care about (e.g., liberty, protection of property, legal certainty, fairness).
Second, a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” reasoning reinforces individuals’ preference for the democratic status
quo over alternative and uncertain states of the world.
510 See Warren, supra note 474, at 167 (“[W]here there is no law there can be no freedom, particularly for the
less advantaged members of society. When law breaks down anarchy prevails”).
511 See Schauer, supra note 506, at 159 (“[R]ules [are] essentially jurisdictional [as they operate] as devices for
determining who should be considering what”).
512 See Mary A. Glendon, A Nation under Lawyers 11 (1994).
513 Cf. North, supra note 453, at 21-24 (the state’s essential role in sustaining stability and growth over time).
514 Id., at 24.
515 Time horizon considerations change the efficiency calculus. See Martin Shubik, On Concepts of Efficiency,
in POLITICAL ECONOMY, OLIGOPOLY AND EXPERIMENTAL GAMES 217, 220 (1999) (discussing long-run efficiency).
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More specifically, the long-term social cost of legislative threats comprises: (i)
higher risk of economic harm and appropriation of individual wealth (including, but
not limited to, any gains realized from improved control of social behavior); (ii) the
higher societal instability, lower investment incentives, and reduced economic growth;
and (iii) the intrinsic decrease in well-being due to violating individuals’ intrinsic
preference for maintaining the constitutional democratic form of government.
Therefore, viewed from a social welfare perspective, the use of explicit or implicit
legislative threats as a means to control social conduct is unambiguously objectionable
and should therefore be outright prohibited.516
Improving society’s ability to control increasingly-complex and informationintensive social activities promises greater regulatory efficiency, lowers compliance
costs, and increases social welfare.517 Hence, the pursuit of effective and normativelyacceptable means of social control (i.e., that maximize regulatory efficacy while
minimizing the toll on democratic legitimacy) warrants consideration. This, because
failure to effectively manage the rapidly-changing and ever more challenging demands
of social control has negative repercussions on economic growth, individual well-being,
and social welfare. The intellectual and practical task should therefore focus on
conceiving social control measures and designing mechanisms that reproduce (albeit, to
the extent possible) the inducement effect of legislative threats. More specifically, that
mechanism should replicate the functional capacity of threats to induce firms to adopt
cost-effective standards of conduct, through either self-regulation or co-regulation,
without compromising democratic processes or violating constitutional principles.
Along these very same lines, Earl Warren has imparted that the problems of social
control “can be remedied and the [regulatory] structure completed in keeping with the
original design … through a rededication to that design which recognize[s] that the
essential ingredient of our system is the co-existence of order and liberty.”518
The solution, I argue, is found in the province of legislation (rather than the threat of
legislation). The nature of the legislation, however, must “change to keep pace with
changes in the economy and society.”519 Specifically, the following generic schema—an
516

Anticipatory threats do not implicate similar concerns and therefore pose no problem from a normative
perspective. If any, anticipatory threats that lead firms to modify their behavior are socially-desirable because
they improve social control and reduce lawmaking and enforcement costs, but involve no undesirable impact.
517 Project XL represents a new approach to improving social control in an attempt to further environmental
and public health objectives. Coordinated by the EPA’s Office of Policy, Economics, and Innovation, the
project is a national pilot program that allows state, local governments, businesses, and organizations to
develop with EPA innovative strategies to test better or more cost-effective ways of achieving environmental
and public health protection. In exchange, the EPA allows the regulatory flexibility during the duration of the
experiment. See Project XL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, at http://www.epa.gov/ProjectXL (last
visited Feb. 17, 2006). Viewed from a social welfare perspective, this approach is inferior to the one I presently
develop. See Thomas P. Lyon, Voluntary versus Mandatory Approaches to Climate Change Mitigation, RESOURCES
FOR THE FUTURE ISSUE BRIEF 03-01 (2003), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-IB-03-01.pdf
(voluntary programs cannot achieve the same level of environmental protection as mandatory programs).
518 See Warren, supra note 474, at 71.
519 See Delivering for the Environment: A 21st Century Approach to Regulation, UNITED KINGDOM ENVIRONMENT
AGENCY (2004), at http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/business/444217/444661/571853/?lang=_e.
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outcome-oriented or risk- focused, deferred-implementation, contingent sunset legislation—is
capable of providing the desired panacea. According to this proposal, legislators enact
into law a legislative measure that specifies policy objectives (i.e., a “purpose clause,” an
“enactment clause”), which targeted entities aim to attain.520 Depending on the features
of the targeted conduct, the legislation may establish outcome-oriented targets (e.g.,
reduction of gas emissions, eradication of steroid use by athletes) or risk-focused targets
(e.g., low risk of money laundering, low risk of e-piracy).521 The legislation also: (i) lay
out implementation procedures, including the adoption of voluntary codes of conduct,
submission of self-regulation proposals for approval by a designated agency, or holding
regulatory bargaining; and (ii) set out compliance deadlines, that is, the time allotted for
submitting a voluntary code or for consummating bargaining. Thus, whereas policy
objectives, implementation procedures, and timetables are fixed in law, businesses are
given broad discretion to decide how it is best to meet these goals.522
Most importantly, in order to ensure sufficient incentives and induce entities to
devise and adopt the most practicable measures capable of achieving the stated policy
objectives, the legislation must contain a default command-and-control regulatory
scheme, the legally-binding effect of which is governed by a front-end deferral clause
and a back-end sunset clause.523 On the front end, the deferral clause postpones the
scheme’s effectiveness until a predetermined future date, thus providing entities with
sufficient time to devise necessary measures and to change their conduct in line with
the statutory targets. On the back end, the sunset clause provides that when the deferral
period comes to an end, the command-and-control scheme will automatically expire

520 It is certainly not uncommon for federal legislation to be introduced by a preamble or a purpose clause
which may identify the problem which the act seeks to remedy or set out the object and purpose of the
legislation. The recently-enacted Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 provides an excellent example. Section 2,
titled “Findings and Purposes,” states that “The purposes of this Act are to assure fair and prompt recoveries
for class members with legitimate claims [and] benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering
consume prices.” See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, PUB. L. NO. 109-2, 5, 119 STAT. 4 (2005). Ordinarily, a
primary source of legislative intention is found in the purpose clause itself.
521 Environmental protection officials in the U.K. are putting to the test the use of outcome-focused and riskbased regulatory methods. See Delivering for the Environment: A 21st Century Approach to Regulation, supra note
519. In keeping with this Article’s normative prescriptions, the British approach is functionally flawed because
it provides no inducement mechanism that is necessary to guarantee the success of such approach.
522 In an attempt to achieve environmental goals without recourse to legislation, the European Commission
has proposed rules in which policy objectives and timetables are fixed in law but the decision how to meet
them is given to businesses. These rules are hoped to encourage voluntary agreements with industry sectors.
See EU-rules for Voluntary Agreements, at http://www.eceee.org/latest_news/2002/news20020717.lasso (last
visited May 1, 2004). As with the U.K. experience, the key problem with these rules, however, is that (absent
legislative threats) they lack any inducement mechanism. My proposal addresses precisely this problem.
523 This element of my proposal—which produces a credible threat—is the key to obtaining regulatory
efficacy. Its absence from several regulatory approaches that have been developed in recent years seems to
explain their failure or sub-optimal results. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based
Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003) (discussing
“management-based regulation,” which directs regulated organizations to engage in a planning process that
aims toward the achievement of public goals).
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(i.e., permanent sunset) or be suspended (i.e., temporary sunset),524 unless entities fail to
change their conduct and adequately meet predetermined targets. This determination
should be made by a designated agency, according to statutorily-defined and
observable criteria.525 While it might be difficult or even impossible to observe internal
practices and compliance measures, it is often possible to monitor certain performance
indicators through inspection, testing, or auditing.526 Furthermore, when monitoring is
not economically- or technologically-feasible, an anti-sunset clause—providing a
presumption against sunset whenever compliance is indeterminate—will shift the
burden of verification, thereby ensuring that the firm voluntarily divulges sufficient
information showing it has adopted measures necessary to achieve the stated objectives.
In distinct contrast to legislative threats, this proposal relies upon formal legislation
as a means to induce firms to adopt cost-effective measures necessary to achieve
predetermined policy objectives. The mechanism harnesses the functional advantages
of threat-induced self-regulation and of threat-induced co-regulation, wherein firms
adopt the most practicable measures in order to secure social goals.527 The latter
becomes possible because the legislation (rather than the threat thereof) imposes a
credible threat on targeted firms, according to which their failure to take proper
measures will activate the command-and-control scheme.528 Given firms’ superior
capacity to self-regulate, any default command-and-control scheme is bound to
decrease their profits and make them worse-off.529 As a result, the threat induces firms
to devise voluntary codes and measures or engage in regulatory bargaining—which are
both better-suited than adversarial legislation to deal with the complexity of social
activities—so as to avert the unfavorable impact of command-and-control
requirements.530 Moreover, the threat may also reinforce firms’ tendency towards
524 Assuming all else remains equal, temporary sunset is preferable to permanent sunset because once the
legislation expires, the incentives to continue incurring the expenses of costly compliance significantly weaken
unless the legislation is re-enacted. Temporary sunset is further desirable because it ensures that targeted
entities continuously evaluate and modify their conduct in order to secure that the stated policy objectives are
achieved even though circumstances change. Cf. A Framework for Evaluating Voluntary Codes, CANADA OFFICE
OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 10 (1998), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/volcodes (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
525 Designating a monitoring agency is not uncommon. The SEC, for example, reviews the intended purpose
and statutory basis of rules proposed by the NYSE. Similarly, the U.K. Treasury was appointed in one case to
review financial institutions’ money-laundering monitoring programs. See Legislation Threat to Banks’ SelfRegulation, supra note 152.
526 See, e.g., Monitoring Proforma for Commercial Leases Code of Practice, supra note 165 (monitors appointed).
527 Similarly to legislative threats, this approach to social control enables “industry partners to identify the
reduction opportunities that best suit their local operations and that provide maximum protection for the
environment.” See Lucent Technologies Signs Voluntary Agreement with EPA, supra note 159.
528 The idea of automatic fulfillment serves as a commitment mechanism that guarantees the credibility of the
threat (and the credibility of the inverse implicit promise). The logic is that when carrying out a threat is
determined ex post by an independent, self-executing mechanism, the threat becomes ex ante credible. See Dixit
& Skeath, supra note 219, at 308.
529 The superiority of self-regulation is discussed and substantiated in Part III(A)(3)(d) above.
530 Adopting voluntary codes may confer additional benefits on targeted firms, as they can point to these
codes as a form of responsible social conduct and enhance their “good corporate citizen” image. See Voluntary
Codes versus Legislation, in TOBACCO IN AUSTRALIA: FACTS AND ISSUES § 15.3 (1995), available at
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organization, so as to reduce the transaction costs of regulatory bargaining and to
increase the likelihood of industry-wide compliance. Lastly, the threat may induce
firms to cooperate with related interest groups and integrate their perspectives into the
process, thus giving them power to influence the ultimate rules of conduct.531
Counter-intuitively, formal legislation may be functionally superior to legislative
threats: while the probabilistic nature of legislative threats may in certain circumstances
render credible threats ineffective (i.e., when the probability that the threatened
legislation will be enacted into law falls below the effectiveness condition), the current
proposal surmounts this problem. Specifically, enacting the command-and-control
scheme into law virtually eliminates the probabilistic feature of the threat to enact
adverse legislation. Then again, that a formal legislation can (at least in theory) be
repealed at any point of time inevitably weakens its inducement effect. Complete
compliance with the stated policies therefore cannot be guaranteed. Lastly, in contrast
to non
- majoritarian legislative threats, formal legislation is generally the result of
political compromises. Hence, compared with legislative threats, formal legislation is
likely to impose more lenient targets and is therefore unlikely to realize maximum gains
from social control.

CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF LAW AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE SECOND-ORDER REGULATORY STATE
Economic growth has many virtues. First and foremost, it increase society’s wealth and,
when wealth is justly distributed in society, it also improves the quality of life and the
standard of living of its members. Growth also entails a rising demand for products
and services, which stimulates employment and encourages capital investment. In
turn, growth has a positive effect on firms’ profits: this increases returns on equity and
lowers the cost of capital, thereby sustaining a continued expansion of the economy.
Lastly, growth offers the government a fiscal dividend from increased tax revenues.
The immense benefits notwithstanding, economic growth and social progress are
not free of problems. Specifically, these processes inevitably increase the speed of
societal change: advances in technology, the wealth of information, the increase in
population, and the constant migration of people and work across borders are but a few
of the far-reaching transformations. Indeed, Nobel laureate economist Douglas North
has forewarned that “the process of growth is inherently destabilizing to a state.”532 In
this respect, the exponential increase in the complexity of activities and the rapid
changes in behavior across all social domains are two major sources of growth-driven
instability. Paradoxically, absent effective social control, the processes that drive welldeveloped market economies towards economic growth, technological advancement,
and cultural progress, may ultimately propel their inevitable economic decline, increase
http://www.quit.org.au/quit/fandi/fandi/c15s3.htm.
531 See David Vogel, Kindred Strangers 73, 74 (1996) (discusses the advantages of cooperative regulation in the
U.K. and its impact on environmental public policy, and noting that “the British have been more successful in
integrating environmental pressure groups” into the regulatory process).
532 See North, supra note 453, at 29.
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social instability, and lead to their gradual societal deterioration.533 Therefore, the more
advanced a society becomes the more demanding is the lawmakers’ role: maintaining
order and eradicating disorder—that is, the sin quo non of continued economic growth—
require exacting social control measures, flexible legal intervention, regulatory acumen
and finesse and, above all, considerable amount of information.
These observations suggest that lawmakers face an overwhelmingly difficult task,
the results of which are consequential to social welfare. In particular, limited data or,
alas, an unstructured wealth of information; the inability to accurately assess risks and
project possible outcomes; insufficient knowledge of relevant processes, relationships,
and methods; and, above all, lack of time and resources—compound the legislators’
responsibility and render sound policy-making all the more challenging. Documenting
the rising challenges to effective control of social conduct, commentators note that as
social reality becomes ever more complex, legal rules become so too.534 Furthermore,
the trend towards legal complexity affects the government, which “grows in complexity
just as our society does.”535 In view of these problems, the law’s tormented regulatory
efficacy and the counter-productiveness of state intervention should surprise none.
In light of the foregoing, it is fair to say that the “[l]aw confronts unprecedented
challenges today as it seeks to order an astonishingly dynamic American society.”536
Moreover, the limits of law and lawmakers are bound to intensify as the activities and
conditions that the law aims to control become unruly. And, as these problems worsen,
it is not implausible that the “law’s legitimacy will erode if and when a widespread
belief takes hold that law has become incompetent in discharging [its] fundamental
function.”537 While this concern is generally valid, it is particularly alarming for
Americans whose diverse aspects of social life and economic activity inextricably
depend on a well-functioning legal system.538 In keeping, litigation “has gone beyond
being a quirk of American culture; it is a central pillar of society.”539
Viewed as a whole, these trends underscore the growing incapacity of the legal
system to deliver its pre-eminent promise: to maintain ordered liberty and to promote
sound public policies. The specific role of the law, as a system of social governance,

533

Cf. Thrainn Eggertsson, Imperfect Institutions: Possibilities and Limits of Reform 9 (2005) (discussing the
effects of imperfect social institutions on economic growth).
534 See Epstein, Simple Rules, supra note 391, at 21-36 (documenting a massive increase over the past decades
in the complexity of rules that govern society).
535 See Warren, supra note 474, at 67.
536 See Schuck, The Limits of Law: Essays on Democratic Governance, supra note 428, at ix.
537 Id. at ix (emphasis in original).
538 Indeed, “the range of matters that can be litigated in the United States is broader than in other nations …
there are few ‘litigation-free’ zones in twenty-first-century American life, domains in which no lawsuit can be
brought. … [T]he United States relies more than any other nation on lawyers, rights, and courts to address
social issues.” See Thomas F. Burke, Lawyers, Lawsuits, and Legal Rights: The Battle Over Litigation in American
Society 3-4 (2002). See also Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 87-92 (1996) (discussing
and explaining the growth in federal courts caseload since 1960).
539 See Paul M. Barrett, Civil Action: Why Americans Look To the Courts to Cure The Nation's Social Ills, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 4, 2000, at A1.
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must therefore be re-examined and, possibly, re-conceptualized, notwithstanding the
durability and robustness of social institutions to environmental change.540 Indeed, the
“compatibility of order and liberty must be relearned and re-earned.”541 For, a society
that fails to take account of these challenges and that disregards the ensuing pathologies
runs the risk of heightened instability, economic stagflation, and social degeneration.
Demonstrating the latter point, it has been suggested that due to failures of its legal
system, the U.S. “was not able to create lasting institutions to match the new structures
and strategies of private firms or to find appropriate social measures to offset the more
destructive aspects of capitalist development.”542
Legislative threats can be regarded as a spontaneous (in the sense of unplanned and
unregulated) response to the functional limits of the law and the systemic failures of
lawmakers, intended to reduce information and transaction costs associated with
policy-making and regulatory bargaining. As such, legislative threats represent an
attempt—albeit, illegitimate and socially -unwarranted—to counteract the very social
processes that undermine society’s ability to adequately control increasingly-complex
and information-inten
sive activities. When using legislative threats, legislators impose
background threats in order to induce entities to change their conduct and secure
predetermined social interests. While legislators do not dictate the ultimate (first-order)
rules of conduct, they lay down background (second-order) rules, pursuant to which
industry-wide and market-driven arrangements are devised
.
Viewed from an even broader perspective, the widespread use of legislative threats
(which has been substantiated by examining ten diverse case studies in Part II) evinces
an increasing tendency towards (what I label) a second-order social control system.
Succinctly, this approach provides that, rather than decide the ultimate standards of
conduct, legislators establish second-order rules designed to create the incentives
necessary to induce entities and groups to adopt socially-desired rules of conduct.543 In
its deepest sense, the second-order approach to control of social behavior highlights the
pluralistic property of—what game-theorists John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern termed—the established order of society, where a comprehensive rigid
system ultimately gives way to efficient particular governance arrangements which
derive from general principles but nevertheless differ in particular respects.544
Inevitably, the trend toward second-order social control diminishes the traditionallyextensive role of the regulatory state; concomitantly, this trend increases the power of

540 See Masahiko Aoki, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis 233-35 (2001) (explaining why specific
institutional designs and governance systems may withstand significant background changes).
541 See Warren, supra note 474, at 71 (emphasis added).
542 See Richard Kozul-Wright, The Myth of Anglo-Saxon Capitalism: Reconstructing the History of the American
State, in Ha-Joon Chang & Robert Rowthorn (eds.), THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN ECONOMIC CHANGE 81 (1995)
(“[M]any of the [U.S.] more creative efforts in support of forging ahead … were in important respects
obstructed by a legal system whose economic responsibilities had diminished significantly”).
543 Instead of creating first-order rules of conduct, lawmakers should establish second-order rules and
second-order incentives, which are necessary to induce entities to self-regulate or co-regulate.
544 See John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 41 (1945).
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groups that, in shaping their regulatory environment, practically turn into islands of
self-regulation.545 Under this approach, the state’s social governance role is practically
relegated to setting policy objectives, while entrusting the design and adoption of
specific measures to the regulated entities.546
The decoupling of policy objectives from policy measures highlights the inevitable
transformation of the post-New Deal regulatory state into a modern second-order
regulatory state. Furthermore, because the second-order approach is predicated upon
regulated entities’ self-regulation or co-regulation (which may require, in turn, longterm investment), the problem of commitment inescapably emerges. Specifically,
unless the state can credibly commit itself to adhere to a consistent policy objectives
through second-order social control measures, the regulated entities will have neither
sufficient incentive to achieve the policy objectives, nor will they change their conduct
or making any necessary investment. In other words, the state’s task is to design
second-order social control and accompany these measures with a credible commitment
to ensuring compliance with the stated policy objectives.547 Counter-intuitively, viewed
this way the legal system exists not to prescribe the ultimate legal rules and standards
but, rather, to facilitate conditions that are necessary to induce entities to regulate
themselves. Lastly, the second-order approach to social control also turns the focus
away from the dichotomous debate on the scope of state regulation (i.e., “nanny state”
vs. “Pontius Pilate state”548), and towards the commitment mechanisms used by the
state to promote social policy interests.
Second-order social control comes in different forms, few of which are presently
noteworthy.549 First, legislators may pass legislation along the lines I have proposed in
Part V. As I have explained earlier, an outcome-oriented or risk-focused, deferredimplementation, contingent sunset legislation will induce the regulated entity to devise
rules and measures that are necessary to achieve the statutory targets, so as to avert the
negative impact of the legislation’s default command-and-control scheme. In this
respect, the legal system facilitates the making of a credible threat.
Second, legislators may pass a legislation that requires entities that transact goods
and services in the market to disclose pertinent information.550 The disclosure of such
545

Cf. Patrick Birkinshaw et al., Government by Moonlight: The Hybrid Parts of the State (1990) (noting that the
state has transferred various public responsibilities to a spectrum of semiautonomous institutions).
546 This argument is consistent with casual observations in other social domains, showing an increased in the
scope and frequency of private-public partnerships. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public
Goods, 13 J. L. & ECON. 295 (1970).
547 Credibility is vital to the regulatory success of second-order social control.
Lack of credibility
undermines the state’s ability to induce entities to change their conduct and make necessary investment. See
Amihai Glazer & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Why Government Succeeds and Why it Fails 75-89, 94-95 (2001).
548 See Ben Leepman, New Curbs Planned on Sweet Sales and Smoking, EVENING STANDARD, March 3, 2004.
549 A comprehensive discussion is found in Schuck, The Limits of Law: Essays on Democratic Governance, supra
note 428, at 187-95.
550 The different variations of Megan’s law, which are designed to provide timely information to the public
on registered sex offenders residing in a specific area, follow this logic. See, e.g., The Jacob Watterling Crimes
against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14071.
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information engenders market forces (e.g., a demand response) which subsequently
induce the regulated entities to change their conduct.551 While the market is already in
existence, this legislation is designed to increase the flow of information and thus
improve the market’s operation.
Third, legislators may pass legislation in order to create a new market and
commoditize a specific good in order to ensure socially-desirable level of production.552
For example, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990553 commoditized pollution rights
(by introducing permits for clean air allowances) in an attempt to reduce acid rain.554
The road pricing proposal that the U.K.’s government recently put forward applies a
similar logic. According to the proposal, a new legislation would introduce a pricing
system that governs the use of road space. The proposal echoes the notion that “[t]he
problem is not a lack of capacity, as most roads are empty most of the time, but rather
the absence of an efficient system for allocating” the use of road space across time.555
Fourth, legislators may pass a risk-management legislation that shifts, reallocates,
spreads, imposes, or even magnifies particular risks with respect to the regulated
entities. This type of legislation employs the idea that the changing the magnitude of
risk affects ex ante incentives and behavior. Moreover, assuming all else remains equal,
the changed magnitude of risk will induce the regulated entity to conduct itself in a
way that minimizes its risk-exposure.556 Observations reveal that “[l]awmakers have
frequently intervene [in risk-management], striving to reduce some types of risk
outright and to reallocate numerous others.”557
The discussion presented in this Article is merely the beginning on a large and difficult
set of problems. The thesis on legislative threats seems to have raised questions that
deserve further study and analysis from both positive and normative perspectives. The
emergence of invisible law, for example, and its effects on the formal legal system and
its economies of scale and network effects, is one such matter. Another issue that lies at
the heart of the matter is the manifold ways in which public officials, including
Information disclosure is one way in which legal rules can reduce transaction costs and facilitate market forces.
551 Cf. Kathleen Segerson, Mandatory vs. Voluntary Approaches to Food Safety, 15 AGRIBUSINESS 53 (1999) (when
information related to food quality is available, market forces may create incentives for voluntary provision of
food safety). Yet, this approach cannot be used in the presence of externalities, as when harm is inflicted on
third-parties who do not participate in the market transaction.
552 Using market mechanisms may offer a superior regulatory strategy to strict command-and-control
regulation. See W. Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Safety at Any Price?, 25 REGULATION 54 (2002).
553 See PUB. L. NO. 101-549, 104 STAT. 2399 (1990).
554 Title IV of the Act also created a market for sulfur oxides as part of a program to cut their production in
half. Rights to produce sulfur oxides were distributed to coal-burning power plants that then had the option of
keeping them or trading them in the market to other producers. See Paul L. Joskow et al., The Market for Sulfur
Dioxide Emissions, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 669 (1998) (discussing conditions necessary to ensure market’s success).
555 See Road Pricing: Driven to Radicalism, THE ECONOMIST, June 11, 2005, at 33.
556 Cf. Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (2002) (showing that whereas
insurance spreads risk and erodes incentives, magnifying risk can strengthen incentives to reduce that risk).
557 See David A. Moss, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager 292-96, 302-311 (2002).
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legislators, can attempt to commit themselves to pursuing a stated social policy, and in
the case of policy bargaining—to standing by their promises once these have been
exchanged.558 The thesis also directs attention to the importance of the design of
political policy-making institutions.559 In view of the intrinsic commitment problem, the
question that merits additional inquiry is how these institutions should be designed so
as to facilitate credible commitments and to bind lawmakers and public officials to their
stated policies across space and time.560 Clearly, these issues implicate the costeffectiveness of social control of behavior and therefore are bound to bear decisive
impact on individual well-being and aggregate social welfare.

558 For a related discussion that focuses on enforceability problems that are associated with political
transactions, see W. Mark Crain et al., Legislative Majorities as Nonsalvageable Assets, 55 S. ECON. J. 303 (1988).
559 Defining legislative organization as the allocation of resources and the assignment of parliamentary rights,
Keith Krehbiel argues that forms of legislative organization bear directly on the performance of individual
legislators and their legislative product (micro-level effects), and on the performance of the legislature within
the political system and on how effectively does a legislation meet its policy objectives (macro-level effects).
See generally Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (1991).
560 This important question has indeed occupied economists. See, e.g., Douglass C. North, Institutions and
Credible Commitment, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 11 (1993) (examining the effects of institutional
design on the credibility of commitments that are necessary to facilitate complex social contracts). See also
Randall S. Kroszner & Raghuram G. Rajan, Organization Structure and Credibility: Evidence from Commercial Bank
Securities Activities before the Glass-Steagall Act, 39 J. MONETARY ECON. 475 (1997) (certain internal structures can
provide an effective commitment mechanism).
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